Talking straight
Dugri speech in Israeli Sabra culture

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

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Foreword

by Dell Hymes

Tamar Katriel's book is fascinating and significant. It shows us a way of speaking that expresses and enacts a modern way of life; a way of speaking, indeed, that, like its nation, has come into being within this century. We learn the life history, even life cycle, of the way of speaking: the taking over of the name from Arabic, where its meaning is to say what is true to the facts, and its redefinition in Hebrew, where its meaning is to say what is true to oneself; a correlative change from a conception among pioneering groups in Palestine of sincerity as self-disclosure to a conception among their Sabra children of sincerity as self-assertion; *dugri* as part of the formation of a new identity in reaction against ways of speaking that had become associated with historical catastrophe; what came to count as *dugri* in the new, dominant, Sabra generation; and the subsequent emergence of public reflection and critique involving the norms of *dugri*, including public debate as to whether the actions of certain officers, particularly a front-line commander, were justified, and the publication of second thoughts years later by a woman famed as a fighter in the War of Independence.

Not least among the values of this book is that it attends to the costs as well as the benefits, or, more neutrally, the trade-offs inherent in the adoption of any one cultural style. "Plain speaking" can go with being "at a loss for words." "Forthrightness" can suggest lack of concern for others. "Sincerity" can be accompanied by a distrust of "style," even a devaluation of speech itself. Too often accounts of language miss its ambiguity as a resource, praising or blaming and disturbing its powers, but neglecting the task of discovering the balance sheet in actual lives.

This rich account comes from someone who is a participant in the way of life described, yet never quite wholly within it. As Katriel says of herself, she has "one foot in, one foot out." That can be an uncomfortable way to live, yet a marvelous opportunity for understanding. Shifting one's weight from foot to foot allows access to insight and texture when poised on the foot within, and perspective and analysis when poised on the foot without.

Such perspective and analysis are especially important in a case such as this. Often enough a community's assumptions and beliefs about speech are tacit, unexamined, and unnamed: Who can or should or must not speak to whom? What can be spoken about, and what cannot? What obligations do participants in a state of talk have to each other? Do questions need or need not to be answered at the time? Does one wait for a turn or jump in? What counts as politeness, rudeness, suspicious ingratiation, or subservience? What manners of speaking, what voices, are admired or disdained? Matters such as these, the constant stuff of interaction, may be taken for granted. In such a case the effort to gain understanding from within may dominate: how to identify and connect details that together point to what is taken for granted, so that one can grasp what people regard as appropriate means of speech, and what meanings those means have for them. If a way of speaking discerned is to have a name, the name of the group must serve (e.g., "a Wasco way of speaking") or the investigator must do the christening (e.g., "bipolar perfectivity in Wasco grammar and speaking").

This way of speaking is not one of those that require an outside view to infer their presence. Israeli society itself discusses *dugri*. One can ask about it by name. The way of speaking can take the form of a named, specific type of speech event, a *dugri* talk. The centrality of *dugri* enables Katriel to elicit lively comments and to draw on a public record. Shifts in phrases and contexts referring to *dugri* can be traced. There still remains the difficult task of identifying and connecting the details of what is said, so as to discover and integrate the meanings of *dugri*. Here the outside footing comes significantly into play. Katriel draws on several fields, including symbolic anthropology, literary criticism, and sociolinguistics. Her use of such a wide range of work is itself a contribution, a fruitful example of the integrative scope required of work that seeks to understand the meanings given speech in different societies and histories.

Having established five dimensions or clusters of meaning for *dugri* – sincerity, assertiveness, naturalness, solidarity, and antistyle – Katriel describes the place of *dugri* in verbal interaction. The use of a *dugri* marker is contrasted with the effects of other ways of defining an interaction. The nature of *dugri* as a way of foregrounding concern with face and as a ceremonial idiom symbolizing personal integrity is explored. Instances of *dugri* talk are analyzed as ritual with reference to general components of speech events. Katriel then focuses on two instances that had the status of public events, analyzing them as social drama. Here her experience as a member of the culture no doubt is especially helpful.

This rich picture is not the end of the story. The dialectic of inside and outside footings is carried to completion by a chapter that places *dugri* in cross-cultural perspective. Katriel has already shown sensitivity to misunderstanding between people who have different ways of speaking, both between Sabras and others within Israeli society, and between Israelis and others. Now she seeks a general grounding for such differences. She considers male "Tough Talk" in the United States; the directness of women in Madagascar; the uses of indirectness among the Ilongot, a people of the Philippines; and indirectness among Arabs. Common dimensions and differences are sorted out. The nature of *dugri* is further illuminated by contrast and comparison, and *dugri* is used to contribute to such general understanding of human ways of speaking as we now have.

This comparative chapter shows well the need for a series such as that in which this study takes its place. Katriel displays throughout her study a fine synthesis of the footings of insider and outsider. Personal knowledge and access are intimately combined with analytic frameworks and insights from several fields; and she knows the further step of this dialectic, in which the individual study, having drawn on general frameworks, makes its own corrective contribution to them. At this last stage, however, there is only a little in the way of comparable studies. In work on the nature of language structure today we increasingly see the depth of insight that comes from close comparison of individual cases and types, but those who seek to understand language this way have a considerable wealth of individual analyses on which to draw. Not so those who seek to understand the use of language and its meanings to those who use it. There are few comparable cases. General frameworks for comparison are likely to be unwittingly ethnocentric and a priori, if they have arisen through philosophical or formalistic speculation, or to be little more than first passes at complexity, if they have arisen through attention to cross-cultural data. The frequency of dichotomies is evidence of this. The concepts of "direct" and "indirect" with which Katriel must work are themselves examples. The contrast may mean different things in different places. Only studies as thorough as this one can show what specific practices and attitudes are actually present in a given case. Katriel herself makes a valuable contribution by spelling out the five dimensions in terms of which *dugri* itself can be said to be "direct."

Two decades ago, to be sure, there was almost nothing at all on which to build a general understanding of the place of speaking in human life. Now there is a generation that has begun to build the basic knowledge that is needed. There are valuable studies by such scholars as Roger Abrahams, Ellen Basso, Keith Basso, Richard Bauman, Jack Bilmes,

Charles Briggs, Regna Darnell, Sheila Dauer, Nancy Dorian, Joseph Errington, Steven Feld, Henry Glassie, Gary Gossen, John Gumperz, Shirley Heath, Judith Irvine, Ann Kibbey, Thomas Kochman, Joel Kuipers, Jacqueline Lindenfeld, John McDowell, Leslie Milroy, Michael Moerman, William O'Barr, Elinor Ochs, Susan Philips, Gerald Philipsen, Michelle Rosaldo, Ron and Suzanne Scollon, Joel Sherzer, Brian Stross, Deborah Tannen, Dennis Tedlock, Greg Urban, and others. From such work we will be able to establish the range of ways of speaking in the world, the possible types, their features and dimensions, the sequences of change among them, and their connections with modes of production and worldviews, exploitation and rebellion, oppression and accomplishment.

Tamar Katriel's study takes a special place among these, containing, as it does, so rich a picture of both meaning and change, and exemplifying so well the three moments of the dialectic necessary to such work – descriptive framework, close analysis of the particular case, and extension or revision of the comparative framework that ultimately will constitute the theory of such matters.

Acknowledgments

I am grateful to the many individuals who, in planned encounters or casual conversations, shared their perceptions and insights with me and became partners in the excitement of reflecting on our shared or different cultural worlds. My long conversations with Netiva Ben-Yehuda, author of *1948 – Between Calendars*, stand out as special moments in this exploratory process.

At the University of Washington, Seattle, I am deeply indebted to Gerry Philipsen of the Department of Speech Communication, who acted as advisor on the dissertation on which this study is based, and to Valentine Daniel of the Department of Anthropology. Their wise counsel and the example of their scholarship will be with me for many years to come. At the University of Haifa, Israel, I am especially indebted to Pearla Nesher of the School of Education, for her continuing support of my work from the very first steps I took in research, including many helpful discussions of this particular study.

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I owe a special debt of gratitude to the late Professor Victor Turner for his warm endorsement of this work, to the reviewer of the manuscript for much help in bringing it to its present state, and to Susan Allen Mills for her forthcoming and effective editorial guidance.

My very special thanks go to my husband, Jacob, for making my work on this project possible and for sharing in it wholeheartedly in many ways, and to my children, Irit and Hagai, for their unusual understanding and sweetness.

These pages are dedicated to the memory of my parents, Lisa and Eliezer Epstein, whose struggle to re-create a humane and compassionate world out of the ashes of their past has shaped my search for personal meaning and my study of human expression.

Haifa T. K.

not cease from exploration
end of all our exploring
to arrive where we started
ow the place for the first time.
liot, "Little Gidding," *Four Quartets*

1. Introduction

This study is concerned with a culturally situated way of speak
dugri speech, translatable as straight or direct talk, and th
world in which it finds its place. The directness of mode that c
dugri way of speaking is analyzed with reference to the eth
Sabra subculture of modern Israel – that is, the subculture
born Israelis of Jewish heritage, mainly of European desce
became crystallized in the prestate period of the 1930s and
is still influential in contemporary Israeli culture.

The notion of a cultural *ethos*, which refers to the affective p
the moral and aesthetic "tone" of a culture, is often invoke
explicitly or implicitly – in discussions of cross-cultural diff
interactional strategies.[1] Most typically, these strategies are lin
realized as devices associated with the direct–indirect dim
speech. For example, Blum-Kulka (1984:4) remarks, with re
Hebrew discourse, that a major factor that can influence the a
of principles of politeness "can be the general 'ethos' of one
compared to another one." Her description of Israeli direc
resents typical comments concerning the Israeli communicat

Generally speaking, Israeli society seems to allow for even more d
social interaction than the American one (Levenston 1970:11). It is
uncommon to hear people around a conference table in Israel disa
with each other bluntly (saying things like 'ata to'e' – you're wron
nachon!' – not true). Such directness in a similar setting in Americ
would be probably considered rude. Similarly, refusal is often expr
Israel by a curt "no"; the same 'lo' (no) can also be heard as a res
requests phrased as requests for information (Do you have such an
shops, hotels and restaurants, a habit that probably contributes to
popular view about Israelis' lack of politeness.[2]

Similar comments and examples are frequently encounte
cussions of the Israeli scene by both insiders and outsider
references to Israeli directness of style (or bluntness, or fort
to mention but two differently colored alternative labels) are
the folk linguistics of Israeli discourse. Although Israeli st

as alien to Euro-American ones as it probably is to members
ner cultures (cf. the discussion of American "Tough Talk"
6), misperceptions in intercultural contacts between Amer-
raelis nevertheless abound: Americans tend to interpret the
oliteness formulas in Israeli speech as rudeness, and Israelis
erience the standard American use of these conventions as
nsincerity.[3]

pproaches may be taken to the exploration of intercultural
in relation to directness of speech. I chose to focus not on
peech acts and the rules governing their use but rather on a
istinctive speech style, *dugri* speech – identified and circum-
he label given to it by cultural members – and to make it
f an ethnographic inquiry. Thus, rather than taking the ethos
ch community as a cultural given, I sought to "exoticize" it
its implications within the context of an ethnolinguistically
dy.[4]

ng the notion of cultural ethos to the study of ways of speak-
o a distinction drawn by Hymes (1974b) – one that is familiar
domains of expressive culture such as music, dance, and
he distinction between two principles of form: the principle
and the principle of mode. The notion of *stylistic structure*
e organization of elements into recognizable larger units.
ctures in language involve the organization of speech ele-
rms of one or more defining principles of recurrence and/or
l and/or opposition. The second principle of form, that of
de, has to do with the tonal coloring given to spoken per-
their feeling tone. The dimension of directness, which con-
re, is a primary example of the stylistic category of mode.[5]
ltural form, such as narrative or ritual, combines a stylistic
d a stylistic mode. The mode of a cultural way of speaking
s the culture's ethos, its moral and aesthetic tone. It is ar-
structured units of interaction such as the interactional pat-
lying interpersonal rituals of various kinds. *Dugri* speech is
r its mode, as, I believe, is generally the case with cultural
aking whose employment comes to be considered a symbolic
nifesting the speaker's self-identification with the ethos of
[6]

of the *dugri* way of speaking, then, seeks to encompass the
issues related to the understanding of speech performances
laimed to be *dugri* so that it can offer a persuasive account
neans for members of the culture to speak or be spoken to
nanner, to fail to do so, or to claim to have been *dugri* on
asion. My account should, for example, clarify what was

conveyed to Israeli readers by a newspaper headline that cited
President Herzog as having said, on completing a ten-day tou
United States, "I spoke *dugri* to the American Jews," referrin
outspoken urge for *Aliya* (Y. Atlas, *Yedioth Ahronoth*, Nov. 25
It should clarify why some of the people who drew my attentio
article did so with a glint in their eyes, playfully imitating the pre
Anglo-Saxon, non-Sabra accent, which is felt to counteract the
the identity-claim ordinarily implied by the use of the *dugri* spee

In describing *dugri* speech, I refer to it either as a speech sty
a way of speaking. The point I seek to emphasize is that my co
equally with the means of speech and with the social meanings co
Hymes's (1974b) coinage of the term "ways of speaking" as a
sociolinguistic theory was geared to just such a broad conceptio
study of language in social life. This term is an amalgamatio
Whorfian notion of "fashions of speaking," which refers to the
means and their organization, and the commonsense notion o
of life," which requires further specification in terms of cultural
to be meaningfully applied in the study of particular ways of sp

The view of speech style informing this study – its cultural an
and its identity-function – is not new. It harks back to Burke's (
characterization of style as ingratiation, as the "suggestive pr
saying the right thing'." Burke illustrates the possibility of styli
ure, of what he calls "style gone wrong," with reference to the di
of style that is our focus here:

> A plain-spoken people will distrust a man who, bred to different way
> statement, is overly polite and deferential with them, and tends to pu
> command in the form of questions . . . They may even suspect him of
> sneakiness. He, conversely, may consider their blunt manner a bit bo
> even at times when they are almost consumed with humility.

In Burke's terms, then, this study had its genesis in intuitive
tions of "style gone wrong" in encounters of Sabras with cultu
siders. However, although such instances of miscommunicatio
in this analysis, its main thrust is an attempt to understand t
way of speaking from the "native's point of view" (Geertz 1
part of cultural members' own "drama of character"[7]

Some of my informants and readers claimed that there has
considerable erosion in the cultural standing of the Sabra ethos
as of *dugri* speech, in recent years. This, indeed seems to be t
since both the rise and fall of *dugri* speech are part of broad
cultural trends. It is all the more reason, I maintain, to catch the
they are still around, if we wish to understand not only past and
but also future developments on the Israeli cultural scene.

fore I turn to the story of *dugri* speech, let me make a few comments
out the research approach utilized in this study.

First of all, my own position as researcher vis-à-vis the culture I have
died deserves some comment. I came to Israel at a young age and
e lived on the fringes of the Sabra culture for most of my life. Defining
mbership in a speech community is an intricate matter. Drawing on
mes's (1974a:50–1) distinction between membership and participa
in a speech community, I would say that I do not consider myself
ll-fledged member of the Sabra culture and am not as fluent in the
ri style as I might have wished. I was, however, definitely raised in
pirit, at least as far as my early schooling and peer-group experiences
an Israeli kibbutz went, and have been a participant in *dugri* ex-
nges many times. As I discovered in the course of this study, my
newhat uneasy response to the Sabra ethos and to the *dugri* way of
aking was echoed in the talk of other virtual Sabras like myself who
e raised in immigrant homes of European origin. Uncertainly strad-
g incompatible cultural worlds (their own and their parents'), non-
nt speakers of at least one "home language," their fluent Hebrew
ely hiding traces of an unidentifiable foreign accent, virtual Sabras
quently carry their acculturation experiences into adulthood. Dis-
sions of *dugri* speech tended to bring them to the fore, making explicit
vivid the link between *dugri* speech, the Sabra ethos, and the identity
blems associated with it. For me, then, participant observation in
Sabra world – one foot in, one foot out – started early.

Making one's home one's field has both disadvantages and special
ards. The main disadvantage has to do with the absence of the
ebrated culture shock anthropologists experience in foreign fields,
ch has the power of jolting one out of one's accustomed ways of
king at the world. The special reward attending such work has been
nted out by Schneider (1976:212):

> eed, the whole enterprise in cultural analysis starts with our own society
> point of departure, not only because we know it (or can know it) in both
> racy and depth, but because it is precisely our own society which is
> tematic in our lives.

n studying one's own culture, the initial culture shock, usually per-
ted with a sense of estrangement and disorientation, is exchanged
another shock, probably milder but also more enduring; I think of
the shock of self-recognition so aptly described by T. S. Eliot as
blend of familiarity and strangeness, which is the experience of
ving at the point where our exploration began ("Home is where one
ts from," he says in another line of the *Four Quartets*) and knowing
place for the first time.

The fresh look at a highly familiar culture involves a re
what Geertz (1973) calls the *experience-near* concepts of
bers (as reflected in their native terms). This reorien
achieved through an appeal to appropriate *experience-d*
lytic, concepts in the process of interpretation. The wea
two types of concepts in an interpretive account is at th
ethnographer's dilemma.

Different stages of the research process involve differ
on either experience-near or experience-distant concepts
tification phase, that initial phase in which the phenome
vestigation is delineated and its boundaries are tentativ
informants' experience-near concepts play a central role
case when I tried to determine what the metacommunicat
refers to, the meanings it has for its users, the forms it
functions it performs. This involved a close, linguisticall
amination of the uses of *dugri* as a modifier, as an indica
prefixing an utterance, and in its nominalized form, *dug*

The ethnographic interviews provided a rich source
near concepts related to the meanings of *dugri* speech. I h
many exploratory informal interviews, highly conversation
and tone, discussing *dugri* speech and whatever issues i
to be relevant to it. Some of the interviews were conduc
to-one basis, but many also took place in small groups
natural part of the group's social exchange. This initial
pletely open, exploratory conversations with native-bo
convinced me not only that *dugri* speech is part of Isra
world, but also that it occupies a very special place in
versations were always animated, often accompanied by
citement that I later came to associate with the shock of se
The people who took part in those conversations were kee
some returned weeks later with additional examples, s
flections; a small minority became defensive. Themes v
and observations made by one informant were echoed ar
others. Patterns began to emerge, and as they did, exp
concepts were brought more and more into play. By and
realize that talking about *dugri* speech in the context
Israeli society amounts to no less than exploring, often a
who we are or would like to be as Israelis, as modern Je

In addition to gathering information from native Israel
themselves as members of, or at least participants in, the
I discussed *dugri* speech with Israelis of European desc
to Israel at an older age, and who identify themselves as
[people who would be prone to say "*hasabres haele*" (th

n tone Sabras have learned to dislike]. Their perception of *dugri* speech s very different from that of the natives. They did not share Sabras' valuation of the *dugri* way of speaking and indicated high sensitivity to ts blunt edge. Moreover, they were largely unaware of the meanings associated with *dugri* speech by native-Israeli informants. This was one example of the miscommunication, of "style gone wrong," that is associated with the *dugri* style and that often occurs between members of he same society, even between different generations within the same family.

Having identified general themes and attitudes in relation to *dugri* speech, I constructed a semistructured questionnaire (see the Appendix) and conducted fifty-four additional interviews with native Israelis in an attempt to elicit further examples and linguistic judgments concerning he distribution and uses of *dugri* speech. Because I knew that the word *dugri* is a borrowing from Arabic, I interviewed twenty native speakers of Israeli Arabic about the meanings and uses of the word in their speech. This proved a fortunate move, since it turned out that there are interesting differences between the uses of *dugri* in colloquial Hebrew and colloquial Arabic. An account of these differences and their implications or an appreciation of the cultural significance of *dugri* speech in the Sabra culture is given in Chapter 2. Different conceptions of *dugri* speech n these two speech communities are another example of the possibility of miscommunication under the same label, one that may have considerable social and political consequences.

The casual conversations, the anecdotal evidence, and the semistructured interviews together produced a rich source of data for the analytic description of the *dugri* way of speaking. The cultural code formulated by a process of abstraction from observed instances of *dugri* speech, or from talk about it, could then be applied to the understanding of various public "cultural texts" (Varenne 1977). The fact that the *dugri* idiom could be used to make sense of some recent dramatic events in the country indicates that the code and the meanings associated with it have wide currency in Israel, despite recent changes in its standing.

The semistructured phase of the inquiry was followed by several rounds of discussion with native Israeli informants as well as scholarly audiences. I presented my analyses and interpretations and received comments and responses, which helped to refine my account further. Generally speaking, I was encouraged by the high incidence of responses manifesting what Tannen (1981b) calls the "aha factor," the sense of self-recognition and enhanced self-understanding expressed by both lay and scholarly audiences on hearing my version of the story of *dugri* speech.

These discussions ended my interpretive movement from experience-

near to experience-distant and back to experiencenea time explicitly elaborated as best I could. The moveme perience of social life to its analytic contemplation is, complex and less linear than the foregoing description Turner (1974:3) speaks to this issue when he says that in we frequently find that what tends to become useful an a theorist's thinking is not his system as a whole, but rath ideas, his flashes of insight taken out of systemic co scattered data."

Thus, throughout this study I have taken the libe various theorists' ideas, flashes of insight and suggesti have applied them as best I could to my own and my tuitions, hunches, and interpretative accounts. Those th my rather amorphous "field experience," as well as comments, have been woven into my account of *dugri*

The study is organized as follows:

Chapter 2 discusses the semantic journey of *dugri* Hebrew and identifies five distinguishable, though inter of meanings associated by native informants with the *du* ing and the ethos of the Sabra culture: the assertivenes naturalness clusters of meanings; the spirit of *commu* titude of "antistyle." The particular interpretations giv within the sociohistorical context of the Sabra culture

Chapter 3 examines the functional characteristics o an interactional code within an elaborated version of work" model and traces some recent stylistic and soci associated with this code.

Chapter 4 describes a speech context in which the its quintessential place: the speech event referred to i "*siha dugrit*," a *dugri* talk. It is treated as a verbal a the context of which the cultural identity of the Sabra becomes dramatized and reaffirmed.

Chapter 5 considers two public dramas that took pla time of the study. The first, the publication in 1981 Yehuda's book, *1948 – Between Calendars*, concerned related to the Israeli War of Independence by a legend of the time – an act cast in literary form thirtythre event. The second, known as the Eli Geva Affair, summer of 1982 and involved a sharp protest voice Geva, a brilliant frontline commander, during the sieg Lebanon War. These two events – the publication of withdrawal of Eli Geva from active duty, and the publ triggered – are examined from one particular angle:

the meanings and forms that I have found to be associated with the *dugri* way of speaking.

Chapter 6 places *dugri* speech in a cross-cultural perspective, drawing some comparisons with American "Tough Talk" as discussed by Gibson (1966); with the indirection of Malagasy male speech in contrast to the directness of Malagasy female speech (Keenan 1974); with the indirection of traditional Ilongot oratory in contrast to the direct mode employed by the new Ilongot administrators (Rosaldo 1973); and with a study in progress that deals with the Arab ethos of indirectness. This chapter raises questions of controlled comparison and suggests a preliminary framework for a typological analysis of speech styles along the direct-indirect dimension.

Chapter 7 concludes this study, offering some reflections on its findings, its tenor, and its methodology.

All the translations from Hebrew are my own. In order not to overburden the text, non-English words are written in a simplified transliteration. Although the *g* in Arabic *dugri* is a glottal rather than a velar sound (as in Hebrew), they will be written the same.

2. The cultural meanings of *dugri* speech

In his book *Philosophical Hermeneutics* (1976:72), th
German philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer underscor
reward of an interpretive study of common expression

> Common expressions are not simply the dead remains of lin
> have become figurative. They are, at the same time, the her
> common spirit and if we only understand rightly and penetra
> richness of meaning, they can make this common spirit perc

This chapter seeks to penetrate the covert richness
derlying the word *dugri*, which is a common expressi
Israeli Hebrew in more than one sense: It is both rou
in everyday casual speech and considered a slang word c
sion." In this analysis, I try to delineate the cultural mea
with the *dugri* way of speaking, that is, to explicate t
tributed to it by Sabra informants.

This exploration follows Schneider's (1976) and Ge
proach, which views culture as a system of symbols and
having identified *dugri* speech as a central symbolic ex
culture, I proceed to consider the meanings associated
to understand its significance. As a cultural form, it is
of the symbol system of Zionist socialism: It shares man
meanings conveyed by more deliberately constructed
sions such as reinterpreted traditional festivities, newl
and so on.[1]

The symbolic meanings of *dugri* speech have been in
from my reading of the data. As central dimensions the
values provide a cultural warrant for the employment
a way of speaking that challenges the common assump
man 1967) that all interaction is grounded in a rule of
– a rule that requires interactants to abide by the unsp
to maintain their own face and help maintain each oth
municative exchanges.

The first section of this chapter traces the semantic shift that has accompanied the introduction of the term *dugri* from colloquial Arabic to colloquial Hebrew. That a meaning-shift has occurred is hardly surprising: This is a common phenomenon in language borrowing, not least in the development of slang. This point is abundantly illustrated in Sornig's (1981) study of lexical innovation, where he underlines the prevalence of borrowing in the development of slang, the prevalence of semantic shifts in lexical innovation, and the sociocultural roots of such shifts [cf. also Sappan (1963) for a discussion of Hebrew examples]. For our purposes, the particular direction this shift has taken is highly instructive, since it brings out some of the meanings and values that are central to the Sabra culture.

The following sections discuss the meaning clusters associated with *dugri* speech: the assertiveness cluster, the sincerity cluster, the naturalness cluster, the spirit of *communitas*, and the attitude of "antistyle." Each of these domains of meaning is considered with reference to the sociocultural matrix of the *dugri* way of speaking. Taken together, I hope that they will provide the insights required for an understanding of *dugri* speech as a culturally situated, symbolic performance.

The semantic journey of *dugri*

The word *dugri* is explicated in a dictionary of Hebrew slang compiled by Ben-Amotz and Ben-Yehuda (1972–82). It is said to be derived from Arabic and to have two meanings:

1. Speaking straight to the point, for example, "I'll tell you *dugri*, I can't stand your face"; or, "There stormed in the courageous young man with his *dugri* and embarrassing way of speaking" (quoted from an article by S. Keshet, Haaretz, Dec. 26, 1969).
2. A label for an honest person who speaks straight to the point, for example, "He is always *dugri*."

Like many other slang expressions in colloquial Hebrew (Sappan 1966), the word *dugri* was borrowed from spoken colloquial Arabic. As Oring (1981) points out with reference to the Arabic word *chizbat* (lie), which was used to label a native-Israeli oral tradition during the prestate years, the Arabs were regarded as the behavioral model for the native-Israeli Jews, or Sabras (another Arabic word). They were felt to be part of the local landscape in a way the newcomers from Europe could not possibly be. Thus, Arabic words were borrowed along with Arab mannerisms and customs. It is, therefore, interesting to note that the term *dugri* has undergone a considerable semantic shift on its route from Arabic to Hebrew.[2]

According to my Arab informants, the word *dugri* i
a pure Arabic word but is borrowed from Turkish. It
related to the Turkish word *dogru*, which, as several
native speakers of Turkish have persuaded me, is ge
way *dugri* is used in Israeli Arabic. The meaning shif
is thus specifically related to the way *dugri* has come
loquial Hebrew.[3]

First of all, there has been a narrowing in the applic
dugri in Hebrew. In Arabic it is used both literally to de
(e.g., a straight line or straight road) and metaphorical
of a person who is *dugri* (roughly, honest and honorab
as in "Speak the *dugri*" (i.e., tell the truth, don't lie)

Only the metaphorical usage has been imported into
restricted sense, the term *dugri* can be used as an attr
person (as in "He is *dugri*"), a way of speaking (as i
i.e., in a straightforward way), a speech event (as in "
a human bond (as in "a *dugri* relationship," implying
which *dugri* speech is the rule). In its use as an attrib
both adjectivally and adverbially – the word *dugri* i
said to color or structure the interpersonal domain: i
cerned with persons and their interrelations as behavi
in and through speech.

Another more subtle difference concerns the cultural
speech in Hebrew as compared to Arabic. The differe
summed up as follows: Although both my Hebrew spea
speaking informants explicated the term *dugri* as refer
of honesty, to Hebrew speakers it meant honesty in t
true to oneself, being sincere, whereas to Arabic speak
true to the facts.

Dugri speech in Hebrew involves a conscious su
concerns so as to allow the free expression of the sp
opinions, or preferences that might pose a threat to th
is often done by prefixing one's utterance with a phrase
("ani agid leha *dugri*"), as in "I'll tell you *dugri*, I d
you put it." This kind of response may occur in co
position in casual exchanges and is not necessarily ass
flict (even a *dugri* talk, which is an agonistic ritual
affectively colored by anger but rather by a sense of c
Chapter 4).

The purpose of speaking *dugri* in Arabic is to re
factual information that the speaker may be tempt
embellish. Thus, a young unmarried Arab woman said
the *dugri*" with her parents when she told them she

viv to join a student demonstration without letting them know. She plained: "I could have told them that I had stayed at my girlfriend's ome. But I thought in the long run it is better to speak the *dugri* to em." When I asked my Arab informants about a prefix in Arabic that ould be analogous to "I'll tell you *dugri*" in Hebrew, they produced construction that was slightly but tellingly different; it often took the rm of a request: "*Beddak eddugri?*" ("Do you want the *dugri*?") Here, in the former example, *dugri* functions as a noun, not an adverb of anner. An utterance of this kind may occur in disputes and is not kely to appear at the opening of an exchange. It tends to be warranted the escalation of anger or when a point is reached at which conalment becomes useless. In such a situation, as judged by the speaker, e can legitimately suspend the general rules of prudence and tactfulss that underlie the customary use of indirect forms of discourse. These ltural rules reflect the Arab highly valorized ethos of *musayra* (mean g roughly to go along, to humor, to accommodate oneself), which is scussed further in Chapter 6.

In Hebrew, *dugri* speech is contrasted to lack of sincerity, hypocrisy, lking behind one's back, or at times diplomacy. In Arabic, speaking e *dugri* stands opposed to concealment in an attempt to mislead or in e service of *musayra*. What stands in the way of truth-speaking in the ebrew *dugri* mode is sensitivity to face concerns, interpreted as lack courage and integrity. What stands in the way of truth speaking in e Arabic *dugri* mode is the high value placed on smoothness in inrpersonal encounters as well as the everpresent temptation to embellish the facts for rhetorical purposes in the service of self-interest.

It is therefore not surprising that some of the *dugri* utterances given by my rab informants could not be characterized in Hebrew by the term *dugri*. or example, one Arab informant cited her use of *dugri* in a confrontation th her husband in which she defended herself, saying: "I am speaking the *gri*. Everything happened exactly as I told you." That is, she affirmed that e had been telling the truth. Another case reported by an Arab informant volved a discussion between a teacher and a school principal; the teacher ported an incident that had occurred in his absence, concluding: "I'm eaking the *dugri*. It did not happen the way you've been told." Comenting on her use of *dugri* in this case, the teacher said: "It is my class and now better than anybody else what goes on there." That is, she referred her speech as *dugri* to underline her credibility as a witness, as someone ho has access to the facts.

useful way of formulating the differences between colloquial Hebrew d Arabic *dugri* utterances is to consider them within the classificatory

framework developed by Stiles (1981) for the study of i speech-acts. He distinguishes different act categories, v *verbal response modes (VRMs)*, according to two princ fication: source of experience and frame of reference.

The notion of *source of experience* (refers to whethe concerns the speaker's or the other's ideas, feelings, or notion of *frame of reference* refers to whether the exper central topic of the utterance) is expressed from the viewpoint or from a viewpoint shared with the other. A crence is the constellation of ideas, feelings, or memori experience the meaning it has in a particular utteranc notion of *focus* here refers to whether the speaker impl to know what the other's experience or frame of referen be. An utterance is focused on the speaker if it does n a presumption. Stiles summarizes his proposal in the t tersubjective elocutionary acts shown in Figure 1 (the p evant to our concern).

Thus, *dugri* speech in both Hebrew and Arabic usage conduct that adheres to the norm of truthful expressior according to Winch (1972), is fundamental to human utterances, however, constitute different types of speech languages: Hebrew *dugri* utterances are "disclosures" onomy, whereas in Arabic they are "edifications." This comes vividly apparent in reading Stiles's description of of speech acts.

1. A disclosure is described as a report of the speak experiences – thoughts, feelings, and so on. To disclosure must be sincere, the orientation of sinc speaker's private frame of reference. This orientatio Hebrew *dugri* idiom. As we shall see, however, wh a particular interpretation of the idea of sincerity constrains the kinds of disclosive acts that would ap under the label of *dugriyut* (the quality of being *du*
2. An edification is said to concern the speaker's expe of his or her knowledge of what happened. No spec is made about the intended recipient's private expe commonly shared frame of reference is "objective is the topic of utterances involving statements of descriptions, and characterizations. To be felicitous must be true; the reported information must fit the In claiming to speak the *dugri*, an Arabic speake imparting true information, facts about an objective



the *dugri*-speaking Sabra claims to be sincere in expressing
...al thoughts.

Arabic and Hebrew, *dugri* speech names a linguistic perfor-
... would fall under the rubric of the "bald-on-record" strategy
...minology proposed by Brown and Levinson (1978), that is,
...manifests adherence to Grice's (1975) well-known maxims of
...ruthfulness), Quantity (informativeness), Relevance, and
...larity). The *dugri* speaker in either language thus tells the
...ds beating around the bush, and speaks to the point. However,

the cultural meanings attending *dugri* speech as an embodime...
"bald-on-record" strategy par excellence in these two langu...
quite distinct, and must be captured with reference to the la...
ural context in each case. This chapter does so with referen...
dugri mode in colloquial Hebrew.

A different meaning of Arabic *dugri*, which is not shared by its ... counterpart, is fairness or impartiality in judgment or in the t... of others. An example illustrating this usage was given by a tea... told me that she had been asked by her principal to serve as ... a contest between two classes. He accompanied his request ... comment: "But you must be *dugri* between them." He had wa... against the temptation to favor one class over the other. ... another informant noted that a parent must be *dugri* amon... children, not favoring one over the rest. The construction *dug*... is not acceptable in Hebrew, and *dugri* is never used in the ... "fair." However, most interestingly, the English word "fair" ... etrated colloquial Hebrew (as have many other English words ... having replaced Arabic and Yiddish as the main source of ... tion owing in contemporary Hebrew slang). Initially, it was ... with its English meaning, but recently it has also come to b... place of *dugri*. Thus, rather to my surprise, some of my yo... formants used "I'll tell you fair" in lingnistic contexts in which ... as many of the older informants, would have used "I'll tell yo...

Moreover, what appear to be analogous uses of *dugri* may h... pletely different meanings in Hebrew and Arabic utterances. ... in Arabic the sentence "He is *dugri*" means that a person gene... the truth impartially, in Hebrew it means that the speaker te... direct and straightforward in expressing his noncomplimentary ... or opinions. In Arabic, *dugri* speech is viewed not as a matte... but of content, whereas in Hebrew it is definitely a matte... (associated with particular types of communicative effects). ... counts for the fact that speakers of Arabic could not accept the ... "He speaks *dugri*, but he is a liar" judging it to be self-contr... Some speakers of Hebrew said that it could be accepted: *Du*... be interpreted as referring to how things were said, not to ... being said. It also accounts for the observation that Hebre... Arabic, has nominalized the word *dugri*: The term *dugrijut* i... refer to a speech style (as in "I like/don't like his *dugrijut*"), ... the property of speaking in a *dugri* manner.

In sum, for speakers of Arabic speaking *dugri* implies the ... a speech mode primarily involving a set of conditions surrou... content of the message. The use of this mode must always be sir...

ighed against the demands of *musayra*. For Sabra speakers of He-
ew, on the other hand, *dugrijut* is a culturally defining way of speaking,
t is, a formally crystallized, valorized, interactional style.

In its passage from Arabic to Hebrew, the term *dugri* has, thus,
dergone a meaning-shift on a number of dimensions: It has become
ecialized in its application to the interpersonal domain only; it has
me to denote a speech style, and as such, it is associated with the
t on of sincerity rather than of truth in the sense of correspondence
h external (or internal) facts or in the sense of possessing the required
dence.

The idea of sincerity, which has emerged as central in the foregoing
ss-linguistic comparison, is only one of the meaning clusters associ-
d with the colloquial Hebrew version of *dugri* speech. *Dugri* speech
a symbolic form is associated with five analytically distinguishable
sters of meanings. Often these dimensions were explicitly verbalized
informants' spontaneous talk in such statements as "He is *dugri*, he
incere," "He talked *dugri*, he was not afraid to speak up," "A *dugri*
rson is natural," and so on. Otherwise, I was able to abstract them
m an interpretive reading of my informants' talk about the *dugri* way
speaking and from a consideration of actual instances of *dugri* speech.

The first of these dimensions, as noted, has to do with the notion of
cerity, of being true to oneself. I will henceforth refer to it as the
cerity cluster of meanings. Another set of meanings associated with
gri speech in Hebrew has to do with strength, determination, daring,
rage, activity, and defiance. These notions were not even mentioned
speakers of Arabic as associated with *dugri* speech or *dugri* speakers.
ill henceforth refer to this dimension as the *assertiveness* cluster of
anings. A third set of meanings associated with Hebrew *dugri* speech,
ich was not mentioned by speakers of Arabic either, has to do with
notions of earthiness, naturalness, simplicity, and spontaneity. I will
er to this dimension as the *naturalness* cluster of meanings. A fourth
ster of meanings is associated with the solidarity function of *dugri*
ech, which I will interpret with reference to Turner's (1969, 1974,
2) notion of *communitas*. Finally, *dugri* speech is associated with the
ra's pragmatic orientation, the matter-of-factness that underlies a
ong preference for deeds over words. This orientation gives rise to
at I will refer to as the attitude of "*antistyle*," and is reflected in a
eral devaluation of language and speech, so that terseness and in-
iculateness become valued verbal traits.

Each of these domains of meaning is treated in a separate section,
hough they are linked in a variety of ways and must all be thought
s jointly underlying the way of speaking labeled *dugrijut* in colloquial
brew usage.

The Sabra image as cultural assertion

As was noted in the Introduction, the *dugri* way of speaking
with the Sabra subculture, which has occupied a privilege
Israeli society since the prestate years. It is the culture of
daughters of the *halutzim* (pioneers) who had left a religio
and a confining Diaspora existence behind them, and had
land of Israel to build and be both personally and commu
in it. In matters of ideology their offspring, the first-gener
generally followed in their parents' footsteps, although th
a different tone and style. The pioneers' orientation was b
affected as it was by the socialist movement in their count
(mainly Eastern and Central Europe), and Zionist, tha
toward a renewal of autonomous Jewish life in the land o
historical bedrock of the Jewish people.

The creation of a homeland for the Jewish people was
only to provide shelter to the persecuted Jews of Europe
normalize Jewish society and to correct the social ills ind
turies of subordination and persecution in Europe (Pinske
cording to Zionist ideology, the hallmark of the new social
as the condition of its achievement was to be the new J
who defended himself (or herself) against external imposit
ductive in labor, and strove to create a just and egalitarian
construction of a new Jewish identity was a conscious asp
Zionist movement. To some, it was to be its very test. M
for example, said in a speech delivered in 1936 that the
popular movement is its ability to create "a new essent al a
a new kind, a new type of person," and argued that the Z
ment "has proved its authenticity in the image of the *ha*
1961:255).

Initially, then, the New Jew was founded in the image
the embodiment of the humanist, socialist, and national
the Zionist movement. This image was based on the orien
as *shlilat hagola*, the negation of the Diaspora: The Israe
be everything the Diaspora Jew was not. In communicati
implied the rejection of ways of speaking associated wi
genteel culture and Jewish Diaspora life in particular. J
responding to life's exigencies, and especially their ways
with the non-Jewish world – as these were depicted in Zio
– were marked by a sense of restrictiveness, defensiveness,
as an adaptive mechanism. Their passivity was compoun
tensely religious orientation.[4] Traditionally, Jews recogni

ısing speech adroitly, since it was the only "weapon" at their disposal. vish Talmudic tradition also colored Jews' disposition toward the *pul*, a form of discussion that involved a recognition of the complexity l many-sidedness of issues, the inherent ambiguity of human affairs.[5] s New Jew, by contrast, was to prefer clear-cut deeds to mere words, rity of purpose coupled with simplicity and a nonmanipulative opens of expression, rather than a debilitating sensitivity to the complexity issues and to external pressures.

For the Sabra, the son or daughter of the *halutz*, the struggle to shed unwanted identity became less central; the task of creating and susning a credible cultural image with a content and style of its own came a central issue. As far as content was concerned, the image of Sabra continued to be predicated on the negation of what were taken be Diaspora Jewish characteristics.[6]

However, for the new Jewish identity to exist as a public fact, and to oduce and carry a new vital culture, the meanings associated with it l to become articulated symbolically. One of the main problems, refore, became the elaboration of a distinctive style that would prot and reaffirm the image of the Sabra, the offspring of the *halutz*, in eryday communication.

The difficulty involved in translating this cultural task into commuative practice is expressed in an autobiographical novel (Ben-Yehuda 81) written by a legendary soldier-girl of the *Palmah*, the prestate itary combat units, which tells the story of the months preceding the icial outbreak of the 1948 War of Independence from the point of w of an arch-Sabra. In her vivid descriptions she points out the enorous difference between the Sabras, the so-called First Generation to demption, and those born in the Diaspora. It was a difference mansted in style of dress and behavior, as well as of speech. In fact, in e of my conversations with her, the author attributed the emergence the *dugri* way of speaking to the Sabras' desire to set themselves ar: from the newcomers, who were embarrassingly tainted with their st Diaspora experience. Rejecting "anything that smelled of the Diasra," however, left them with no clear behavioral models; and although ch new wave of immigration made its own contribution to the new ture, this was not enough. The Sabras were left with the burden of enting themselves: "clearly they could not think of everything a per- n needs, a member of a new people, if we were to start everything m scratch. For example, they could not invent for us the accent we re going to have when we came to speak English, or what our handstures were going to be like" (p. 76).

Notably, although the term *Sabra* applies officially to Israeli-born Jews general, it is used mainly to refer to a subset of them – to the sons

and daughters of immigrants of European origin who were negation-of-the-Diaspora spirit and who became a cultural group in the years preceding the establishment of the State through the first three decades of its life (Rubinstein 1977) the term *Sabra* is itself worthy of comment: In citing the most explanation for it, Oring (1981:24) says that "the sabra fr aphor for the native personality. Like the prickly pear, the is sweet and gentle within, but only to those who underst penetrate the tough and thorny exterior." The following self of one of Schoenbrun's (1973:231) interviewees echoes m identification with the prickly pear metaphor: "Like our frui we are prickly outside. We often seem rude, tough. But we, too, have our conscience."

Not all those who seem to qualify as Sabras identify with role. Several of my informants, who qualified as Sabras by criteria, admitted having a sense of not quite fitting in wi culture. Interestingly, they often exemplified this claim by culties with the *dugri* mode. This was expressed in such j "I could never have said anything like that" in reporting *dug* made by friends identified as "real Sabras" or general ex defensiveness in relation to *dugri* speakers, or wistful com as "I often feel that I am not Sabra enough to speak as *dug* really like."

The uneasiness of virtual Sabras, as the latter group may b equaled by the devastation of newcomers on experiencing exerted by the rigidly upheld image of the Sabra as a behav This was particularly true for those who arrived at a young still considered worthy of intensive efforts to socialize the

Typical accounts of the shock of arrival in Israel, wheth refugee from Nazi Germany (Ben-Amotz 1979) or as a you from Iraq (Amir 1984), have recently been given literar These stories, like many other comparable ones I have h clue to the intensity of the cultural impact of the Sabra im comers. They echo vague memories of my own acculturatio and attest to the instantaneously recognized message wi young newcomers had to contend: To become a natural pa land, one should try to approximate the Sabra image as be

This pressure was reflected, first, in the practice of confe Sabra-sounding Hebrew name on the immigrant child. Thi done without consulting the child. Some children accepted rite; others, like the aforementioned Iraqi author, Amir Whatever the child's response, it was a memorable mom

e of my own earliest memories is of the day when, as a five-year-old wcomer to Israel, I was told to choose between two Hebrew-sounding mes to replace the Yiddish name I had been given at birth in memory a grandmother I would never know. I can clearly recall the scene: I s standing in the hall of my aunt's small apartment, my back pressed ainst the rough surface of her wardrobe, encircled by all the adults the family, who were glaring down at me: "What will it be, Tamar Ruth?" I remember clumsily trying to roll the foreign sounds on my accustomed tongue and, finally, exhausted by their piercing, expect t stares, I heard myself pronounce "Tamar."

The name change was the first step in the process of self-transfor- ation, which was marked by a persistent pressure to model oneself on hat seemed to be the unattainable figure of the Sabra. The extent to hich one could approximate that image became the measure of one's vn – and sometimes one's family's – adaptation to the new life and nd. I could not help but smile at reading Ben-Amotz's (1979) "confes- on" that the day someone asked him if he was born in Israel was a y of triumph for him; nor can I help noticing that to this day, whenever am asked where I was born – a question implying that it was not in rael – there is an echo of exasperation.[7]

This same intercultural encounter was no less problematic from the andpoint of the Sabras themselves, though in a different way. In de- ribing it from their angle, Netiva Ben-Yehuda (1981) notes that among e Sabras there was an intentional ban on the newcomers' past (a point ost bitterly commented upon by many of my non-Sabra informants d more clearly recognized in Israel today). It represented everything e Sabra had tried to get away from – mainly the weakness and vulner bility of Diaspora Jews, which was a source of both fear and contempt r the young realizers who were blunt, thick-skinned, nationalistic, and sperately bent on persuading themselves and the world that they were fferent, that they would never be "taken as sheep to the slaughter." ne newcomers, so embarrassingly different in all their ways, were un- lentingly expected to be like, act like, and speak like Sabras. In the ords of Ben-Yehuda (1981:71): "If you can't speak like us, then shut ."

These descriptions illustrate the grip the Sabra image had on the mmunal imagination. It far exceeded the numerical weight of the bras in the budding Israeli society of the 1940s and 1950s, and it is wonder that the meanings associated with it became crystallized and pressed in the form of a distinct, recognizable way of speaking. In- ed, throughout all of my discussions of *dugri* speech with native speak s of Hebrew, they consistently associated it with the image of the bra and the cultural problems attending it. As one of my informants

succinctly put it, "to speak *dugri* is to act like a Sabra." then, the communicative correlate of the Sabra's thornines that it is a common theme in discussions of the Israeli cu

The accent of sincerity

The foregoing discussion underlines one important cluste associated with *dugri* speech: the assertiveness cluster, wh associated with the revolutionary orientation of the Zioni encapsulated in the phrase "the Negation of the Diaspora another cluster of meanings associated with *dugri* speech the idea of truthful expression. I have referred to it as cluster.

Indeed, for many of my informants, the *dugri* way of sp communicative counterpart of being sincere or being tru That is, *dugri* speech, as it is conceived by native speakers Hebrew, is intelligible in a cultural world in which the ide plays a part. Therefore, I turn to Trilling's (1971) illuminati the concept of sincerity with reference to the history of ide culture for a better understanding of the broader ideation which the *dugri* way of speaking has become crystallized a

The concept of sincerity, understood as the congrue avowal and actual feeling, is predicated upon an interpre notion of the *individual* or *self* as it evolved in the Wester the Renaissance with the advent of humanism.[8] The c Western conception of the *person* can be elucidated b temporal and cross-cultural comparisons. Working withi perspective, Trilling (1971:25) argues that it was only at a in history that people began to think of themselves as individuals. At that point the word *self* began to be used a as a mere reflexive or intensive. People began to think as intrinsically precious, as something they "must cherish f sake and show to the world for the sake of good faith."

The idea of the individual as consisting of a bounded a interesting internal space, a dynamic center of awareness, judgment, whose nature is signaled by the impression-for or she produces, is conducive to a cultural emphasis on s expressive value.

An illuminating contrast to this Western idea and the val with it is found in Geertz's (1976) discussion of the Javanc of the self, which emphasizes the separation between the world of human experience and the external, observed wo

behavior. These two realms are believed to be independently ordered and smoothed, rather than the one signaling the other: Emotion must be thinned through meditation, and behavior must be shaped by elaborate etiquette. This conception of selfhood and social conduct, as Geertz points out, is inaccessible to a Westerner bred on the notions of "the intrinsic honesty of deep feeling and the moral importance of personal sincerity" (p. 231), but its force can sometimes be gleaned in encounters with cultural members.

I therefore propose that in an important sense the *dugri* way of speaking finds its credence in the larger matrix of modern Western culture. The Sabra culture's receptivity to the spirit of modern Europe is understandable in view of the fact that the process of secularization that started in Jewish communities throughout Europe at the end of the eighteenth century (associated with the Jewish Enlightenment movement) was greatly inspired by modern European cultural trends (cf. Kurzweil 1959). Thus, the Sabra is not only a New Jew, he is also modern man. Presumably, if the Sabra had been invented at a different point in history, the New Jew would not have weaved his budding identity and expressive values around the notion of sincerity and the broader ideational context of which it formed a part.

More specifically, the development of the *dugri* direct style has its ideational roots in European back-to-nature revolutionary ideologies such as the Russian populist movement and the social-humanist movements that succeeded it (Berlin 1978). These movements, as well as the German Youth Revolt (Stachura 1981), inspired successive generations of Zionist pioneers who preached the cult of sincerity, naturalness, and simplicity as the path to an internal revolution in the human soul.

The ideologically oriented concern with speech style found its early expression in the writings of A. D. Gordon (1856–1922), a laborer-philosopher whose teachings and personal example had a lasting influence on the Israeli Socialist Zionist movement. Gordon emphasized the role of speech in both reflecting and shaping the nation's spirit, and suggested guidelines for what may be viewed as a language planning program on the level of style. Not surprisingly, his formulation contains a rejection of decadent European ways of speaking that involve "twisting the forms of speech for the purpose of showing respect" as well as an appeal to the essential nature of Hebrew, which he described as "more natural and closer to the truth."

In this spirit, Gordon (1943:254) argued vehemently for the abolition of deferential address terms, underlining their corruptive impact on the immediacy of human relations. He argued that instead of European ways of politeness, the Jews of Israel, who were reviving the Hebrew language of biblical times, should introduce into their speech "true,

internal politeness deriving from a pure source – fr
and simple soul – politeness which makes no recours
sions either in speech or in writing."

We see, then, that the idea of truthful expression
cerity, as the true manifestation in words and gesture
reality, was a basic component of the interpersonal
Sabra inherited from the parent generation.

Further insight into this ideational context can be ga
the various aspects of sincerity identified by Trilling.
concept of sincerity has been subject to different inte
ious European cultural traditions: Most notably, ther
distinction between the French and English modes.
(as ideal types) played a significant role in the cultural
Israel, but at different points in time.

In the French tradition, according to Trilling, sin
to the contemporary American notion of self-disclos
probing and soul searching, the discovery and revelati
embarrassing and normally concealed actions and tr
of sincerity that comes close to the French mode pl
role in the ethos of some of the pioneering groups
"intimate groups," many of whose members had b
sional youth organizations in Germany (see Stachur
its expression in what came to be known as *sihot nef*
1971). These nightly talks, in which all members of
pated, provided a ritualized context for the creation
tification through the articulation of sincerity. They
and relentless criticism of each other, as well as
exploration. The flavor of these talks is found in the
by members of one such group, Kibbutz *A*, which w
under the title *Kehiliatenu* (i.e., our community).
cording to one such account, every person "disclos
the other – however deformed or poisoned it may h

The notions of openness, directness, and sincerity
style of the next generation, the Sabra's *dugri* speech
the style of the parent generation's soul talks. T
pathos-filled, self-probing gave way to a more exte
What remained of the directness and openness of
their critical, judgmental edge, not the soul searchin
tation that initially accompanied them. For our purp
to note that the idea of sincerity was rich and flexible
a sense of cultural continuity, while at the same tim
pretations yielded different stylistic configurations.
which characterizes the Sabra culture, comes closer t

of sincerity, which according to Trilling does not require one "to know oneself in the French fashion and to make public what one knows, but to be oneself in action, in deeds" (1971:58).

The affinity between the English and Sabra notions of sincerity may account for the similarity between the communicative style of the English, as described by Emerson in his travel book (1856) and the *dugri* style of the Sabra. To anyone familiar with the image of the mythical Sabra, Emerson's account of the traits of the English of his day who "hate nonsense, sentimentalism and highblown expression," while valuing "conciseness and going to the point" (p. 116), sounds startlingly familiar:

> They are blunt in saying what they think, sparing of promises, and they require plain dealing of others. We will not have to do with a man in a mask. Let us know the truth. Draw a straight line, hit whom and where it will (p. 120)

Trilling stresses that in the English interpretation, sincerity has come to be considered a virtue, that is, the contribution of individual members to the life of the community. In this conception, being true to oneself is not an end, as it is in the more recent ethos of authenticity, but a means to a socially oriented goal: It is the precondition to being true to others and is thus a contribution to the creation of a social order based on sincerity, cooperation, and mutual commitment. This is revealed beautifully in Shakespeare's *Hamlet*, in Polonius's advice to his son, Laertes, which includes the following injunction:

> This above all: to thine ownself be true
> And it must follow, as the night the day,
> Thou canst not then be false to any man.
> (Act I, Scene 3)

As will be brought out in greater detail in the discussion of the *dugri* interactional code in the next chapter, the sincerity of *dugri* speech expresses personal integrity as well as communal participation. The tension between these two analytically distinct poles of human existence – the personal and the communal – is one that all societies must resolve in and through the play of symbolic forms (Philipsen 1981), but different cultural groups have developed their own ways of expressing and resolving it. For members of the Sabra culture, *dugri* speech in its ritual dimensions offers a promise of such resolution, since it expresses the possibility of fusing the personal and the communal in dramatizing sincerity.

The attitude of "antistyle"

The next cluster of meanings I have identified as associated with *dugri*

a central element in the Sabra communicative ethos.
plies that style involves affectation and insincerity,
trasted to "plain" talk. In the following discussion,
"plainness" of *dugri* speech is not the absence of st
alternative stylistic option, which derives its force
between words, talk (*diburim*) and deeds (*ma'asim*).
diburim is often qualified as *stam* (mere talk) and
preted as socially oriented action, manifesting full c
spirit of the nation-building ethos to which this cultu
probably be traced [cf. Katriel (1985) for a discussion
in relation to Israeli "gripping parties"].

The Sabra attitude of "antistyle" found its early
once-common expression "Zionism in quotes" (*tzi*
which referred to the practice of preaching Zionism
language and high-flown expressions – rather than
constructive, preferably agricultural, work in the land
reflected in the proliferation of metalinguistic terms
notion of mere talk and that are commonly emplo
Hebrew discourse (e.g., *birburim*, *palavrot*) and in th
a pragmatic, matter-of-fact, active orientation.[10]

The crucial point for our purpose is that this cu
implies a devaluation of speech: Speech becomes a
standing for lack of social action and a failure to
attainment of communally cherished goals with the f
men of deeds. The Sabra's pragmatic, narrowly func
the emphasis on *tahles*, as it is sometimes referred to,
Yiddish term for "practical ends," stands in sharp co
perceived as the passive spirituality of Diaspora Je
elevated rhetoric of the early Zionist visionaries, who
vided the ideological background for the younger ge
izers." The Sabras sought to dissociate themselves f
images: Neither prayers nor word-spun visions wer
but rather actions, fact-creating deeds

Dugri speech manifests the Sabra's attitude of "a
sociated with it in members' talk. Indeed, the literaln
matter-of-factness of paradigmatic Sabras, their im
quence, and their dread of the glib tongue are as
thorniness.

Oring's (1981) account of the Sabra ethos similarly
verbal quality of terseness is embodied in the *chizb*
the *Palmah* as associated with the Israeli (as oppose
identity. The humorous tone with which it is prese
tradition suggests both an awareness of the attitude

A rather touching illustration of the Sabra's attitude of "antistyle," presented humorously as self-acknowledged rhetorical ineptitude, is also found in the opening anecdote of Ben-Yehuda's (1981) autobiographical novel, where she tells about the day the United Nations made the historical decision to establish the Jewish state. She was riding a bus as one of a group of soldiers on their way to their newly designated posts, having just completed a military training session that had kept them out of touch with current events for several weeks. On the way they happened to run into a limousine carrying Golda Meir, and she passed on the great news about "the outbreak of the State" to their young commander, a quintessential Sabra. He felt he had to dignify the moment by saying something appropriately ceremonial to his soldiers, but found himself at a loss for words. Completely disoriented, he urged his aides:

"I am telling you, I have the feeling we must tell something to the guys, and I'm telling you we must do something. We can't leave it just like that, with nothing." And he kept saying: "But what does one say at such a moment?" And he kept pressing: "Sasha, you've read books, you're an all-round egghead, what did others say when a historical moment suddenly landed on them?" And he kept crying: "Just my damned luck. If we only had one of those professional speech-makers here, at least one, why does it have to happen just to me? What do I know about ceremonies, I?" (p. 13)

As we see, the expressive difficulties completely extinguished the commander's exultation at the greatness of the moment. He concluded a short speech, making explicit the contrast between words and deeds mentioned earlier:

"I want to say one more thing. Perhaps this was not a great speech. But what does it matter today – speeches. Today what matters is who does what. We're done with 'See, see how beautifully he speaks!' So that's it. So on we go. There's no time . . . Yes. And good luck with the State!" (p. 12)

His people, attuned to his gropings for an appropriately ceremonial form, recognized his predicament and were both amused and respectful of the "super-human" efforts he made "to match his speech to the historical moment."

This example illustrates the cultural force of the attitude of "antistyle," as well as its felt limitations. However compelling it is for members of the Sabra culture, there are moments when "plain" speech is experienced as inappropriate, and a yearning for greater verbal sophistication is acknowledged. In a similar vein, the author – a paradigmatic *dugri* speaker if ever there was one – at one point laments Israelis' disdain for the nonfunctional aspects of life, their inability to indulge in the playfulness of high culture:

All the things that are important to people in the large world – we have no time for it. We have no patience for the trivialities, the subtleties, the fine distinctions, the gentle differences, the sophistications – for all those things

that are called "culture" in the world. With us – there's not
(p. 49)

As I argue in Chapter 4, which discusses the *dugri* ri
dealing here simply with the traditional difference betw
and nonceremonial speech (Bloch 1975), but rather w
between two distinct ceremonial idioms. Thus, in so
contexts, it is *dugri* speech that constitutes the proper c
its very plainness providing an expressive vehicle for t
of cultural members and the ritual reaffirmation of the
other contexts, such as the historical moment described
where the focus is on the celebration of communal ev
on individual self-assertion, a different idiom is appro
embodies more of the artistry and flamboyance of a co
attitude.

An interesting insider's reflection on the Sabra style
porary equivalent in journalistic writing is given by Boa
Ahronoth, Sept. 13, 1985). Registering his annoyance
colloquial and impoverished style of contemporary loc
national) newspapers, he compares it to the "dry langu
and concentrated" that his own earlier generation of S
into Hebrew writing in the 1950s. He stresses that the
style was not a mere whim, but the result of a consci
ologically motivated choice. They felt that most Hebre
day rang false, was overly verbose and actually sounded
from Russian, Polish, or Yiddish, the native tongues
and journalists at that time. In a spirit of rebellion, the
a native style: "We wrote in as sharp, precise, simple
a style as possible because all around us we saw falsen
and a disgusting manipulation of the big words."

Somewhat ironically, the author sees in the new style
local newspapers a terrible poverty of thought, a su
appear fashionable, young, energetic, clever, and co
though he entertains this possibility, he refuses to see i
form comparable in function to the stylistic rebellion
eration. In fact, he claims that it is just a new version
orientation his own generation had fought against, or
truth to be hidden behind a facade of stylistic techniqu
while he denies this new style the ideological underpinn
to the direct style of his own Sabra generation, one
scriptive terms he uses with reference to the new style
portray its flavor is *dugri*. In this case, *dugri* carries on
overtones of rudeness and blatant outspokenness that
more recent and more critical perspectives on the eth

[illegible] of the attitude of "antistyle" may seem tandem to [illegible] with American prose. Lanham's (1974) remarks on [illegible]ms of expression bring out some interesting analogies [illegible] ences between the Sabra and the American versions of the [a]ntistyle." In both cases, the notion of style is associated [illegible]on and lack of sincerity, whereas the valorized form of [pl]ain talk, is associated with clarity of expression as an aspect [co]nception, a "responsibility dialect" on the one hand, and [p]ragmatic attitude on the other.

[T]wo notable differences between these versions, however. [illegible]s the central contrast in the Sabra ethos is between words [th]e central contrast in the American ethos of plain talk, as Lanham, is between words and ideas, concepts, or [In] both cases, the end result in terms of cultural stylistic [de]emphasis of lingual means; In the Sabra version, a con[illegible]rds is believed to be at the expense of a commitment to [f]ewer the better; in the American version, words are to be [throu]gh and not at, so as not to obscure the ideas they express [pe]rsistent concern with clarity, as Lanham stresses).

[It] should be noted that despite the similarities between the [Am]erican attitudes of "antistyle," the assumed penchant for [sponta]neous speech in the United States involves a degree of [tha]t falls short of the direct, blunt character of *dugri* speech. [illegible] this difference will be further probed in the chapters that

[illegible] naturalness

[N]aturalness is closely linked to the accent of sincerity. Both [illegible] European back-to-nature philosophies that were inspired [o]f Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712–78), his protest against [illegible] force of culture, and his promulgation of the ideal of the [illegible] In his prize-winning essay entitled "A Discourse on the [illegible] of the Arts and Sciences" Rousseau expounded the ethos [illegible] in such a way as to make sincerity and strength qualities [illegible] man. I have chosen to treat them separately since they [illegible] as distinct, variously emphasized and valorized clusters [i]n the talk of my informants. The assertiveness cluster of [for] example, has received a particular cultural coloration in [illegible] the idea of strength associated with it has to do only [w]ith the strength and vitality of the natural man and is [inter]preted with reference to the experience of Jews in Europe.

The ethos of naturalness is constructed around the polarity of "natu[re] and "culture," and has arisen as a counterstatement to what was s[een as] the decadence of urban culture, including its stress on form and sty[le]. [illegible] (1983) states that modern Israeli culture must be seen a[s a] rebellion against both traditional Jewish and decadent European ur[ban] [cu]ltures. The latter emphasis was brought out in the gloss of A. [D.] Gordon's ideology in an earlier section and is one that permeated [his] teachings; it has become central to the Israeli ethos.

Douglas's (1975) discussion of the role of classification in the c[on]struction of social order provides a helpful terminology with which [to] formulate the link between a revolutionary cultural orientation and [the] cultural meanings subsumed under the naturalness cluster. In seek[ing] to free itself of prevailing classifications that are important determina[nts] of a no longer acceptable cultural scheme, a revolutionary orienta[tion] tends to emphasize nature in the symbolic contrast between culture [and] nature. Hence, the emphasis on simplicity, spontaneity, and earthin[ess;] hence also the inarticulateness and terseness, the distrust of langua[ge] which, as a primary tool of classification, becomes the symbol of it[...]

In sum, the Sabra culture's adoption and elevation of the etho[s of] naturalness helps account for some of the central values and some [of] the major behavioral displays found in the culture: the aesthetic [of] simplicity, reflected in spartan ways of life, dress, and so on, as wel[l as] in preferred modes of speaking; the pragmatic orientation with its [em]phasis on the elemental, basic, instrumental, survival-oriented nec[ess]ities of life and its impatience with verbal polish or circumlocution, [with] the complexities and frivolities of a cultured life. Not least, it acco[unts] for an emphasis on the existential moment and a mode of human [re]lations marked by spontaneity, immediacy, and equality. This visio[n of] human relatedness comes close to what Turner has described as "sp[on]taneous *communitas*" whose spirit has permeated the Sabra culture[, as] I show in the next section.[12]

The spirit of *communitas*

Turner (1969, 1982) has drawn a general distinction between two m[ajor] modes of social life that ground the use of speech and other symb[olic] forms. One of them is termed *societas* and the other *communitas*. [*So*]*cietas* is characterized by a human order held together and differenti[ated] by a configuration of roles and statuses, a web of conventionali[zed] formal relations. *Communitas* is a state of existence outside social [time] and place, characterized by the suspension of the roles and rules

hold in the realm of *societas*, and involving the creation of egalitarian, undifferentiated, individuating, person-to-person relationships.

The suspension of the normative social order in *communitas* gives rise to new relational and expressive possibilities. In the absence of social bonds predicated on role and status relations, there arises the possibility of a qualitatively different type of human bonding, experienced, Turner says (1982:48), as a "flash of lucid mutual understanding on the existential level" by "compatible people" who feel that all problems could be resolved if only this intersubjective illumination could be sustained. Turner (1982) emphasizes that it cannot be sustained for long, but that

> When the mood, style or "fit" of spontaneous *communitas* is upon us, we place a high value on personal honesty, openness and lack of pretensions or pretentiousness. We feel that it is important to relate directly to another person as he presents himself in the here-and-now, to understand him in his sympathetic . . . way, free from the culturally defined encumbrances of his role, status, reputation, class, caste, sex or other structural niche. (p. 48)

Whereas *societas* characterizes the mainstream, instrumentally oriented domains of social life, *communitas* characterizes contexts of liminality and marginality, where the expressive and the sacred exist. The idea of liminality comes from Van Gennep's (1960) work on the ritual process. It is the middle of the three-phase structure of rites of passage he has identified. The first is *dissociation*, which involves the ritual subject's disengagement from his customary world of *societas*. The second is *liminality* (from the Latin word *limen* or border), a transitional phase in which the world of *societas* is suspended and the ritual subject symbolically prepares himself or herself for the third phase, that of reintegration into the social structure following the appropriate ritual transformation.

The states of liminality are transient, and so is their characteristic form of human bonding, spontaneous *communitas*. The experience of *communitas* is antithetical to ordinary, rule and role-oriented human relations, and it cannot be long sustained if society is to proceed with its workaday, instrumental functions. However, it is in those enclaves of social life where *communitas* is allowed to flourish that the community can re-create itself through a regenerative spell of symbolic activity in art, ritual, myth, and play.

Inevitably, spontaneous *communitas* becomes routinized and turns into what Turner (1982:49) calls "normative *communitas*": "a subculture or group which attempts to foster and maintain relationships of spontaneous communitas on a more or less permanent basis." A famous attempt to routinize *communitas* in Israel was the creation of the kibbutz, which to this day stands as a hallmark of normative *communitas*. Con-

certed efforts to socialize children in the spirit of c
part of the rhetoric and practice of mainstream Is
(Katriel and Nesher 1986).

Indeed, many of the forms found in *societas* are r
symbolic expressions once generated in contexts o
mode of directness, which defines *dugri* speech, can
a routinization of symbolic expressions whose circu
tional roots are found in *communitas*-related contex
ization of spontaneous *communitas*, the particul
generated in it are infused into the mainstream of so
part of its approved style, encapsulating the culture
ethos, and its worldview.

Turner (1974) points out that in the popular im
communitas tend to be associated with the lowly stat
fits in well with the Sabra culture's emphasis on si
cultural labor as a means of getting away from the
the Jew as a *luftmensch* (Gonen 1975), the Yiddis
dealing in airy business and all manner of shaky,
unsound occupations. As Rubinstein (1977) notes,
initially modeled themselves on the image of the
Eastern Europe; later the Arab *Falah* (farmer) repla
link between the earthiness or farming ethos of bot
Sabra with *dugri* speech has perhaps nowhere been
than in the address of Ariel Sharon, the Israeli sta
of American Jewish leaders on one of his visits to t
which he reportedly said: "I am a farmer. I speak *dug*
thousands Jews demonstrating in front of the Whit
Sept. 3, 1982). Similarly, another statesman, Mich
described as a *dugri* speaker in conjunction with bi
falah. I'll stand no nonsense" (O. Azulai-Katz, *Yed*
13, 1985).

It seems reasonable to argue that *dugri* speech
product of both an ideology of *communitas* and a
liminality, an in-between phase in which one cultura
and an alternative one sought. The cultural valu
speech, such as sincerity and naturalness, are roo
ideology and experience of spontaneous *communita*
life of the early pioneers and was transmitted to thei
generation Sabras. This latter generation, raised
communitas, actualized its spirit in its own way: C
be associated with the solidarity and camaraderie
ments and of volunteer units in the prestate armed
Palmah. Indeed, the binary list of the properties o

to social-structural states compiled by Turner (1969:106–7) summarizes the central aspects of the ethos of the *Palmah*. Some of the attributes of the Sabra discussed by Oring (1981), such as directness, simplicity, naturalness, and spontaneity, echo central characteristics of liminality identified by Turner, as well as the cultural meanings associated by my informants with the *dugri* way of speaking.

From an analytical standpoint, the example of *dugri* speech can be used to cast new light on the well-known sociolinguistic distinction between elaborated and restricted codes (Bernstein 1964). Restricted codes, according to Bernstein, are associated with "then-coding," with the use of already formulated speech (e.g., proverbs) and the grounding of communication in a positional orientation that locates speakers with reference to their social place. Elaborated codes, in contrast, are associated with "now-coding," with spontaneous expression and the grounding of communication in a personal orientation in which speakers' unique characteristics are brought into play. As Hymes (1974a: 115) points out, the two dimensions linked to the two types of code posited by Bernstein are found to operate independently in the speechways of different speech communities. This pattern can be illustrated in the case of *dugri* speech as well.

However, the social modality of *communitas* is not characterized by a personal orientation; nor does it fit a positional orientation, one that defines and controls persons with reference to their position in the social matrix. In social contexts characterized by *communitas*, persons are neither related nor defined in terms of their structural positions; at the same time, they do not emerge as distinct, unique personalities, but rather as members of a class of "liminars," whose shared membership locates them outside the social structure. It is this membership that defines who they are and how they relate to each other.

It appears that *dugri* speech, which is grounded in a radically different context of expression than the English class cultures studied by Bernstein, escapes his dichotomy. Whereas most sociolinguistic work has been concerned with various social structural contexts, liminal contexts have been little discussed, if at all. A consideration of liminal contexts and *communitas*-related ways of speaking invites us to enrich our conception of social life so as to include not only structural but also "interstructural" contexts and our sense of the potential variability and interrelatedness of dimensions underlying speech.

This chapter has elucidated the cultural meanings attending *dugri* speech as a symbolic performance. As will become apparent in the following chapters, this level of cultural analysis is essential for an understanding of the uses of *dugri* speech in interpersonal contexts and its role as a

cultural resource in the enactment of public drama
ritual function in affirming or dramatically challengin
mantic of identity" that *dugri* speech gains much of i
the ritual form of wholehearted affirmation and th
dramatic challenge, however, are many more casual
changes marked by greater or lesser degrees of d
believe, draw their life and meaning from the *dugri*

3. The *dugri* interactional code

The previous chapter explored the cultural meanings of *dugri* speech in the Sabra culture. It was noted that in this culture particular communicative performances are recognized and named. Their label – *dugrijut* or *dugri* speech – captures their characteristic mode: directness. The meanings and values underlying *dugri* speech mark it as an important element in the Sabra culture's expressive repertoire, or, in Goffman's terms (1967:56), its "ceremonial idiom." Goffman has distinguished between two complementary, though closely related, aspects of the ceremonial idiom:

1. The expression of *deference*, the appreciation displayed by an individual for his or her interactional partners.
2. The expression of *demeanor*, an individual's display of character to those present through the use of conventional means.

Rules of deference are concerned with what one owes to the other in terms of helping maintain his or her face, the public self-image he or she claims in interaction. Rules of demeanor are concerned with what one owes to oneself, with the interactional requirement that the speaker maintain his or her own face. According to Goffman, interactants' tacit agreement to abide by the rules of deference and demeanor is a basic condition of all interaction.

Goffman's discussion of deference has been applied by Brown and Levinson (1978) in their comprehensive elaboration of politeness as strategies addressed to the face-concerns of the other. They posit a universal concern with face and rational action designed to satisfy face-wants.

Two distinctions are relevant to understanding interactional acts that are expressively hazardous in that they involve a threat to participants' face. The first is the distinction implied by the categories of deference and demeanor, of which only deference was discussed by Brown and Levinson. The second is the distinction between two aspects of face (whether the speaker's or the hearer's):

1. *Negative face* – the desire to be unimpeded by oth
of nonimposition.
2. *Positive face* – the wish to have one's self-imag
others, the politeness of approval.

Many routine interactional acts may involve a thr
the speaker's or the hearer's. For example, request
involve a threat to the hearer's negative face, wher
volve a threat to the speaker's negative face. Simila
involve a threat to the hearer's positive face, wh
may involve a threat to the speaker's positive face.

Both of these distinctions help us understand the u
ular, the ritual dimensions of *dugri* speech. At the sam
of *dugri* speech has theoretical implications, since it i
sider current applications of the facework model in a
context.

Viewing *dugri* speech as part of a culturally situated
I have focused on contexts in which the ritual dimensi
is most vividly dramatized, in which the expressive ru
speaking *dugri* are made most visible and thus bec
analysis and interpretation. Two such interactionally
contexts, representing different levels of linguistic or
my account of the *dugri* interactional code:

1. Explicit *dugri* utterances, that is, utterances c
tell you *dugri*" indicating device, which is conside
2. The speech event natively known as *siha dugrit* (
is considered in the next chapter.

Explicit *dugri* utterances

In tracing the language game of *dugri*, I noted that
adjectival or adverbial modifier function mentioned
dugri is often found in the linguistic environment of i
Most typical examples are:

1. "*ani agid leha dugri*" (I'll tell you *dugri*), as in "
this is getting too technical for me" in making
statement
2. "*tagid li dugri*" (Tell me *dugri*), as in "Tell me
want me to do?" in attempting to elicit a straig

The "I'll tell you *dugri*" phrase is invariably compl
that are considered by the speaker to be potential thr
face, whereas the "Tell me *dugri*" phrase indicates

prepared to accept such utterances in good faith when he or she assumes the hearer role. Both of these constructions manifest a concern with positive face, with the politeness of approval.

Questions may also be characterized as *dugri*:

3. "*ani shoel otha dugri*" (I am asking you *dugri*), as in "I am asking you *dugri*, do you want to come or not?"

In this case, the *dugri* preface implies that the speaker realizes that the question may be overly forward in that its very utterance or phrasing may fail to take into account the hearer's sensibilities. It also implies that if it were not for the *dugri* question, the hearer would not have provided the required information, at least not in so explicit a way. The concern here is with potential violation of the hearer's negative face, with his or her desire not to be intruded upon, that is, with the politeness of nonimposition. Another related use of *dugri* is given in:

4. "*ata jahol lish'ol oti dugri*" (you can ask me *dugri*), as in "You can ask me *dugri*, I've got nothing to hide."

In this case, the use of *dugri* to invite a *dugri* question signals to the hearer that a question that he or she may fear would pose a threat to the speaker's face (when he or she assumes the hearer role) will not be so considered. The concern here is with potential violation of the speaker's negative face.

I will henceforth refer to utterances prefaced by *dugri* as explicit *dugri* utterances. The employment of such statements defines the interactional context in which they occur as involving a conscious, hopefully consensual, suspension of face-concerns that would normally be expected to hold. These utterances and speakers' intuitions about them are a linguistic gold mine for the study of *dugri* speech. In such utterances, speakers' metacommunicative judgments of the directness of their talk are spontaneously, explicitly, and systematically articulated in a structurally recognizable way as part of the language code itself. This structural possibility is, indeed, routinely utilized: There was general agreement among my informants that the term *dugri* is most commonly used in this linguistic environment.

The study of *dugri* utterances whose directness is dramatized by the use of a *dugri* indicator, therefore, enables me to supplement the data obtained from observations of talk I and/or my informants have intuitively identified as *dugri*, as well as data from talk about *dugri* speech, with an examination of the nature of talk that is self-marked by the speaker as being *dugri*.

One way of identifying the distinctive function of *dugri* in this linguistic context would be to compare the meaning conveyed by an explicit *dugri* utterance with the meanings of nearly equivalent utterances of the sort exemplified in the following discussion. I focus on the "I'll tell you *dugri*"

indicating device as a primary example of this kind of us
and then locate it in terms of its interactional function
other constructions containing *dugri* previously menti

My analysis addresses two aspects of the expressive m
dugri utterances that pull in different directions. Th
explicit *dugri* utterances with propositionally equivale
containing "I'll tell you *dugri*," the mitigation func
indicator is brought out. On the other hand, in con
utterance with a propositionally equivalent utteranc
agid leha et haemet" (I'll tell you the truth), its confr
elucidated.

In other words, the "I'll tell you *dugri*" device is a multi
sign. Its mitigating effect has to do with the symbolic d
as a speech sign (i.e., with the cultural meanings it ca
in Chapter 2), as well as with the fact that its very emp
a recognition of the addressee's face concerns. Its con
is associated with the indexical dimension of *dugri* – its
impelling, communicative effect related to the threat
dugri exchanges. That is, to understand the functio
indicating device, we must draw a distinction between t
of analysis: the level of social-situational meanings
cultural meanings.[2]

Explicit *dugri* utterances provide an intriguing exa
meshing of these two levels of meanings in the use
sign. By attending to both the symbolic and ind
of *dugri*, we can learn not only what but also ho
users.[3]

An example of *dugri* usage often volunteered by in
then used more systematically to elicit appropriatenes
semistructured part of the interviews, is as follows: S
a friend who is wearing a new dress/coat/pair of sho
she asks you how you like it. Suppose, also, that you
such a case, you have a number of interactional optio
some of them:

1. You can be insincere so as to avoid a threat to th and assert that you like it.
2. You can say flatly: "I don't like this kind of dre does not look good on you," or the like.
3. You can say: "I'll tell you the truth, I don't like t
4. A similar, yet importantly different response wou *dugri*, I don't like this kind of dress."
5. Another response would be: "I'll tell you, I don

[...]ess" (with the second 'I' elongated, stressed, and pronounced with [...]rising intonation).[4]

[...] first two options stand in contrast to the last three in that they [...] contain any indicating device. Contrasting these two sets of [...]s (1-2 vs. 3-5) gives us a general notion of the functioning of such [...]s. I then consider the differences between "I'll tell you the truth"[5] [...]'ll tell you *dugri*" so as to specify their differential interactional [...]ns more clearly in an attempt to shed further light on the com[...]tive force of *dugri* utterances.

[...]ying it/saying it like it is

[...] first consider options 1 and 2. They represent the two extreme [...]ic options in Brown and Levinson's (1978) model of politeness [...]ies: In their scheme, option 1 is the avoidance of face-threatening [...]Don't do FTA") and option 2 represents the "bald-on-record" [...]y, the unmitigated FTA ("no redressive action"). In the Sabra [...] the first option is ideally avoided. Inhibiting the expression of [...]rue thoughts is looked down upon. "Are you afraid to speak [...]" and "Don't be afraid to say it *dugri*" are common ways of [...]g truthful responses, and persons who hesitate to speak their mind [...]ely to be judged as hypocritical or cowardly or both. This is not [...]that members of the culture never opt for this strategy, but when [...], this is often accompanied by a sense of regret. When employed, [...]ually justified by reference to the special circumstances of the [...]

[...] interactional options are contrasted to speaking *dugri*: keeping [...]that is, saying nothing on the subject, and gossiping or "speaking [...] the back." Both of these options involve strategies that prevent [...]cursive clarification of issues by the parties involved, the checking [...]'s perceptions and judgments against those of others, and the [...]ition of problems one tends to ignore. In other words, *dugri* [...] is seen as facilitating the circulation of social information, es[...]y in contexts in which this may be problematic: when negative [...]ons are involved and when relations are such as to block open, [...]bited exchanges. Thus, in expressing their preference for *dugri* [...], informants said things like: "I like her. She's *dugri*. With her I [...]where I stand."

[...] employment of *dugri* speech presupposes an interactional [...]work in which directness is appropriate and least offensive, one [...]ssociated with a code of intimacy or solidarity. The happy per[...]ance of unmitigated evaluative acts seems to be predicated on in[...]nts' definition of the speech situation as involving what

Goffman describes as a "backstage" territory and the in[...] code appropriate to it.

Goffman (1959:128-32) contrasts the "backstage languag[...] [...]or," the language of informality, familiarity, and solidarity, [...] [...]stage language of behavior," the language of formality, interp[...] [...]tance, and guardedness, which tends to reverse the signals e[...] the "backstage" language. For example, the rules of politene[...] for "frontstage" performances may be relaxed and replaced by a[...] "inconsiderateness of the other in minor but potentially symboli[...]

In intimate relations (e.g., with family members and clos[...] the use of unmitigated *dugri* speech is interpreted as approp[...] even preferred as a form of "backstage" language.[6] This in[...] choice is valued both for its expressive implications, as a toke[...] [...]stage" solidarity and intimacy, and for its functional value [...] providing social information that would be either unavailable [...] to accept under less favorable conditions (as reflected in typic[...] such as "Who will tell you if not I?").

In fact, in such contexts, attempts at mitigation are very [...] interpreted as problematic, indicating a lack of forthrightness [...] trust. This accounts for the fact that even "I'll tell you *du*[...] has a mitigation function, is not likely to be used in exchang[...] intimates. Its use between, say spouses, would be judged ve[...] would tend to give rise to the inference that "something has [...] between them," in the words of one informant (cf. the d[...] constraints on the use of "I'll tell you *dugri*" at the other [...] interpersonal distance scale in the next section).

Thus, on the interactional level, *dugri* speech facilitates th[...] of social information, which feeds into interactants' sense [...] [...]ation as well as their attempt to frame their social place. T[...] given to *dugri* speech in the Sabra culture seems to me to re[...] other things, a cultural solution not only to the problem of se[...] but also to the problem of framing one's social place. Both [...] been highly problematic in the newly forged, heterogeneou[...] modern Israel, in which neither cultural identity nor soci[...] firmly established in terms of a long-standing, traditional [...] present study focuses mainly on speech-relevant aspects of [...] of cultural self-definition.

The mitigation function of indicating devices

This section deals with options 3-5, each of which consists of [...] prefaced by an indicating device. Let us repeat them for [...] convenience:

"I'll tell you the truth, I don't like this kind of dress."
"I'll tell you *dugri*, I don't like this kind of dress."
"I'll tell you, I don't like this kind of dress."

ote, first of all, that compared to option 2 (the unprefixed "I don't this kind of dress," which was referred to as "unpadded" by one rmants), these responses are unanimously judged to be softer, less t; that is, these indicators clearly serve a mitigation function (cf. riel and Dascal 1984).

explicating the interactional function of these indicators, I refer to two levels of analysis mentioned earlier: the level of social meanings the level of cultural meanings. At the level of social meanings these cators reflect the speaker's concern with face: They prepare the er for the forthcoming face-threatening act, facilitating his or her ntenance of demeanor. On the level of cultural meanings, however, differ in that each provides a different warrant for the performance ace-threatening acts. Notably, my forthcoming analysis of "I'll tell the truth" relates to only one possible range of interpretation, the in which it can be contrasted to "I'll tell you *dugri*" in such a way o bring out the latter's interactional functions more clearly.

ption 5, "I'll tell you, I don't like this kind of dress" (with heavy phasis and rising intonation on the second "I"), is different from the er two in that it does not warrant the performance of the face-atening act by appealing to the value of truthful expression, as both I tell you the truth/*dugri*" do. The softening effect in this case is, wise, predicated on the function of "hearer-preparation," which ns to attend the use of such indicating devices in general. It is also, vever, associated with an appeal to the idea of the relativity of opin-s and the value of nonimposition associated with it. The speaker does say "I am telling you this because I want to be truthful" but, rather, am telling you this because I am entitled to my opinion as you are tled to yours." We see, then, that different devices of this type, ch perform a similar mitigating function, may do so by invoking quite erent cultural warrants.

creative function of indicating devices

vas argued earlier that "bald-on-record," unmitigated *dugri* utter-es can occur in interactional contexts in which the social relations porting straight talk are taken for granted or presupposed. Most rmants conceded that in some interactional contexts *dugri* speech ld be highly inappropriate. Explicit *dugri* utterances occur in inter-ons in which the speaker cannot readily assume that speaking *dugri*

is appropriate, but considers this a possibility and tests *dugri* indicator. The use of *dugri* in such cases creates a in which straight talk would be appropriate.

That this is indeed the case is reinforced by informants that reflect constraints on the use of explicit *dugri* utteran involving considerable interpersonal distance. In encoun strangers, when it is clear that no solidarity may be clai priately invoked, an explicit *dugri* utterance cannot be us the situation as one in which straight talk is called for perform a creative function – sociolinguistically speakin employed in interactions that allow the transformation of context into one in which a "backstage" language is cu priate. Usually, this transformation is consensually achie however, a speaker may misjudge the relational contex attempt to redefine the situation may be aborted by com the one I overheard an older person make to a younge start this *dugri* business with me. I'm not your buddy."

In defining the social situation, by making explicit anc aspects of the ongoing interaction, "I'll tell you *dugri*/the said to function as *creative* rather than *presupposing* i terminology proposed by Silverstein (1976). This author ative indexes are most important when "the occurrenc signal is the only overt sign of the contextual parame perhaps, by other, co-occurring behaviors in other mec theless the most salient index of the specific value" (p.

Some uses of the *dugri* index are more creative than oth on whether other signals of shared affiliation are present (e.g., dress or nonverbal behavior) and the extent to whi can assume such an affiliation. When no other comparab and interpersonal distance is great, the use of such an in its greatest creative force and is interpreted as an inc speaker's desire to decrease social distance and legitima "backstage" language by emphasizing what he or she in with the hearer rather than what sets them apart.[7] In other signals are present, and/or the speaker perceives h familiar terms with the hearer – though not close enou checked use of "backstage" language – the indicator serve function. It acts more as a social reminder than as a c element.

Notably, some informants claimed that the use of "I'll the truth," in prefixing an utterance, merely served to r picion that the speaker was insincere. As several of them one who needs to declare that he is *dugri* is probably not

e concern for the manipulability of the *dugri* idiom was reflected
ssions of whether people who say they are *dugri* actually are.
cases, the indicator clearly fails to accomplish its creative
.[8]

you *dugri*/the truth: confrontation versus self-disclosure

you *dugri*" can be followed by speech-acts expressing opinions
k 1981), that is, inherently subjective speech-acts whose purpose
ribe a judgment rather than to deal with questions of truth and
The judgments thus ascribed are perceived by the speaker to
ict those of the hearer, and their verbalization is accompanied
fiant, confrontational tone. As one informant colorfully put it,
ing "I'll tell you *dugri*," she feels as if an internal alarm has
ounded, and she slips into a combative mood, ready for a
tation.

ontentious tone attending the use of "I'll tell you *dugri*" is clearly
out by several utterances expressing what sounded like positive
ons prefaced by *dugri*. Upon hearing them, one can instantly
it the hearer does not share the speaker's attitude. For instance,
the 1981 election campaign in Israel, I once joined the line at
versity cafeteria and overheard one student telling another: "I'll
dugri, I think Begin is a great leader." There was nothing
larly contentious about his manner but I immediately, intuitively
to the addressee, expecting an argumentative rebultal, which
curred. The speaker's argumentative stance was for me, as an
arer, encapsulated and signaled by his use of *dugri*. It was im
clear that *dugri* would have been out of place had the speaker
d that the hearer agreed with him. I subsequently shared this
te with many informants and found that their responses and
etations were in line with mine. In brief, the speaker's use of
l you *dugri*" is designed to emphasize his or her disagreement
e hearer and is not related to the content of the valuation.

ances containing "I'll tell you the truth" do not involve the
ion of unfavorable opinions about the other or a challenge to his
position, but rather the disclosure of potentially discrediting or
assing information about oneself. In disclosing this kind of in-
on, the speaker fails to uphold the public self-image he or she
like to claim. That is, on an interactional level, the use of "I'll
dugri" mitigates a threat to the hearer's face, that is, it is oriented
ters of deference, in Goffman's terms. "I'll tell you the truth,"
other hand, mitigates a threat to the speaker's own face in the

performance of self-disclosive acts and is thus oriented to
demeanor. This suggests that even in contexts in which bo
could be appropriately used, they would not be interchange
signals a different interpretation of the social meaning of
volved: Clearly, in speaking *dugri*, one also reveals someth
self, whereas self-disclosive acts can be an imposition on the
is precisely because these possibilities exist that the speaker r
to orient the hearer's interpretation of the utterance in a
direction by using one of these devices. In the case of *dugri*
is on straight talk despite possible offense to the hearer, n
may be disclosed about the speaker. In the case of "I'll te
truth," the focus is on openness despite the possible risk to th
not on potential imposition on the hearer.

Although in using either of these devices the speaker app
idea of truthful expression as a warrant for the performance
threatening act, each device reflects a different focus and
interpretation of this overarching warrant. In neither case
cating device interpreted as an appeal to the factual renderin
mation.[9] Thus, utterances like "I'll tell you *dugri*/the truth
four members in our family" would sound very odd unless i
within the context of an argument (in the case of *dugri*) or a
disclosive act (in the case of "I'll tell you the truth").

If we combine the distinction between speaker's and he
with the distinction between negative and positive face (the
of nonimposition and the politeness of approval, respective
characterize the functioning of "I'll tell you *dugri*/the tr
closely.

Interestingly, the face-threatening acts these phrases mitig
the ones usually considered in studies on the pragmatics of
indirect dimension. Most of these studies take directives (
quests, etc.) as their main example; that is, they tend to deal
acts that constitute a threat to the hearer's negative face. No
case: "I'll tell you the truth" prefaces an utterance percei
speaker as a threat to his or her own negative face (being a sel
act, it allows the hearer into the territory of the self). "I
dugri," on the other hand, prefaces an utterance perceiv
speaker as a threat to the hearer's positive face (it involv
approval of aspects relevant to the hearer's selfimage).[10]

As noted earlier, *dugri* can occur as an indicating devic
constructions as well: In "Tell me *dugri*," which emphasizes
er's positive face concerns by indicating that the act of te
elicited can acceptably violate them; in "I'm asking you *dug*

Table 1

	Positive	Negative
Speaker's face	"Tell me *dugri*"	"You can ask me *dugri*" "I'll tell you the truth"
Hearer's face	"I'll tell you *dugri*"	"I'm asking you *dugri*"

emphasizes the hearer's negative face-concerns by indicating the speaker's recognition of the intrusive nature of his or her questioning; and in "You can ask me *dugri*," which emphasizes the speaker's negative face-concerns by indicating the speaker's readiness to have them violated by what might be considered intrusive questioning.

The face-concerns highlighted by the use of these devices can be schematically presented in a table that combines the distinction between positive and negative face with the distinction between speaker's and hearer's face. Table 1 provides one angle from which they can be viewed, one that helps to capture some of the distinctive interactional functions of *dugri* utterances.

In concluding this section, let me stress that the foregoing analysis invites us to extend the scope of Brown and Levinson's treatment of "facework" to types of face-threatening acts not covered in their study. The extension goes in two directions:

1. To include consideration of acts that pose a threat to positive rather than negative face.
2. To include discussion of acts involving a threat to the speaker's rather than the hearer's face.

These two dimensions provide a grid that allows us to describe the working of these and possibly other indicating devices on the level of social meanings.

Dugri speech as a ceremonial idiom

The discussion of explicit *dugri* utterances suggests that *dugri* speech always involves a threat to the hearer's face – whether it is the actual hearer to whom a *dugri* comment or question is addressed or the speaker-as-hearer eliciting a *dugri* comment or question from his or her interlocutor. In all of these cases, the threat to the hearer's face is legitimated and warranted by the high cultural value placed on the speaker's self-assertion and the uninhibited flow of social information that characterizes close-knit, solidary social units. As was stated in Chapter 2, this

Table 2

	Hearer-focused	Spe
Autonomy	Deference	Dem
Union	Identification	Exp

value orientation is central to the Sabra cultural eth
culture, speaking *dugri* – which in "facework" term
allowing the hearer's face-concerns to inhibit one's se
acquired symbolic value in the display and reaffirma
Indeed, for a paradigmatic Sabra not to speak *dugri*
ranted according to the shared cultural code would b
a failure to uphold the public self-image a proper Sa
project. It would, at the same time, prevent the ger
of community that uninhibited, direct expression ec
communitas can be hoped to create. When appropri
other hand, *dugri* speech affirms both a sense of s
communal participation.

Hymes's (1982) elaboration of the "facework" mo
that enable me to analyze *dugri* speech as a cultural
as individual speech-acts, within a more compreh
framework. Hymes, too, combines a distinction betw
hearer focus with a distinction between an interactio
tonomy" (oriented toward maintenance of the separ
and hearer) versus a stress on "union" (oriented tov
ment of common ground). "Autonomy" is realize
hearer-focused category of "deference" and the spe
gory of "demeanor," which have already been disc
the politeness of nonimposition; "union" involves t
Burkian category of "identification" and the speake
of "expression," which refers to what the speaker
interaction, for example, interest and involvement di
thus associated with the politeness of approval. The
be schematically represented in such a way (Table 2)
relationship between the interactional properties o
discussed earlier and the use of *dugri* speech as a
(1982:76).

As a ceremonial idiom *dugri* speech is speaker fo
a concern with demeanor, with what the speaker c
herself (as a proper Sabra), but is also oriented towa
the sense that interactants share a relationship in wh

appropriate. Notably, the focus on the speaker's demeanor in the performance of *dugri* speech is dramatized by the violation of the hearer's face-concerns at the level of social meanings by turning the performance of unmitigated facethreatening acts into a symbolic gesture. This formulation brings out the function of the *dugri* way of speaking: to express members' sense of integrity, of being true to themselves and to their community.

Winch's (1972) discussion of the virtue of truthfulness as an essential element of social life is relevant to the understanding of *dugri* speech as a ceremonial idiom. Drawing a formal analogy between language and other social institutions, he says that the more general concept of integrity is to social institutions what the concept of truthfulness is to the institution of language. Both concepts are associated with the idea of commitment – to what one does and says, and, I would stress, to who one claims to be. Winch is, however, alert to the different roles these concepts may play in the cultural life of particular societies. He says:

> Of course, the particular form which integrity will take, what will count as "integrity" and "lack of integrity," will depend on the particular institutions within the context of which the question arises. (Ibid.:70)

Friedrich (1977) similarly discusses the notion of integrity as a cultural construct, which varies in both the content and the form of its articulation across cultural groups and is encapsulated in their "code of honor." Of special interest in our connection is Friedrich's emphasis on the speech-relevant aspects of the code of honor that symbolize personal integrity:

> Much of the overt stuff of honor is a matter of idiom, the selection of key words, the use of certain words in certain ways . . . Thus honor is in some ways a matter of style, and this is connected with its apparent superficiality (even "triviality" for many observers) and its sensitive, albeit imperfect reticulation with ways of speaking. (Ibid.:186)

Integrity is located at the point where a speaker-focused but integrative orientation finds its symbolic expression. It is publicly displayed in a ceremonial idiom that is both intelligible to and cherished by individuals sharing a common culture. In this sense, the code of honor, however symbolized, unites cultural members, enveloping speaker and hearer in a shared symbolic web, while at the same time dramatizing the "sense of self."

As was suggested earlier, the analysis of *dugri* utterances – whether explicit or not – must take into account two types of meanings: social and cultural. From the standpoint of social meanings, *dugri* utterances are claimed to be hearer-oriented in that they pose a threat to the hearer's positive face. But this is only part of the story. From the standpoint of cultural meanings, *dugri* speech is both speaker focused and

communally oriented. It is an important element in th
honor, which provides the symbolic means for estab
integrity or "sense of self." Despite their recognitio
of their *dugri* talk, some of my informants express
people who were not able to respond to it graciously
hurt by its blunt edge. Responding to a *dugri* comm
is not only a failure to act as a wholesome member of
it also aborts the interlocutor's attempt to pl
appropriately.

More poignantly yet, in discussing *dugri* speech v
Sabras, those who claimed they would speak *dugri*
stances, I came to realize that their understanding of
the threat it poses to the hearer's face was strongly
culture-specific interpretation of the role of "facew
cultural meanings associated with *dugri* speech (as dis
2), they said that in speaking *dugri* they displayed
conversational partner as a person who is strong and
to accept *dugri* talk and function within a *dugri* re
who are overly concerned with their own face, who h
with silk gloves," as some informants put it, prevent
them with true respect. From the Sabra's point of view
from *dugri* speech that one displays lack of respect fo
is, paradigmatic *dugri* speakers do not disregard the h
but they interpret the interactional dance Goffman
work" within a culture-specific framework in whic
considerateness is the issue, and both demeanor and d
ured in terms of interactants' willingness to engage in
the case of *dugri* speech indicates that speech com
respect to the weight and cultural interpretation the
work" dimension in interaction, not only in the specif
"facework."

The foregoing analysis demonstrated that explicit
tokens of *dugri* speech, serve many interactional fu
both the social and cultural meanings of the statem
are embedded. It was shown that as speech signs, *dugr*
emphasize the speakers' concern with face. The analy
it was argued, requires an extension of the Brown a
of politeness strategies to acknowledge the speaker
well as concerns related to both the speaker's and th
face-wants. In taking into account cultural member
the "facework" involved in speaking *dugri*, a serio
model emerges: its lack of sensitivity to the level of
The example of *dugri* speech therefore suggests tha

study of ways of speaking must go beyond the study of devices and strategies to acknowledge the role of cultural orientations in the shaping of speechways. It is only when cultural interpretation becomes an intrinsic part of the study of speech forms and strategies that their significance in particular cultural settings can be more fully appreciated (Hymes 1974a).

The discussion so far has emphasized the role of the Sabra cultural ethos in the crystallization of the *dugri* interactional code. Despite the well-established patterns I have pointed out, neither the *dugri* way of speaking nor the cultural world of which it forms a part are fixed, immutable realities. I therefore conclude this portion of my exposition by describing some recent changes and meaning-shifts associated with the *dugri* mode and the cultural code that grounds its use. These fluctuations have implications for a broader account of Israeli culture, reinforcing statements made by other observers, and perhaps forcing a new awareness of them by the additional insight they provide.

On the softening and roughening of the *dugri* mode

Through discussions of the *dugri* mode with a wide variety of Israelis, I consistently encountered two kinds of responses to my study. Many people expressed the feeling that directness is, indeed, the most central element in the Sabra's expressive repertoire. At the same time, several of them commented that in recent years *dugri* speech has not been as prevalent as it used to be and that there has been a considerable erosion in its cultural force. This tended to be associated with broader cultural trends, especially the erosion of what some have called the "civil religions" of Socialist Zionism and then statism that dominated Israel until probably the mid-1960s and have left their mark on Israeli society.[11]

I believe the intuitive observations of my informants concerning changes in the standing of the *dugri* idiom, whether accurate or not, correctly link these changes with significant cultural developments that have taken place in Israel in the past decade or so, and in which the *dugri* idiom and the cultural world associated with it have played a special role. My observations suggest that the *dugri* code serves as a point of reference for cultural members not only in explicit nostalgic allusions to the spirit of times past; it also provides the terms and tropes through which other, less crystallized, and less familiar cultural orientations are made intelligible, and in relation to which they are often evaluated.

The precarious status of the *dugri* code has some interesting linguistic reflections: notably, the term *dugri* has undergone a process of "dissociation," as Perelman (1978) calls it. Thus, my notes yield the follow-

ing "dissociated" expressions: "real *dugri*," "true
content/form," "internal/external *dugri*," "sincere
to the end." Interpreting Perelman's notion of the d
as a cultural process, I would say that this phenom
weakening of the hold of the *dugri* idiom and the et
it, while at the same time, its basic appeal is still ac
attempt to defend it linguistically.[12]

The characterization of the expressive developm
by the dissociation of the term *dugri* as the "softe
ening," respectively, of the *dugri* mode was sugge
wording of a short article written by an Arab Druze
he used the expression "the roughening of the Sabr
describe some expressive manifestations that had ho
rure of extreme right-wing political rhetoric in recen
Kol Haifa, Feb. 25, 1983). The terms *softening* and
intended to imply a coherent process moving in two d
As I try to show, what we are witnessing are a r
movements that seem to affect stylistic expressio
different ways, with the result that the presumed heg
idiom is undercut in various ways. This may accou
although some informants were convinced that th
matter of times past, several soldierboys believed t
term, part of the ever-changing military slang to v
been introduced.

The following discussion is necessarily tentative
more empirical work and perhaps greater historical d
to trace the fluctuations of cultural style in contemp
however, to convey some of the flavor of these ch
coming sketch of the softening and roughening of t

The softening of the dugri *mode*

The softened *dugri* mode is a style associated with th
(*tzabar bli kotsim*), a social designation that plays
metaphor introduced earlier. In an interview, a mi
scribed it as follows: "I used to be very *dugri* when
now I've grown up, I've mellowed. I'm careful not
against the wall. My friends, we've all grown up yo
Sabras, but without so many thorns." There are
softening process: One has to do with the growing
social costs attending the use of the blunt *dugri* mo
heterogeneous and hierarchical society, many of w

never shared the symbol system of which *dugri* speech forms a part. This trend is reflected in calls for a better quality of life, interpreted, inter alia, as greater considerateness and politeness in interpersonal contacts as well as in public debate. Repeated calls by Israel's current minister of education (and former president), Yitshak Navon, indicate the centrality of this concern; for example, a notice in *Yedioth Ahronoth* (Nov. 25, 1984) reports, under the heading of "Reeducation," that the street language common among youngsters nowadays worries the minister. At the same time, the speech of European youth appears to him to be overloaded with signs of "artificial politeness." Weighing the balance, the minister is reported to have resolved: "From now on, special emphasis will be placed on oral expression in the school curriculum. I came to the conclusion that artificial politeness is preferable."

A second facet of the softening of the *dugri* mode has to do with a reinterpretation of the notions of sincerity and openness associated with it. I was initially alerted to it when a number of informants, female students in their early twenties, interpreted the term *dugri* as being open in a sense similar to the American notion of self-disclosure or the French notion of sincerity as described by Trilling. Subsequent questioning revealed that some Sabra informants interpreted *dugriut* as a speech style differently. Most of them understood it in the traditional way, in the sense of speaking one's mind, whereas a few others, notably the younger ones, believed that it referred to the disclosure of one's feelings in contexts that may entail embarrassment and loss of face. Still others wavered between these two interpretations.

This wavering is neatly exemplified in a chapter entitled "*Dugri*," which appears in a book for adolescents by Smadar Shir. The book, entitled *More Conversations with Anat* (1985), which takes the form of dialogues with a teenage girl, is based on the author's column in a popular youth magazine, *Maariv Lanoar*. Let me trace the uses of *dugri* in this chapter to illustrate the subtle semantic shift the term may undergo even in the same discourse.

Anat enters the author's apartment in a state of outrage, but is extremely vague about the reason for her anger. The author prods her to stop beating around the bush and tell her *dugri* what had happened. Anat blurts out that she will never speak *dugri* again, since so far it has resulted only in aggravation. After some probing by the author and further vows never to speak *dugri* again, Anat tells her story:

She had a blind date with a boy she liked, and before they parted she was "*dugri* to the end" and told him that she would be glad to see him again. He was very nice and promised to call. She waited, but no call came. So she called him and he was pleasant again, but again did not keep his promise to call. This pattern was repeated several times. Anat

was determined to see how long he would keep up "t[illegible] game" and became very upset. She claimed that the reas[illegible] was not that he did not want to see her but that he [illegible] explicitly, and she voiced the Sabra's creed: "There is o[illegible] asked for and still ask: sincerity" (p. 46).

In response to the author's question of whether it [illegible] been worse to be explicitly rejected, she admits that i[illegible] pleasant to hear or tell the whole truth. However, sh[illegible] spite of the potenrial injury this policy is better and les[illegible] both parries in the long run. To the author's suggestion [illegible] white lies are an inevitable part of life, she retorts:

> Not by me! In my view, a white lie, too, is hypocrisy and dec[illegible] never compliment anybody on her new hairstyle if I thought [illegible] a monkey face. She may think that I am impolite, or that I a[illegible] revolutionary change in her appearance, but I will not bluff [illegible] white lie, nor a black lie, nor a freckled lie, none at all (p. 4[illegible]

The author expresses her admiration for Anat's high[illegible] suggests that Anat and the boy would probably not h[illegible] other given their very different communication styles. S[illegible] urging Anat to be "*dugri* with herself" and examine t[illegible] for her outrage, indicating that she does not take Ana[illegible] the *dugri* creed at face value.

A careful reading of this article brings to light the s[illegible] the notion of *dugri* speech is used: At first, Anat uses t[illegible] its nontraditional sense, to refer to the disclosure of on[illegible] and desires. Being "*dugri* to the end" in her parlance [illegible] coincide with the notion of openness as used in some Am[illegible] (cf. Katriel and Philipsen 1981). Later, however, in disc[illegible] conduct, she appeals to the traditional notion of being *du*[illegible] an extreme version of the *dugri* speaker. Finally, the au[illegible] the meaning of *dugri* speech, associating it with the [illegible] confrontation and self-probing when – perhaps somewh[illegible] she tells Anat to be *dugri* with herself.

This article reflects some of the semantic fluctuations [illegible] in the discourse of certain Israelis. The direction of th[illegible] an increasing concern with self-expression rather than t[illegible] associated with the *dugri* mode, and an increasing conce[illegible] feelings rather than the social commitment that animate[illegible] This reinforces general observations of a shift from a [illegible] individualistic orientation in Israel. This shift is sometim[illegible] the impact of American culture and has a variety of [illegible] including the unprecedented growth of a therapeutic [illegible]

ts focus on individuality and interpersonal sensitivity as part of an intimate domain removed from the public sphere.[13]

I suggest that the process of accommodating new cultural emphases and uncharted expressive domains – for example, the emphasis on the private self and emotional expression – is facilitated by embedding it in the native notions of directness and sincerity, as manifested in the tendency to stretch the meanings and uses of *dugri*.

The roughening of the dugri *mode*

Whereas the softening of the *dugri* mode is marked by a reinterpretation of the concept of sincerity, its roughening involves a reinterpretation of the ideas of assertiveness and strength. The former process has gone unnamed; the latter is often associated with a named communicative style known as *signon hakasah*, the style of *kasah*, a colloquial Arabic word (from "to bust") that refers to confrontation involving intimidation through aggressive verbal encounters or physical violence.

Currently, the term *kasah*, in its reference to interactional style, and its various derivatives, especially the verb *lekase'ah*, are commonly found in everyday parlance and in the press. In discussions of this stylistic manifestation, *kasah* tends to be associated with the growing factionalization and radicalization of Israeli social life as a result of various societal and political processes, and with the absence of a consensually upheld system of symbols and meanings.[14] Several informants described *kasah* as a degenerate, corrupt version of the *dugri* mode, mainly in discussing the limits of *dugrijut*. I have noted comments explicitly contrasting these two styles, most commonly, "*Ze lo dugri, ze kvar kasah*" (This is not *dugri*, it's already *kasah*). These comments were intended to prevent the notion of *dugrijut* from being associated with, and contaminated by, expressive displays the informants considered to be in the style of *kasah*.

Interestingly, the entry for *kasah* in the second volume of the dictionary of slang by Ben-Amotz and Ben-Yehuda (1982:180) acknowledges the use of the term only in reference to physical violence. Thus, *kasah* is defined as "a violent fight, with blows and beatings" but the examples suggest that it may be used with reference to verbal violence as well: "She is a member of Hashomer Hatza'ir [a leftist youth movement] and her older brother is in Eretz Israel Hashlema [a right-wing movement]. Don't ask what *kasah* goes on in that home." Or "He was drunk and insisted on going into the club. Some hoodlum got hold of him and there started a serious *kasah*."

As far as I can tell, the term *kasah* is systematically ambiguous in its

reference to physical or verbal violence: At times the c
the meaning of the term, as when the TV debate between
and Democratic candidates from the U.S. state of North
described as "*kasah* televisioni," as TV *kasah* (*Yedioth A*
2, 1984); or when physical political violence in the city
described in the weekly *Koteret Rashit* (Mar. 9, 1983), wh
carried the words "Days of *Kasah*." In other cases, the
remain ambiguous; for example, when someone reports
kasah" (He went down on him *kasah*, that is, he attack
is no way to tell if words, or blows, or both were exchan
is that in these contexts it does not matter: The words
as violently intended as the blows.

The metaphor underlying the style of *kasah* is that of
the expression *kasah bli kfafot* (*kasah* without gloves), w
the ruthlessness involved, unsoftened by the use of glo
ample I have encountered, this metaphor was used in a
dugri could have been just as appropriately used – whe
use of *kasah* instead was rather surprising. An article i
19, 1984) related the struggle of a family whose son h
wounded in the army. One passage reads: "From the do
to hear only the truth. They ask difficult questions. Comfo
irritate them. N. [the father] says he wants the doctors to
kasah with gloves."

Finally, in an article by G. Samet (*Haaretz*, Oct. 1
laments the lack of sensitivity shown toward the elderly i
Israeli society, the author reflects that this is the mark o
manifests an attraction to the *macho* style and that "
integrated into its lexicon the term *kasah*."

I am not claiming by any means that the style of *kasah*
of the *dugri* mode. I do suggest, however, that this styl
to which it gives expression – unpalatable as both may be
– have become competing forces in Israeli culture and are
a conflation of terms and rhetorical appeals to similar-so
values: Both *dugri* speech and *kasah* style valorize the
of self-assertion and a direct attitude. In an almost im
in meaning, however, the Sabra's drive toward autono
based personal integrity is being replaced or reinterpre
power of intimidation rather than fortitude and streng
becomes the measure of all things.[15]

Clearly, the softening and roughening of the *dugri* m
patible, and both reflect widely acknowledged trends i
Israel. They are equally incompatible with the ethos u
speech in one important sense: Neither the retreat to a

domain nor the construction of a public domain in which brute force reigns is compatible with the self-focused yet egalitarian and humanistic orientation that is the distinctive social-expressive meaning-complex underlying *dugri* speech.

Whether or not these developments are "mutations of *dugriyut*," as one informant expressed it, and how they stand in relation to it are questions I cannot answer. However, some speakers, whether consciously or not, seem to interpret a variety of expressive manifestations they encounter with reference to the *dugri* code and the meaning system associated with it. This may facilitate some of the stylistic shifts observed on the Israeli scene.

The persistence of the *dugri* mode

The preceding observations notwithstanding, the *dugri* idiom is still widely intelligible in Israeli society. This is reflected, for example, in the way public figures are sometimes portrayed in the press. Journalistic portraits of prominent men at times include allusions to their Sabra characteristics and *dugri* style in a nearly formulaic fashion. This is indicated by the following descriptions of public figures of various political persuasions and a wide range of personal backgrounds, which point to the public reality of the cultural code underlying *dugri* speech.

One example is a sympathetic portrayal of Mr. Tulipman, a former director-general of the National Power Company (T. Avidar, *Maariv*, Dec. 12, 1980) following his angry resignation after a stormy meeting with the company's board of directors. The affair focused public attention (for a moment) on the problematics of the Sabra *dugri* style. The article presented Mr. Tulipman's side of the controversy and reads somewhat as an apologia for the Sabra style in a world where it is not as effective as it used to be. Among other things, it says:

> He is a man of the direct approach, the *dugri* speaking style, high principles and an inner honesty which he applies both in his personal and his public life. An old friend of his defines him as a person who is sensitive – and inflexible, who ranks high on "Sabra toughness." The leader of the workers' union in the company rejected the suggestion that Tulipman was a tough and uncompromising director-general, offering a most favorable valuation of his Sabra manner: "Right, he is a Sabra manager, with all the good qualities this implies. Simple, *dugri*."

Another article (Y. Kotler, *Maariv*, Jan. 8, 1982), devoted to a senior military officer (Ben-Eliezer) on his departure from army life and entry into politics, says:

> He speaks *dugri*. It is easy to get him to talk. His hawkish vi
> crystallized. His sentences clear, sharp . . . Commitment to th
> for him the highest of values . . . His advice: in place of empty
> of deeds.

A third example is found in a journalistic portrait o
Israel's minister of transportation at the time of its wri
Maariv, Aug. 7, 1981):

> Haim Korfu is a pragmatically oriented Sabra (*tzabar bitzuis*
> the difference between the important and the trivial, betwee
> and the practical . . . He speaks straight to the point. His lang
> simple, without embellishments and ambiguities.

Another example includes the following comments in
Moshe Dayan, which appeared in the *International Hera*
18–19, 1981):

> He called himself a Jewish peasant but to millions around th
> Dayan was a symbol of Israel – proud, straight talking, defia
> recognized by the black eye-patch he always wore.

Finally, the Sabra characteristics identified in a publi
be the focus of bitter criticisms, as in the case of a rather
of Mota Gur (Y. Kotler, *Maariv*, June 12, 1981), a form
who became politically prominent in the Labor move
1981 election campaign. The article, entitled "Mota
critical interpretation of the Sabra image, highlighting th
ness and at the same time indicating an awareness
attractiveness of the image for voters and for the Labo
described as eagerly looking for "a savior in the imag

> He is a former chief-of-staff, a Sabra who speaks Hebrew w
> accent, dynamic, speaks *dugri*. Many like him just because
> characteristics, his lack of rhetorical flair, his terrible toughn
> he is a through-and-through Sabra, a native-born and not a
> transplant.

Several years later, another portrait of Gur, writte
journalist, drew a comparison between him and Sha
during their military careers both were in the habit
whatever they thought and paid for it dearly more
Azulai-Katz, *Yedioth Ahronoth*, Dec. 6, 1985).

These excerpts illustrate that the meanings and valu
my informants with *dugri* speech echo more general cult
ings in Israeli society. Let me emphasize that my pur
the previous chapter was to explicate the meanings a
speech as an expressive form, not to assess the genera

bution of the cultural premises and behavioral norms that give it cultural force. Except for a few cases, even informants who readily identified themselves as *dugri* speakers and expressed a high positive valuation of the *dugri* interactional code did not claim that it is equally applicable in all social situations. Personal dispositions as well as strategic considerations may prevent a Sabra from speaking *dugri* in a given situation – but whether one engages in *dugri* speech or not, the significance of one's choice will be colored by the symbolic value of this way of speaking in the culture. In some cases, most notably in contexts that call forth the enactment of a *dugri* ritual, the interactional mode chosen carries considerable symbolic weight, as will be demonstrated in the analysis of the *dugri* ritual as a speech event in the next chapter. In other cases, it may be either casually or self-consciously avoided in the interest of maintaining interpersonal harmony in contexts in which *communitas* relations can neither be readily assumed nor easily invoked.

The cultural world in which *dugri* speech crystallized was crucial in the development of modern Israeli culture – which, like "the culture of any society at any moment is more like the debris or 'fall out' of past ideological systems than it is itself a system, a coherent whole" (Turner 1974:14). Let me stress, then, that this study does not purport to be a study of Israeli Culture writ large (no such thing exists, many of my informants took pains to underline). It is, rather, a study of a set of significant symbols that articulate a particular domain of ideological fallout.

4. The *dugri* ritual

The *dugri* way of speaking is embodied in a speech
dubbed "the *dugri* ritual." In native terms, this even
siha dugrit, a *dugri* talk. A *dugri* talk is not just any e
the *dugri* idiom is employed or in which utterances in
exchanged. A *dugri* talk is a distinct speech event wit
motivational structure of its own. That Sabras thems
to be true is shown, first, by references made to *siha*
by the fact that informants clearly distinguished betwe
and having a *dugri* talk. Thus, although a *dugri* talk im
speaking *dugri* does not necessarily imply the stagin
The consideration of a *dugri* talk, therefore, takes us
utterance or single speech-act level of analysis and i
ination of larger discourse units and their episodic st

Two typical enactments of the *dugri* ritual that a
involve interactions in the workplace, that is, in a c
relates to the social modality of *societas*, with its syste
roles and statuses. In one case, an engineer in his ea
at some length about a *dugri* talk he initiated with hi
what he described as *siha dugrit* by declaring: "I wa
dugri. I don't like the way this department is being
case, a young faculty member of approximately the
some of his colleagues had independently identified
initiated what he referred to as a *dugri* talk with
professors in his department just as he was being
criticizing the way things were going in the departm
his list of complaints by saying that he wanted to voice
he got tenure so that no one could say he had been
mind before his job was secure. The forthcoming ana
what these two men were up to.

These examples could be easily multiplied. Let m
example of the *dugri* ritual to which I myself was a
brought home to me its compelling force in a most viv

during a meeting between a group of university faculty and represen tatives of the Israeli Ministry of Education who had sought the academics' assistance in setting up some new extracurricular programs for elementary school children. In previous meetings, there had been fundamental differences of opinion between a number of the academics and the ministry people on the nature of the proposed programs and the kind of involvement expected from the former.

The meeting opened with a lengthy conciliatory speech by a ministry representative in which he acknowledged the validity of the academics' view that educational efforts should be directed toward the betterment of regular schooling, but pointed out the practical constraints under which the ministry operated, which had led them to plan the proposed programs. He expressed the need to bridge over differences and reach a working consensus.

One of the university professors, a first-generation Sabra, who had initially demanded a principled discussion of the cooperation proposed, changed the tone of the encounter by initiating a version of the *dugri* ritual. Using blunt language and a confrontational tone, she argued that the university should not play the role of educational contractor for the ministry and should become involved only with programs that called for and permitted the exploration and rethinking of educational issues and policies. She said that as long as children's regular schooling was allowed to be meaningless, there was no point in establishing extracurricular programs. She stressed that she had no problem helping these programs in her field of expertise and would do so if asked, but refused to share in the pretense that anything of substance was being done for the children. She concluded by saying that she would not lend her name to something she did not believe in.

The interesting point from the standpoint of this study is not just that this event provided me with a live, prototypical example of the *dugri* ritual as it will be characterized later, but that, familiar with my work, its initiator turned to me shortly after the event and, half triumphant, half embarrassed, said: "Well, there, I gave you an example of a *dugri* ritual." Neither she as initiator nor I as peripheral participant had been aware of this while it was happening, but both of us readily recognized it for what it was afterward, and could discuss our interpretations of it in the terms employed in the forthcoming analysis.

Notably, unlike the tenure situation, this case did not involve a clear cut, hierarchical relationship but rather an attempt to prevent the incorporation of the academics into the educational establishment. It was a ritual act of confrontation, a ceremony of discord, performed in the culture's legitimatizing idiom: the idiom in which one's integrity and one's shared cultural world are reaffirmed. The use of *dugri* speech here,

as in all other cases of its ritual enactment, scr
in the Sabra culture is considered the tendency
sonal differences in the service of a false, superfic
with harmony in interpersonal relations at the
basic issues and matters of principle. Despite th
the confrontational tone, the *dugri* ritual was ex
of true contact, of unmasking, and was receive
appropriate even by participants whose own s
dugri speech.

It is not claimed that participants consciously
mensions of a *dugri* talk. What I propose to c
metaphor to the interaction referred to by my in
so as to shed some light on what I perceive to b
My focus, thus, differs from that of Turner in
process, with its emphasis on the high-profile,
pressive culture in that it deals with everyday c
that are not "officially" regarded as cultural per
On the other hand, unlike other approaches gea
of members' experience,[3] this study seeks to c
structured moments of life. It is these structure
tively colored interaction sequences, experienc
in their everydayness, that are most readily am
a ritual framework.

In what follows, I try to show that the *dugr*
ognizable pattern of symbolic actions whose f
affirmation of participants' relationship to wh
culturally sanctioned "sacred object," the Sabra
be seen as providing a context in which the m
ciated with *dugri* speech are encapsulated and d
it is a context in which the image of the Sabra
driven, sincere New Jew is reaffirmed throug
bellious confrontation.

Thus, despite the discordant note associated
manifests the functional nature of conflict as a
life of individuals and groups. Simmel (1955:1
chological satisfaction inherent in the act of op
to prove our strength consciously and only th
procity to conditions from which, without su
withdraw at any cost." Myerhoff's (1978:184)
pattern of conflict among elderly Jews in Cal
psychological satisfaction associated with con
tential: "To fight each other, people must sha

and knowledge. Fighting is a partnership, requiring cooperation. ...undary-maintaining mechanism – for strangers cannot participate – it is also above all a profoundly sociable activity."[4]

...e agonistic behavior that constitutes the *dugri* ritual is perceived ...embers of the culture as a sign of engagement and commitment ...most frequently used native term being *ihpatijut*, which means ...rn with others or with public issues). It is conduct that is both self ...ive and communally oriented. As such, it is contrasted by cultural ...bers to "silence" (in the sense of a failure to speak up, as in "I'll ...m *dugri*, I won't shut up") as well as with indifference (*lo ihpatijut*), ..., as Simmel points out, is what both conflict and positive associ... should be conceptually distinguished from.

...ven the potency of such ceremonial discords, it is no wonder that ...ments of the *dugri* ritual tend to be so intensely remembered by ...cipants in it, especially the initiators. Such events have often been ...ted to me spontaneously by friends and even casual acquaintances ...her emotional tones. The telling of the event carries its ritual import beyond the context in which it was enacted so that the initiator's ... of integrity is further reaffirmed and the sense of discomfort often ...iated with initiating conflict is alleviated.[5]

...form and function of a *dugri* talk

...fortbcoming account of the *dugri* ritual utilizes Hymes's (1972) ...ma for the study of speech events, which was proposed as a heuristic ...t for ethnographic descriptions and includes the following compo...s: message form, message content, setting, scene, participants, ends ...her divided into goals and outcomes), key, channels, instrumen...es (or forms of speech), and norms of interaction and interpretation. ...se categories, though analytically distinguishable, often blend into ... other in the description of actual speech events, as is the case at ...ous points in the following account.

Participants

...road terms, the initial relationship among participants in the *dugri* ...al is defined by their relative position, that is, by social-structural ...erences, rather than by a shared cultural core. In addition, partici...s must accept the Sabra culture's interpersonal ideology according ...hich the attempt to re-create *communitas* symbolically through di..., confrontational speech is an intelligible and legitimate interactional

move. Indeed, a *dugri* talk can be seen as a way of effecting a r... transition from *societas* to a *communitas*-like state marked by ... stage" language of behavior. This implies the aforementioned ... condition for participation: Participants must be linked thro... pendable, social-structural bonds but at the same time must s... Sabra interpersonal ideology that guarantees the possibilit... creating the social modality of *communitas* within the ritual c...

The felicitous performance of the *dugri* ritual depends not ... the speaker's projection of a Sabra image but also on his ability t... that image to the addressee, or at least to cast the addressee in ... of someone who can understand and accept it.[6] In contacts betw... Sabra and outsiders to the culture who, unlike the non-Sabr... generation, are neither familiar with nor inclined to accept t... idiom, the staging of the ritual is felt to be utterly inappropria...

An example of a context in which the re-creation of *com*... through direct, confrontational, *dugri* speech is neither intelli... legitimate is that of diplomatic encounters. In fact, one of the c... offered by informants for *dugrijut* was diplomacy. Diplomatic ... ters probably stand at the farthest remove from *dugri* talks: Di... has room neither for the *dugri* speaker's preference for clear ... ambiguous expression nor for his or her tolerance of a confron... direct approach. When this is forgotten or deliberately ignored, ... to have been the case with former Defense Minister Ariel S... one of his reported meetings with American Special Ambassad... Habib during the Lebanon War, the result can be confusing ... concerting. In this case, the directness of the Sabra style seem... been stretched beyond its customary bounds: The line betwee... and the "mere rudeness" from which my informants often tri... tinguish it – a line that is not always easy to draw – was blurre... violation of a rule of participation. This made the rough ed... talk more clearly noticeable.

Thus, a news headline in *Maariv* (July 23, 1982) reported tha... needed medical treatment after a talk with Sharon." The su... consisted of an anonymous citation stating that "Habib was on ... of a heart attack," apparently as a result of the fact that "Sh... ployed a tough, resolute and blunt style." The body of the artic...

> The protocol of the Habib-Sharon talk indicates that it was, indeed, ... routine conversation. The Minister of Defense, in his open and direc... speaking, told the American intermediary what was on his mind, giv... lack of progress in the negotiation which costs Israel human lives.

In fact, this conversation triggered what is known as a di... incident as well as puzzlement at Israel's intentions and, po...

misinterpretation of its stance. In this as in other communicative contexts, the way things were said carried more weight than their actual content. This incident illustrates that the interpretations of the *dugri* style inside and outside of the Sabra culture often do not coincide. Thus, in the English-language daily newspaper of the same day, the *Jerusalem Post*, Wolf Bitzer reported that the American ambassador to Israel, Mr. Lewis, had complained on behalf of the U.S. government to Begin of Sharon's brusqueness with Habib. Begin apparently endorsed both the positions put forward by Sharon and the straightforward manner he had employed. The incident, according to this report, actually led to misunderstandings: Although he had been invited to Jerusalem by Sharon on Begin's behalf, Habib seemed to have interpreted Sharon's straight talk on that occasion as a signal that Israel had despaired of the diplomatic effort.

In discussing these issues with a couple of newcomers from the United States who resented the Sabras' directness, I noted a very interesting point in folk comparisons of Israeli and American patterns. The Americans' objection was not to the bluntness associated with *dugri* speech; they felt that, especially in discussions that would be classified as a *dugri* talk, the speaker, although claiming to be direct, was "hiding behind an impersonal facade," was not talking as one person to another. The *dugri* comments were made in the name of some general principle and were sometimes even prefaced by "Don't take it personally." I think these commentators captured an important aspect of the *dugri* ritual: Although it provides the initiator with a context for selfassertion, it is not the self-assertion of the individual qua individual; it is, rather, the principled defiance of the individual as the representative of an alternative, more valid point of view, of the individual as a paradigm-bearer. It was both startling and sobering for me to find out that the very cultural performance that epitomizes the Sabras' directness from the natives' point of view can be experienced as annoyingly indirect by at least some Americans, whose cultural interpretation of directness seems to include reference to interactants' orientation to their unique personalities (cf. Katriel and Philipsen 1981).

One more point: Although the *dugri* ritual marks an interactional shift of gears involving the social leveling of the participants, this does not imply an interactional symmetry between them. In fact, the ritual is organized in terms of two clearly differentiated interactional roles: The first is the role of the initiator, the person who has a protest to voice and who defines the situation as calling for the enactment of the *dugri* ritual, thereby challenging the addressee's position by expounding his or her views. This role involves personal choice and hence, by its

very nature, implies a measure of self-expression. Th
of the respondent, the person whose position or para
lenged. The ritual is primarily the initiator's; the r
secondary. He or she contributes mainly by being
facilitating the initiator's attempt to stage his c
character."

These observations concerning the structure of p
is typical of *dugri* rituals, bring out the nature of th
associated with it. As noted in Chapter 3, these role r
be comprehended in terms of Bernstein's distinction
versus personal social orientations. In the context
one set of positional relationships is suspended and an
What is suspended is a set of relationships pertaini
of *societas*, and what is invoked is a set of relationsh
liminal-state quality of *communitas*. In this ritually c
like order, participants play a representative role;
express their individual personalities. It is a relatio
Bernstein's positional order in that it is grounded i
norm. It is, however, unlike Bernstein's positional
shared cultural norm is invoked precisely to enga
speech, speech oriented to the goals of clarificatio
misunderstanding, and the expression of divergent o
tures are associated with "elaborated" coding and pe
in Bernstein's work and not with limited, norm-or
acterized by implicit understandings that are invok
proverbs, and so on.

The poignancy of the ritual is greatest when th
power than the addressee in societal terms (the em
place, the son in the family), when no appeal can be n
rights to warrant outspokenness. When the ritual is i
powerful person (the boss in the workplace, the fa
the enactment of the ritual implies that the initiat
refuses to appeal to his or her institutional rights.

In sum, whether a person's place in a hierarchy
kenness, or whether the person is unwilling or una
or her power-based right to speak, the *dugri* ritual is a
format for sidestepping the bounds of *societas*. The
counter provides an arena for the assertion of cha
same time being softened by the spirit of *communi*
modeled. Its ritual containment prevents it from rad
ticipants' structural relations outside of the ritual
provides a forum for the airing of discontent and
action.

Setting

e initiatot wants to ensure that the *dugri* talk remains ritually con-
ed, he or she enacts it in a private setting. This protects the re-
ndent's interests, since the absence of onlookers softens the edge of
dugri talk. In taking this precaution, however, the initiator limits
audience for his or her own "drama of character," which has its
drawbacks. So, in choosing the setting for the staging of the ritual,
the initiator's and the respondent's interests come into play, and
aking a choice the initiator indicates the degree to which they have
taken into account.
dugri talk is a somewhat formal event and has to be set up in terms
me and place. It is not initiated casually. Typically, the initiator
rms the respondent that he or she wishes to have a talk and will
for an appropriate time or place to be suggested. This occurs when
r she is willing to oblige the respondent by limiting participation
conducting the talk in an inner office or the like. When no such
sideration is intended, perhaps because it is not practicable (as in
meeting with the Ministry of Education people cited earlier), the
al is enacted in a public domain, in view and hearing of other par-
pants, who no less than the respondent become an audience for the
ator's message and self-dramatization.

Scene

informants' characterization of the psychological setting of a *dugri*
, as one calling for a corrective action, a protest, or a challenge,
ks it as a rhetorical situation (Bitzer 1968). This was revealed most
rly when they repeatedly cited two contexts in which they would not
e a *dugri* talk. The first one involved situations in which *dugri* speech
ld be ineffective, "would make no difference," or "would not change
thing." The second one involved situations in which the informant
no stake: People said they would not bother to speak *dugri*, let
ne initiate a *dugri* talk, if they "did not care" whether things would
nge or not. In this instance, what was missing was the sense of
sonal commitment and personal responsibility for shaping one's so-
world that is associated with the enactment of the *dugri* ritual.
social situation is defined as rhetorical when it is interpreted as
lving a rhetorical exigency, that is, in Bitzer's terms, an "imperfec-
marked by urgency" (1968:386), which calls for a corrective rhe-
cal act. It is a rhetorical exigency because it is believed that it can

be positively modified and that this modification requires c
by the use of discourse. Thus, in order for a member of th
initiate the *dugri* ritual, he or she should:

1. Define the situation as involving a rhetorical exigency
   requiring a remedy to be achieved through discourse.
2. Define the respondent as a rhetorical audience, one o
   of persons who "are capable of being influenced by di
   of being mediators of change" (Bitzer 1968:387).
3. Feel a moral obligation and commitment to interpret t
   as one addressed to himself or herself.
4. Feel that he or she has the right to confront the re
   demanding the correction of the situation.

The *dugri* ritual, then, can be regarded as a rhetorical a
to function "as a fitting response to a situation which need
it" (Bitzer 1968:386). It is predicated on a sense of comm
pation interpreted both as an obligation and a right to ha
and to influence one's social world in the direction one s
dugri ritual provides a way of doing so and a context f
dramatization of the person prepared to speak up. Therefore
the initiator does not really hope that much can be accom
dugri talk (as was the case in all three examples cited at th
of the chapter), it is perceived as a link in a change-produc
actions in that it signals division and lack of consensus. Th
not only acknowledged but also intensified by the initiator
gloss over fundamental differences for the sake of maintai
pearance of harmony, to "plaster the issues" ("*letajeah et*
as the prevailing metaphor has it. There is no expectatio
that the ritual confrontation will lead to the resolution of
ences. In fact, persons who reported about *dugri* talks they
indicated that they would have been confused and even em
the respondent had been readily persuaded. This would hav
their "drama of character" had exceeded its stage. Immedia
thus implies a misjudgment. To know this is an importan
participant "competence," since to overdramatize one's "ch
plies loss of face no less than underdramatizing it, which s
discussions of demeanor as an element of facework shoul
concerned with both aspects of self-presentation.

Message content

As noted earlier, in terms of its content the *dugri* ritual
against a particular state of affairs the initiator perceives t

to uphold, and with which the initiator is dissatisfied. The *dugri* message involves an explicit verbalization of one's thoughts concerning a controversial issue as well as a commitment to deal with it, however uncomfortable and costly this may be in terms of participants' social relationships.

More often than not, the situation protested against in the *dugri* ritual is formulated as an issue related to the public good rather than to one's personal interest. It thus tends to be cast in moralistic terms and to deal with basic tenets and principles of moral and social life, with competing paradigms rather than with localized, particularized problems. The protest against "the way the department is being run" thus tends to challenge undemocratic management procedures, and the criticism of a university department becomes a defense of academic standards.

As noted earlier, differences of opinion that could be readily dealt with in discussion between the participants would not be proper candidates for a *dugri* ritual. This ritual, like the "griping ritual" studied elsewhere (Katriel 1985), is not a problem-solving session, although it takes problematic issues as its topic. Whatever the subject of the *dugri* ritual, its underlying theme is the tension between dissensus and affiliation: The initiator, through an act of protest and self-assertion, dissociates himself from a given structural relationship or social paradigm while at the same time asserting a deeper affiliation with a more basic and more encompassing one.

The form in which this tension is expressed and resolved seems to be rooted as much in traditional Jewish culture as in a revolutionary orientation. The actualization of the individual in and through communal affiliation is a long-standing theme in Judaic culture as emerges, for example, from Robinson's (1964) discussion of the "corporate personality" in ancient Israel. A traditional ritual context in which this conception is dramatized is that of public prayer, whose symbolic structure has been insightfully analyzed by Prell-Foldes (1980). Jewish public prayer, and the *dugri* ritual in its very different but structurally parallel fashion, both demonstrate the possibility of interweaving individuality and communal affiliation in constituting members' sense of self.[7]

Message form

In this section I take the speech-event as the unit of analysis, sketching its internal, episodic organization. The foregoing account (Chapter 3) of the characteristics of the *dugri* interactional code in face-work terms is, of course, relevant to this section and will be incorporated into the analysis without, however, repeating the exposition already given.

The explicitness and clarity of expression associat
code are also manifested in the form of the messa
dugri talk. Speech exchanged in such talks seeks to
and elaborate expressions that would render interpr
diate and clear-cut. This speech reflects both the atti
(Chapter 2) and a stance of commitment, of standing
(see Chapter 6 for further discussion).

The sequential organization of a *dugri* ritual can,
fully considered with reference to Turner's (1974, 19
social drama, a unit of a particular type of agonistic
into four phases: *breach*, which refers to the symbolic
crisis, a phase of acutely experienced division and
ensuing phase of *redressive action* in which attempt
compass the breach within the social order; and fi
when these attempts are successful or *schism* when
Chapter 5 for further elaboration and utilization of t
drama).

In staging a *dugri* talk the initiator ritually trigg
events that can be understood as a structural variant
In fact, the *dugri* ritual can be viewed as involving a
breach and crisis phases of a social drama. The bre
addition to the actual protest made, involves a rejec
man (1967) considers a basic interactional norm: in
agreement to maintain their own and each other's
breach of content is echoed by what on one level
as a breach of form. The breach is legitimated in th
higher set of norms – the norms mandating the com
sion of sincerity, strength, courage, commitment, an
values, articulated in the ritualized form of a *dugr*
illustrate the possibility of a competing sociocultura
volves a reinterpretation of the notion of face and sug
mode of human bonding.

This dramatization has an intense quality but is
in a ritual framework, not the outburst of the pers
or the recklessness of the rebel burning bridges behin
time, the social drama sequel is not rounded off; i
beyond the crisis phase, nor is it expected to. T
function precisely by creating and culturally locating
remains unresolved. It thus both indexes the existe
capitalizes on it, suggesting the possibility of change
sanctioned framework.

There is a generally recognized pattern in the sc
acts comprising the *dugri* ritual. As noted, a *dug*

prearranged in some way, often by the initiator's offer to have a talk with the respondent. When they get together the respondent, usually the more powerful person, may ask about the initiator's purpose or problem. In response, the initiator indicates that the discussion should be considered a *dugri* talk by saying: "I want to/I must/let me speak to you *dugri*," or "I want to be sincere with you," or the like. This use of *dugri* has a creative function. It establishes a ritual context within which direct talk is culturally sanctioned.

The respondent briefly signals agreement to enact the *dugri* ritual by indicating that the initiator can proceed. As noted, most of the ritual consists of the initiator voicing some protest. The respondent may make some counterclaims, but not vigorously: The respondent's position is well known; it is its challenge that is the issue.

Within the ritual context, there is no room for lengthy discussion of the issues brought up by the initiator: If such discussion follows, the ritual bounds have been overstepped. The ritual is terminated with a sense of relief, sometimes verbalized by the initiator's statement that "I have done my part" and the respondent's reply, "OK, I've heard you." At times, particularly when there is a sense that one's interactant is not comfortable with the exchange, one of the participants may express gratitude at having been given an opportunity to speak (e.g., "Thank you for your frankness" or "I appreciate the fact that I could be frank"). This last step helps to bring participants back smoothly into the realm of *societas*, reaffirming the interactional norms applicable in it.

Instrumentalities

Several points should be made regarding the instrumentalities associated with *dugri* speech. The notion of *dugrijut*, a *dugri* talk in particular, is typically associated with spoken, face-to-face encounters. It involves directness in the sense of unmediated communication. Thus, as already mentioned, one of the common responses to my request to characterize talk that is not *dugri* was the notion of gossip: A person who does not stage a *dugri* talk when the occasion calls for it, it is claimed, is likely to end up speaking behind one's back. That is, a *dugri* talk is seen as employing the most direct, and therefore preferred, channel for conveying particular kinds of messages.

There are interesting nonverbal concomitants to the enactment of a *dugri* talk. These came up most frequently in discussions of the *dugri* quality of various public figures. Informants listed a variety of nonverbal displays: For example, postural tendencies such as fidgeting while talking or shifty eyes tended to disqualify a person from being considered *dugri*.

The movements accompanying *dugri* speech can be de
of Laban's notation of movement analysis (Laban 19
which captures the qualitative aspects of movement r
Effort/Shape elements. The most relevant parameters fo
quality of movement characteristic of the *dugri* ritual
of tension, weight, and direction. In enacting the *dugri*
movements tend to be free-flowing (rather than boun
they manifest the quality of strength (rather than lightne
dimension and the quality of directness in spatial orien
on each other). These elements of the Effort/Shape
with the time factor of quickness or abruptness chara
verbal signals attending *dugri* speech.

Both in its movement and in its verbal thrust, *dugri*
metaphorically regarded as a punch: It is direct, strong,
a person who projects a resolute and sincere image in
behavior, but whose nonverbal behavior is felt to unde
is not judged credible in the attempt to enact the *dugri*
a person who projects sincerity but speaks hesitantly
manner, or whose posture is relaxed and noncommit
to be judged as properly enacting the *dugri* ritual. T
must signal through verbal expression, bodily postur
tact, as well as tone of voice, that he or she is ind
resolute.

Key

In terms of its "key," that is, its feeling-tone or affect
dugri ritual can be characterized as an emotionally inte
It is dominated by a sense of commitment, of "som
being at stake," as one informant put it, and also by
companying confrontational exchanges. Despite the op
frontation involved, the tone is one of contained,
somewhat impersonal anger rather than the outburst
company conflicts grounded in the clash of personal
compatible desires.

Since the ritual roles of the participants are asymm
in the tone accompanying their respective performanc
as noted earlier, has to exude an air of resoluteness
defiance. The respondent, on the other hand, must m
composure and project the image of the forthright pe
pared to accept criticism "without becoming personal
person put it. Thus, both participants, in their own

the image of the person of character. They do so by fulfilling com
mentary ritual roles marked by a reversal of tone.

Ends

atever point of view we adopt, the *dugri* ritual is a multifunctional
air. Its purposes pertain to the participants' psychic life, to their
nition of their social task, to their definition of their cultural identity,
l to their communal affiliation.

For the initiator, the ritual has a clear cathartic function: It provides
ontext in which to release pent-up frustrations and aggravations with
pect to a structural social unit or relationship. It also provides a ritual
text for conveying socially sensitive information as well as for publicly
ining and clarifying one's position in an institutionalized social unit
asserting and publicizing issues that one has a right and an obligation
nfluence.

For the respondent, particularly in the more common cases in which
or she has power over the initiator, the *dugri* ritual is a cultural
nnel through which to obtain social information that may otherwise
ain unavailable; at times, the *dugri* ritual can also allow the rede-
ion and clarification of social positions.

From the communal point of view, the *dugri* ritual reaffirms partici-
ts' cultural identities and communal affiliation. It encapsulates the
ole spectrum of cultural meanings and values associated with *dugri*
and suggests a model – more for than of – the ideal person and the
al form of human relations.

The outcome of a *dugri* ritual is not a resolution of differences but a
ification of positions, especially the recognition of the existence and
ure of the disagreement. Whereas the respondent may at times be
uieted and disoriented by the confrontation with an alternative con-
tion, the initiator experiences a sense of relief at not having been
aid to speak up." It is generally felt that for the initiator the main
come of the ritual is a sense of increased confidence and control, the
sfaction that goes with self-assertion.

Genre

ugri talk can be characterized as a conversational genre as distin
hed from play, fictive, and static genres in the typology proposed
Abrahams (1976). It takes the form of a ritual confrontation marked
high degree of interpersonal involvement. In conversational genres,

according to Abrahams, "one person directs his expression
personal fashion to a limited number of others as part o
discourse. The speaker does not need to assume any involve
role to make his point. He, rather, is engaged in a sponta
municative relationship in which opportunities to introduce
devices of persuasion commonly arise" (p. 200).

The intensification of expression associated with the first,
types of conversational genres in Abrahams' scheme, of wh
talk is an example, is accomplished in this case through the
of the direct mode that colors and frames the flow of disco
also be accompanied by colloquialisms and slang expressions
as intensifiers.

Celebrating a gesture of revolt, the *dugri* ritual is animated
stance that favors action and a spirit of control over one's fat
of passivity and the acceptance of one's circumstance. As w
in the earlier discussion of the cultural matrix of *dugri* speec
2), the activity/passivity contrast is very important in un
Israeli culture. In dramatizing the choice of action over c
straint and acceptance (e.g., in silence), the *dugri* ritual
generic form through which members can reaffirm the cu
attached to action that for them spells mastery, strength, an
– hence, dignified survival. An intriguing conceptual link bet
and conflict is pointed out by Turner (1982), who notes – in a
different context – that the word *act* and the word *agon* (
stem many conflict-related words such as *antagonism*) are ety
related. It is in conflictual situations that a person's abil
brought to a head. Therefore, looking for a fight is a com
test and reaffirm one's actional potential. In a sense, the *du*
an agonistic ritual genre provides a safely circumscribed con
a test.[8]

Norms of interaction

The performance of the *dugri* ritual is governed by two con
interactional norms:

1. The initiator, having defined the situation (to himself an
as involving a rhetorical exigency, is expected to initia
ritual in an attempt to motivate the respondent to corr
2. The respondent, at the same time, is required to acce
approach in good spirit and to refrain from interpre
personal affront.

It should be stressed that the *dugri* ritual involves suspending or reinterpreting societal norms of "facework" and embracing an alternative set of interactional norms predicated on a cultural ideal of personal worth and on a culturespecific interpretation of the nature and role of "facework."

The normative force of the *dugri* ritual stands out when the respondent refuses to join the initiator in enacting the ritual, for example, when he or she acts insulted or loses composure in reacting to the threat to face involved. To members of the culture, such a response is highly unsatisfying. As informants repeatedly said, it indicates that the respondent is weak, that he or she cannot face the truth. Such a person is regarded as unwholesome. Moreover, by refusing to enact the *dugri* ritual, the respondent prevents the initiator from reaffirming his or her ideal version of the Sabra. That is, the respondent prevents the initiator from acting like – and therefore becoming – a wholesome person as defined by the culture. From the native's point of view, it is the respondent rather than the initiator who is felt to have violated a basic interactional norm.

In sum, an ideal *dugri* speaker should both speak *dugri* when this is called for and respond to *dugri* speech addressed to him or her in a fitting manner. Some of my informants made biting comments about Sabras who speak *dugri* but recoil when such speech is addressed to them. Whatever one's feelings about the *dugri* mode, the minimal requirement is to abide by its norms as both speaker and addressee, as the occasion arises.

I conclude my discussion of the *dugri* ritual by offering an interpretation of a public event that took place in Israel in the middle of the Lebanon War (summer of 1982) and was referred to in the media as the Galei Zahal Affair. From the vantage point of this study, much of the discussion involved a controversy as to whether one particular communicative encounter could be considered a *dugri* ritual.

A ritual misfire: the Galei Zahal Affair

Galei Zahal is the official radio station of the Israeli Defence Forces; it runs parallel to the various channels of Kol Israel, the Israeli national radio station. It is specifically designed to cater to the needs and interests of soldiers but is very popular with the public at large and has usually been considered to serve it well. It is headed by a journalist who is granted the military rank of colonel so as to stress his position in the military hierarchy, and is staffed by journalists, who are civilian workers in the army, and by soldiers.

Six weeks after the outbreak of the Lebanon War, Galei Z
a public issue to the extent that the Israeli parliament deci
the events at the military radio station in its meeting of Au
As reported in *Maariv* the following day, two journalists
ruveni) employed by Galei Zahal had complained to the
that the radio station had not functioned properly during
not represent the official Israeli position on the war, an
disservice to the legitimate interests of Israel. This complai
at a meeting between the two journalists, their superiors,
of staff. Their complaint was interpreted by their colleague
and they were accused of unprofessional conduct, of contr
politicization of the media and damaging the morale of the
These events triggered a public debate, indicative of a
that centered on the issues of freedom of speech and the r
ally controlled media in wartime, with widespread ac
counteraccusations.

The interesting point for our purpose is that the deba
troversy over the definition and interpretation of the jou
terms that call to mind our discussion of the *dugri* ritual
regarded them as informers and labeled their act as sland
porters, as well as the two journalists themselves, rejected
of their act, in effect claiming that it constituted what we
terms a *dugri* ritual, as indicated by the language of the
cerpts. Their critics, likewise, were apparently oriented
idiom in arguing that the exchange that took place in th
the chief-of-staff did not meet some of the conditions se
chapter and could therefore not be considered a *dugri* ri

A reader's letter in *Maariv* (Sept. 1, 1982) says this abo
of the journalists (my emphasis):

> Recent publications concerning Kor and Haruveni . . . indicate t
> accused of being informers and of bypassing their superordinat
> how this could be called informing: Kor and Haruveni gave vo
> reservations about the working of Galei Zahal during a meetin
> Chief-of-Staff *openly and courageously* and *not behind the back*
> so *in the presence* of those they consider responsible for the sit
> Should they have denied their true opinions and said the oppo
> they really thought when the issue is *a crucial one* in wartime?
> no slander here and no bypassing but the fulfilling of *a moral-c*
> the time of *emergency*.

In their hearing in front of the Journalists' Associatio
as reported in *Maariv* (Aug. 29, 1982), Kor and Haruv
that "their words in the meeting with the Chief of Staff
to *correct* the situation in the radio station in accordan
views. They said that they had asked the Chief-of Staff
a *change* in the policy of Galei Zahal."

The two journalists admitted that they had initiated the chief-of-staff's invitation to take part in the meeting, to which they would ordinarily not have been invited. They did so because they considered him a potential mediator of change; he could serve as a proper audience for their rhetorical act. Clearly, the meeting between Kor and Haruveni, their immediate superiors and colleagues, and the chief-of-staff was differently defined and evaluated by the various participants in it.

The conclusion of the committee set up by the National Journalists' Association to investigate the situation in Galei Zahal included the following comments (reported in *Maariv*, Aug. 29, 1982):

The nature of their appeal to the Chief-of-Staff and to the political rank, its causes and circumstances, support the committee's conclusion that the two expected intervention by a military authority which could not be questioned. This deed invalidates, in the view of the committee, the claim that they were naive and well-intentioned.

The journalists' critics focused attention on the chief-of-staff's presence, thereby indicating that the social-structural modality could not have been suspended (as it is in proper enactments of the *dugri* ritual). On the contrary, it was deliberately invoked. The journalists' complaint was interpreted as a personal accusation rather than a concern with public issues, a fitting response to a rhetorical exigency. In our terms, the critics refused to validate the event by viewing it as a proper enactment of the *dugri* ritual, which involves a clash of paradigms and altruistic motives rather than self-interested action.

The two journalists and their supporters, on the other hand, emphasized their immediate superiors' and colleagues' presence (ignoring the fact that they played the role of hearers rather than addressees) and presented the event as a playing out of the *dugri* ritual. Thus, they described their conduct as direct in the sense that they voiced their protest openly in the presence of those they considered responsible for the state of affairs (rather than bypassing them or speaking behind their back); they were not only open but also courageous and sincere, and said what they really thought in spite of the risk involved. The issue they brought up was a rhetorical exigency – a "crucial issue in wartime," as the writer of the letter to the editor cited earlier put it. Finally, like all initiators of the *dugri* ritual, they were motivated by the commendable desire to correct a publicly relevant state of affairs they considered undesirable.

In an article publicizing his response to these events, Kor capitalized on his favorable interpretation of them, pointing to the identity-related function of his act (*Maariv*, Sept. 2, 1982). He described his inner conflict the night before the meeting with the chief-of-staff in terms familiar to anyone who shared the *dugri* code:

Should I say in the meeting with the Chief-of-Staff what I think
Galei Zahal broadcasts during the war? . . . I can also shut up. C
there was a meeting in the Chief-of-Staff's office like dozens of
meetings which take place throughout the country in both milita
civilian contexts every day. Two employees presented their opin
courageously, in accordance with their conscience, *in the presen*
superiors and colleagues and in the presence of the person who
supreme commander of them all.

Is there a more decent, cleaner, context in which to express o
– than this way? I am proud I have decided to voice my opinion
in the original]

Whether Kor was right in claiming that dozens of such
place daily throughout the country or not, it is clear tha
code underlying the *dugri* ritual is alive and well: Kor and h
utilized it in framing his defense whereas his critics – simil
to the *dugri* code – worked to undermine his case by poin
the meeting with the chief-of-staff did not meet the conditio
a *dugri* talk. Clearly, the framework was not effectively co
the initiators, and the event did not remain ritually contai
it became a social drama, a structural-processual unit tha
our attention in the next chapter.

c *dugri* idiom in social drama

pter, I examine two events that took place in Israel in the
s as manifestations of the processual structure of a social drama
culations of the cultural code underlying *dugri* speech. Both
cted as public enactments of the *dugri* ritual. In both cases,
ritual gave rise to social drama. Thus, whereas in previous
e sociocultural circumstances of modern Israel were referred
ttempt to understand the development and use of the *dugri*
aking, this chapter draws on our understanding of *dugri* speech
nse of the unfolding as well as the import of these two notable

thod is helpful in locating the study of the *dugri* way of speak-
oader analytical framework and showing not only that it has
ed by its cultural world but that it has become a shaping force
my account is persuasive, it will also have general method-
plications for the study of ways of speaking, relating it to
ural concerns. As an interpretive path is drawn from a central
unicative term, *dugri*, to a focal speech-event, the *dugri* rit
ore encompassing social sequence, a social drama articulated
ri idiom, the interplay of speech and sociocultural world is
the fore.

urning to a more detailed consideration of these public events,
examine more closely Turner's treatment of the concept of
na, which was mentioned in the previous chapter. I then try
at just as our understanding of the texture and structure of
itual was enhanced by considering it in relation to the notion
rama, our understanding of particular public events, which
e phased structure and oppositional nature of social drama,
anced by considering them with reference to the *dugri* code
al functions. In this discussion, I draw from Turner's 1974
nas, Fields and Metaphors, highlighting those points that bear
ly on our present subject.
er's formulation, social dramas are "units of aharmonic or

disharmonic process, arising in conflict situations" whose natu
their study particularly rewarding since "conflict seems to
damental aspects of society, normally overlaid by the customs
of daily intercourse, into frightening prominence." In such c
uations, people find themselves taking sides "in terms of
trenched moral imperatives and constraints, often against
personal preferences" (p. 36).

Social dramas are, structurally, four-phased processual u
ated with the sociocultural rather than the natural order. The
involves a breach, "a symbolic trigger of confrontation or e
which takes the form of "the deliberate nonfulfillment of so
norm regulating the intercourse of the parties" (p. 38). T
brings to mind the threat to face that is a feature of *dugri* sp
symbolic breach that triggers a social drama is not an act
rather, it is associated with a sense of commitment by an indi
"always acts, or believes he acts, on behalf of other partie
they are aware of it or not. He sees himself as a representat
a lone hand" (p. 38). As was indicated in the previous chapte
of being a representative of ideas greater than oneself, of b
adigm bearer, accompanies the initiator of the *dugri* ritual. T
is reinforced by our consideration of the two social dramas
in this chapter.

Turner characterizes the second phase of social drama, th
a turning point that cannot be ignored and that dares the repr
of the established social order to respond to it. A public crisis
to Turner, has liminal characteristics, placed as it is betwee
stable phases of the social process. It occurs at those mome
it is least easy to don masks or pretend that there is nothin
the village" (p. 39) and is thus naturally associated with the
of expression that characterizes the *dugri* ritual.

The third phase of the social drama involves redressive ac
designed to limit the spread of the crisis and contain its t
escalate. In this phase, certain corrective mechanisms are b
play by representatives of the disturbed social system. Tu
that in the redressive phase the society is most selfconsciou
attain the clarity of someone fighting for his life, as its most
are being clarified and negotiated.

The fourth and last phase of a social drama consists ei
reintegration of the disturbed social group or of the recog
legitimation of an irreparable schism between the contesti
The working of different types of redressive actions and
final phases will be sketched in relation to the two dramas to
in this chapter.

Turner makes the intriguing suggestion that articulates the
en bis cultural-symbolic approach and a sociolinguistic con-
speechways:

istic level of "parole," each phase has its own speech forms and
vn rhetoric, its own kinds of nonverbal languages and symbolisms.
greatly, of course, cross-culturally and cross-temporally, but I
at there will be certain important generic affinities between the
d languages of the crisis phase everywhere, or the redressive
where, or the restoration of peace phase everywhere. Cross-
nparison has never applied itself to such a task. (p. 43)

hat the forthcoming analysis will make a small contribution
s-cultural enterprise ultimately envisioned by Turner. I have
some of the linguistic features – at the level of "parole" or
hat characterize the breach and crisis phases of a number of
nas in Israel: They are features of the *dugri* way of speaking
ed in this study. I therefore propose that the "directness"
of speech is likely to emerge as a significant aspect of the
peaking proper to the breach and crisis phases of social dramas
ltural contexts as well. Since, as Turner rightly emphasizes,
ultural comparison must be based on particular case studies,
t analysis may be taken as one such beginning.
urn to an examination of the two public events whose in-
reading forms the substance of my argument. The first in-
publication in 1981 of the provocative autobiographical novel
Ben-Yehuda, which was mentioned in Chapters 2 and 3. The
tled *1948 – Between Calendars*, relates her experiences as a
icer in the *Palmah* assault units during the months preceding
Declaration of Independence. The other event occurred dur-
nmer of 1982 at the height of the Lebanon War. It earned
f an affair (*parasha* in Hebrew), which indicates its problem-
standing. The Eli Geva Affair was named after Colonel Eli
portedly brilliant thirty-two-year-old Armored Corps colonel,
ad successfully led bis troops through difficult battles up to
s of Beirut. Then, during a pause in combat activities, he
the situation and came to the conclusion that he could not
oops into the city. He therefore petitioned to be relieved of
so as not to refuse an order in case such a move was decided

ication of Ben-Yehuda's book and Eli Geva's act each con-
ymbolic trigger to a social drama, as evidenced by the public
t followed them. The forthcoming summary of those events
blic debates that followed are not designed to give the full
ossible interpretations or to evaluate any of the actions or

views that formed part of these public dramas. My goal is a more
one: I consider these events as public occasions in and throug
the code underlying *dugri* speech and the cultural meanings as
with it became highlighted. If my account makes sense, I will a
shown that despite recent changes in the standing of the Sabr
the *dugri* code is readily intelligible to many Israelis and still
a prominent place in Israeli social life.[2]

1948 – Between Calendars

Netiva Ben-Yehuda's novel was published in 1981, thirty-thr
after the events related in it. It had a great impact on Israeli
sold several editions, and occupied a respectable place on the b
list. It drew many critical responses by both critics and lay peo
its author became even more of a public figure than she had bee
In an article written about the author following publication,
nalist Tamar Avidar expressed many readers' response to the bo
she said that "it is a landmark – both in its style of writing a
myth-debunking and norm-shattering function" (*Maariv*,
1981).

In this section I treat the publication of the novel as a rhet
that became part of a rhetorical event whose unfolding reveals
cessual nature of a social drama. In both content and form,
constituted a breach: a breach on the level of cultural norms,
taken-for-granted national myths, as well as a breach on the
literary canons. Most interestingly from the standpoint of this s
novel was advertised by its publisher as employing "colloqui
and *dugri* speech." Indeed, readers, critics, and the author he
firmed this description in many references to the novel's styl
scoring both its linguistic features and its social-functional pro

I therefore claim that a full account of the novel's rhetoric
must take into consideration the meanings and functions of *dug*
as an expressive symbolic form. My first step is to examine
detail the breach phase involved in the publication of the nove
motivations underlying it. Understanding what the breach con
we can then appreciate what the crisis phase was about and
the social drama through its redressive and reintegration phas
amining the public debate that followed its publication.

In *The Philosophy of Literary Form*, Burke (1941) makes the
comment on the interrelationship between the motivation und
work of art and the expressive form in which it is cast:

> ...egin to consider the situation behind the tactics of expression, ...t tactics that organize a work technically because they organize it ... The two aspects ... are but two modes of the same substance. ...u look for a man's burden you will find the principle that reveals ...c of his unburdening; or, in attenuated form, if you look for his ...ou will find the lead that explains the structure of his solution.

...hcoming account moves from an examination of the author's ... she presents it, to the structure of her unburdening, as it can ...d from the content and language of the novel. It is in the ...etween the two that the rhetorical impact of the book is found.

...nation given on the jacket of the book about its author and ...t is minimal. It states the date and place of her birth, and ...he schools she attended and her military service. Her coau... ...f a popular dictionary of Hebrew slang is also mentioned. ...erficial description, which does little more than establish the ...a Sabra, stands in sharp contrast to the regnant terms with ...has been described in accounts of the War of Independence. ...is noted for her unusual wartime exploits, for which the Arabs ...ll her the "yellow-haired devil." Indeed, many Israeli readers ...d to be introduced to the author, who, as one journalist put ...wn no less for her exploits in the field of language than for ...s in the battlefield; she is one of those figures whom a heroic ...nto a legend" (N. Margalit, *Maariv*, Mar. 27, 1981).

...hor became famous following an ambush of an Arab bus in ...took part as a soldiergirl and killed a considerable number ...ingle-handedly and at close range. She came to be the bane ...bs of the Galilee, and a "wanted dead-or-alive" advertisement ...hed by a Syrian newspaper that offered a handsome reward ...uring the years since the War of Independence, she has re... ...m giving public expression to her experiences either in writing ...alistic interviews. She has, however, attracted public attention ...the battle she has been waging against the linguistic estab... ...n behalf of spoken, colloquial Hebrew.

...iews given after the publication of the novel, she expressed ...e for the image of the "yellow-haired devil" that had remained ...e years. She deeply resented the influted images of the *Palmah* ...d the glorification of war so commonly found in accounts of ...by the "heroic writers." They, she alleged, spent the war in ...afes in Tel Aviv and had no notion of what it actually meant ...of those nineteen- to twenty-year-old children, whom she ...n the jacket of the book as "our dear cannon fodder," who

ran about in muddy battlefields and turned the politicians' wo... ...a reality "with their young bodies and meager breath."

In presenting the events from the standpoint of the pawns in t... Ben Yehuda sought to modify the way in which the war was repr... in the public consciousness. Thus, rather than a "yellow-haired... there emerges from her account the image of a perplexed gir... experience on the battlefield left her guilt-ridden and disoriente... than victorious and proud.

She felt that this experience would never leave her, that ... "marked for life": She was both the killer and the kill, sacri... society to do the dirty job involved in "making history"; yet sh... not stay away from the battlefield even when she had a chanc... so. After the nervous breakdown she had in midwar, she ran ... Tel Aviv, but a few days later, she found herself on the way ... her unit "on the run from running away." She was torn between... of deep estrangement from the ideology that required her to ... she did not want to be and could not become – a tough, remo... unquestioning *fightereet* (female fighter) – and the overwhelmi... tional grip that same ideology exerted on her. Throughout the b... in her interviews, she repeatedly said that the image cast for ... her comrades by their parents' generation was untenable, that th... who spun the mythic image of the Sabra out of the depths of t... fears had no idea what it amounted to in terms of the flesh-a... human experience of their own sons and daughters.

The author's feelings and conflicts about this problem of id... which is as central to the book as it is to the Sabra culture in g... are clearly brought out in her account of the events following the... of the Arab bus that earned her her fearsome reputation. I bel... incident constitutes a critical moment in the book, the moment ... she awoke to the reality of war and found herself questioning ... cherished values and beliefs. Most tellingly, to her this traum... perience was a profoundly existential moment, articulated in t... of the Sabra's quest for a livable identity. From the standpoi... newly acquired awareness, her inner doubts as to whether s... become the mythic New Jew could not be dispelled. The onl... she could give to herself as she tried to come to terms with... implications of her heroic deed remain disturbingly equivocal: ... I cannot.

Burke (1941:66) suggests that "critical points" in a work o... "give us a 'way in' to the discovery of the motivation, or situ... the poetic strategy," and thus shed light on the work as a ... believe that the author's two reported attempts to articulate her ... and feelings at this critical point in the book, the moments ...

on the bus, can be structurally regarded as precursors to iting the novel years later. Her account of what she tried but failed, can give us some insights into her motives in ublishing the book. Using the culture's accent of sincerity. xperiences that are painfully authentic and personal, and ms that echo the main dilemma of her generation, the first Sabras: Who will the Sabra, the new *Homo israelicus*, be? redeeming reversal of the Diaspora Jew he was so ardently ome?

f her two unsuccessful attempts to speak up after the bus lved her meeting with Saul, a member of a kibbutz and a parents. He was elated at the success of their mission, and, im looks, pulled her aside and asked her what the matter l him she was upset because he wanted her to feel proud ad done, blurting out: "People were killed, so I don't want of myself." At this he grabbed her by the shoulders, held nce, took his time and shouted:

l! Idiot. Like all of them. What will you all amount to? . . . t talking like that, do you hear? Wipe those foolish thoughts d, do you hear? These are the thoughts of a weak, miserable e want a normal people here? Do we want to stop being spora Jews? Weaklings? So among other things we have to ish hero . . . A strong person, free, liberated, who can take a d and kill those who want to kill him, before they do, do you an't be like this, then you are either a woman or a damn ess! (p. 162)

shouting, she felt that he was panicking at the thought that neration to Redemption would not fulfill their parents' ex- fter all, and she drew her conclusions, which came to be nore than one generation of Sabras (Lieblich 1979): She remained silent and proved to herself, to Saul, to the whole ne New Jew existed. That's what she should have done – l, however lonely it was going to be: "One should be strong, and yet stronger. And strong doesn't speak. Strong – shuts .

ronic twist here: To be the long-hoped-for Jewish hero, as earless as the ideology commands, one must not dare ques- epted ideology. So she abided by the unwritten rules and ughts to herself, sensing that others were doing the same. silence, they all helped to uphold the dream of the strong ld take it, who could do it, who would not let history repeat

o articulate her distress and puzzlement, however, was not

silenced by Saul's outburst. She still felt that someone from the f generation had to hear her and realize what was happening to offspring, because "they only told us all our lives to go, but they know what this means" (p. 170). So she composed a letter to her f in which she asked him, as she had asked Saul, not to take pride i success of their mission when he read about it in the paper. To he knowledge that she had killed people was nothing to boast abou found that at the moment of killing, the word *enemy* lost its mea and enemies became human beings. So in this letter she felt comp to reiterate in exasperation: "I am sure there is something bad very bad, a terrible crime, an injustice. To us and to them everybody."

But then, perhaps remembering the panic she had sensed in reaction, she went on to reassure her father that he had nothing to about, that she would not fail him: "I will go on doing what we to do, like all of us here, we the young 'realizers'; there's just one I want to say: if you knew it was like this, why didn't you tell us? if you didn't know – you should know now. And then you can recon the whole thing" (p. 175).

This letter, which was never sent, encapsulates her predicamen wardly torn, she could neither fully accept nor fully reject the r the new Jewish hero. Her solution was no solution for a member Sabra culture. Doing things she did not believe in went again culture's fundamental values of integrity and sincerity. At this jun two clusters of meanings associated with the *dugri* mode and the identity clashed: assertiveness and sincerity. To be strong she h become insincere, and her outspokenness revealed her weakness. ically, she felt she "had done her part" after writing this lette before failing to send it), rather than after successfully completi military mission. It seemed to her that in speaking *dugri* more anything else, she could become a full participant in her cultural and could fully reaffirm her sense of self.[3]

Now, with the publication of the book, the story whose telling s thirty-three years earlier was finally brought to a conclusion. R than a call for help, however, it was now a testimonial to the some of them close friends to whom she had pledged to tell the of the war as they had seen it, "with all the shit," as an antidote glorified accounts of the battlefield.

After the war, she told an interviewer, she saw that none of the boo came out told the true story of the war as she knew it. So she appro some of the writers of the *Palmah* generation and asked them: "Why you write your book in a *dugri* way?" (N. Gal, *Kol Yerushalaim*, J 1981). Her book was thus offered as a counterstatement, as an atte

the public conception of the 1948 war – and of what war is like in ... in the hope that it would serve the cause of peace. In an interview urnalist Dan Omer she asked:

> d it happen that American public opinion stopped the Vietnam War? n guarantee that books that started with Remarque and then Norman lid not affect the people's thinking about the waste and hopelessness ? (*Haolam Haze*, Mar. 25, 1981)

, through its testimony to the past, the book voices a protest with e of affecting the present and the future. The author stated that e 1973 Arab–Israeli War she had to face a young generation that ning to her with the same accusation she had directed toward ner: "If you knew, why didn't you tell us?" So she sat down to story, addressing it to the soldiers of the traumatic 1973 war, eration of her own daughter.

ed, the book is intensely addressed. In the introduction, the nu esents her dialogic conception of her work, insisting that it is art, nor history, nor a memoir: "Actually one can say that the an interview. As if someone, unseen, who knows nothing about asks me questions throughout the book, and more questions, s again and again, and the whole book are the answers I give – *h*" (emphasis in the original). In fact, the book jacket shows a painting by her daughter following the 1973 war of a nude aratrooper – identified as such by his boots and the paratrooper's ressed to his bare chest – in the posture of the crucified Chr st. hor told me she had insisted on using that painting on the book's She had placed the original in front of her while writing the book as to him, to this mute interviewer, this anonymous successor this contemporary sacrifice, that her spoken answers were ed.

h the book was addressed to the younger generation, it naturally d members of the author's own generation, and many of them ed to it in a variety of ways. Some of the responses highlighted ional aspect of the myth-debunking thrust of the novel, which s of the author's generation were apparently more sensitive to er readers: the author's questioning of the widely held picture *almah* as an enclave of *communitas*-like relations.

in his review of the book, the literary critic Dan Meron un- d the significance of the author's clear, sensitive depiction of *nah* social scene, which challenges accepted accounts of the spirit as characterized by a unique quality of human relations, ship, and deep emotional ties, a spirit whose lure is still found

in nostalgic cravings for the "Beautiful Israel" of times gone b critic noted, the social world of the *Palmah* fighters, as depicted Yehuda, is, on the contrary, "marked by a lack of intimacy intellectual, emotional, and even sexual. A genuine interchan it occurs, is something of a small miracle" (*Hadoar*, summer

By painting a picture of alienation and social differentiation that disavows the *Palmah's* image of ongoing *communitas*, pu a more reasonable perspective: In the *Palmah*, as in many social groups, there were moments of *communitas*, but these the midst of a highly routinized and differentiated social wor inhabitants were both held together and kept apart by the b symbols of *societas*.

The revolutionary ideology inherited from the parent gener pervasive expectancy and instability, and the physical and so lateness of many *Palmah* groups all contributed to a sense of and between," a circumstance that tends to facilitate undiffer *communitas*-like relations. The significance of this kind of framing the message of the novel is clearly brought out by *Between Calendars*. As the author stated, it refers to that lim sition phase between one Jewish calendar, which spanned years of Jewish existence in the Diaspora, an existence marked inferiority and persecution, and the new Jewish calendar, whi icles the new, autonomous, independent existence of Jews in of Israel.

Whatever potential for *communitas* there was, it soon bec tinized, developing rigid patterns of differentiation – a social of its own. The author's description of *Palmah* culture is an i account of the routinization of *communitas*, which is accom the crystallization and rigidification of symbolic forms. The n of conduct that became associated with the *Palmah* ethos an bolic expressions are found throughout the book. A reviewer, l summarized some of them, indicating what was involved i proper *Palmah* member:

> Knowing what to say at the right moment. Not showing any weakn in the "in" (*ba'injanim*). Acting out the tough guy. Behaving like a as to appear like a native Israeli. Laughing at aliens (newcomers ar not born in Israel). Disrespecting one's elders ("old" commanders passed the age of 30). Doing everything for a friend. Dressing simp modestly, but according to clear and well-defined rules. Not nomina oneself for an important job. Ignoring sex. (*Al Hamishmar*, Mar. 3

Thus, the routinization of ideological as well as spontane *mmunitas* produced a social world of structure sprinkled with th elements of *communitas* and permeated with a longing for it

s interplay of increasingly routinized structures and persistent
s of *communitas* that the two scenes grounding the novel – the
d the now – find their shared texture.
oregoing account has attempted to delineate the author's "bur-
e human situation behind the tactics of expression employed in
. Now let us turn to those tactics themselves and see what they
h us about the work's "structure of unburdening."
nost salient feature of the novel is its colloquial, fluent style.
as it may sound, I can readily confirm a comment made by
an one interviewer: "She writes exactly as she speaks and speaks
as she writes" (T. Avidar, *Maariv*, Mar. 20, 1981). The spon-
immediacy, and directness of her written speech are mentioned
lly by reviewers and readers, whatever their responses to it.
ke the style for what it claims to be, whereas others see it as a
form rather than the *dugri*, uninhibited expression it claims to

rucial importance of the style for the author is brought out by
unts of her battles with publishers in earlier years in which she
or the legitimization of colloquial Hebrew as the language of
expression. She both identifies with the style and uses it to
herself. It is an inseparable part of the messsge of the book.
ducing colloquial, spoken, *dugri* speech into literature, the au-
owed it with a degree of legitimization beyond anything it had
efore.
of the comments made on the book's style, whether by those
roved of it or those who did not, noted a basic "fit" between
and the content; the style was regarded as metonymically re-
he scene, an apt vehicle for conveying the flavor of the *Palmah*
ce. For example:

> o me that this combination creates a very lively language,
> ly expressive, which stands out in the correspondence between
> d style, a correspondence which contributes a great deal to the
> of the distant period in which the events occur. (M. Oren,
> Dec. 1, 1981)

ng the style's important role in evoking the scene of the *Palmah*,
eless argue that it plays a much more complex role in this book.
oyment of *dugri* speech here raises many questions, given the
aracterization of it as involving an identity-function in the Sabra
n previous chapters I argued that *dugri* speech reaffirms the
dentity of the speaker as a wholesome Sabra, a New Jew – the
tity the author finds she cannot fully embrace. In fact, the main

message of the book is its disconfirmation of the Sabra my
analysis of the *dugri* way of speaking is correct, the use of
idiom to say things such as "I am probably a Diaspora Jewess"
a contradiction in terms. Thus, the author paradoxically uses
of cultural affirmation to disconfirm the very identity the idiom
forged to celebrate.
As noted, my reading of the book and the circumstances
lication have led me to regard it as a public enactment of
ritual. Like all such enactments, it gives expression to the p
identity that is so central to the Israeli cultural experience. U
mundane enactments of the ritual, however, it is both explic
plicit, with the explicit message contradicting the implicit one
to me that the tension between the novel's explicit and implicit
the first given in its substance, the second in its form, is esse
overall meaning and effect.
It is precisely the lack of "fit" between the author's explicitly
"burden" and the work's stylistic structure of "unburdening"
us so acutely aware of the poignancy of the Sabra's problem
and its unresolvable nature. Whereas in the *chizbat* oral tradi
Palmah (Oring 1981), it is the structure of humor (appropr
gruity) that tells us that the cultural identity of the Sabra is
paradoxical, since it encompasses the two incompatible ident
Israeli-born and the Diaspora Jew, *1948 – Between Calend*
that paradox is an essential feature of the Israeli identity by dis
the Sabra mythic image through his very idiom of cultural a
I believe, however, that the conflict between the novel's e
implicit messages not only alerts us to the author's proble
indicates what to her seems to be the direction of its sol
resolution of the paradox lies in her attempt to reinterpret r
totally reject the image of the dauntless Sabra. Playing on t
of strength and weakness, she claims the right to be strong
acknowledge her weakness. She uses the resolute *dugri* form
used to express firmly held opinions and beliefs to voice her
indecisions, and in so doing she violates one level of cultural
yet affirms another, apparently more vital level.
If "to speak *dugri* is to act like a Sabra," as one of my
put it, then the writing of this book was the act of an arch-S
Yehuda is a Sabra, a New Jew, because she can speak *du*
public drama of *1948 – Between Calendars* she has used b
resources in a new and startling way – to confront the values
ings presupposed by its ritual idiom. As on all occasions in w
speech is appropriately employed, she has done something *f*

ing something *to* them. A comment she made during one of
ersations is for me a poignant summary of the book's intended
This is not a book," she said, "it is a scream."

ssion so far has been an attempt to delineate the nature of *1948*
n Calendars as the product of a rhetorical act, an act involving
on a number of levels: On the level of content, it was a breach
blatantly disconfirmed the accepted image of the Sabra and
he picture of boundless *communitas* as a central feature of the
pirit; on the level of form, it was a breach in that it violated
ted canons of literary style by reverberating with spokenness.
ny responses to the novel indicate that in 1981 the author had
ce she felt she did not have right after the 1948 war. I suggest
cceptance of her explicit message was greatly facilitated by the
yle. I believe that contemporary readers, like the author her-
se to accept the Sabra myth at face value, yet are equally
to give it up completely. They willingly join the author in her
desire to reshape and redefine their shared cultural image.
her in asserting that they refuse to assert themselves; caught
tural double bind, they are even willing to echo the author's
, paradoxical verdict on the mythic image of the New Jew – it
s not.

believe the ritual invocation of the *dugri* idiom functioned
does in all enactments of the *dugri* ritual: It made the author's
nore palatable by implicating the reader in its ritual framework.
aders were so lured, however. Some had difficulty accepting
s breaches and responded angrily to them; one woman, in a
he editor, accused the author of grossly distorting the image
lmah (H. Gur, *Maariv*, May 26, 1981), as did some of my
s in private conversations.

nfavorable responses by readers involved an attempt to in-
e author's testimony, or at least minimize its representative
ne of the people I talked to about the book, who had them-
ed in the *Palmah*, said that the book did not really reflect the
perience, that it presented a very personal point of view, the
ntative responses of an "individualist." Netiva Ben-Yehuda,
had always been different. However true and sincere her
as, it reflected her own psychology and not a widespread
oblem. As we shall see in the next section, a similar statement
by the critics of Eli Geva, who tried to recast his moral protest
f individual psychology, thus removing it from the public
both cases, these moves can be seen as a redressive action

providing a context for public negotiation of the breach and
ntative web surrounding it.

The crisis that followed the breach involved in the publicat
book was rather mild: It was not allowed to escalate so that the
acts applied were, accordingly, rather mild, too. This was par
the fact that the controversy related to events that belonged to t
past (whereas in the Eli Geva Affair, the immediacy of t
heightened the sense of crisis). It was also due to the fact that
in question involved a literary work and could be relegated to
of art (mere play), in contrast to real-life dramas such as the
Affair.

It was my perception that the author was both pleased and
by the public attention she had received. She told me she w
the numerous useless interviews she had let herself be dra
Yet, she did not reject the attention of the media. As we l
gether to a radio interview she had given some time earlier,
she was savoring the relived experience. Although she mu
she didn't know why she was taking part in "all that festiva
could guess: The "festival" had an obviously redressive funct
part of the processual logic of the social drama in which she
major role. Refusing to take part in it would have amoun
venting the social drama from proceeding toward its closure
reintegration phase.

The reintegration phase naturally followed. Whether this w
the times were ripe for her protest, or the manner in which it
or the way in which the drama unfolded, or for all of the
combined, there were many unmistakable indications that
gration phase had been reached. Let me mention just a few:
became a popular speaker in the army and was often invite
before young soldiers; she told me with satisfaction that h
used as a graduation gift for soldiers of the *Nahal* (succes
Palmah in many ways); and, above all, the literary enterprise
launched with this book is in full swing.[4] These events seem
that the author's protest has found a niche in the ideological
that constitutes Israeli public life.

The Eli Geva Affair

We now turn from a public drama associated with the first A
War (1948) to one associated with the last Arab-Israeli War
"Eli Geva Affair." Although this affair has not been explicitl
with *dugri* speech, whereas Ben-Yehuda's novel was explic

try to show that central aspects of the *dugri* cultural code
ted at various stages of its dramatic unfolding.
, 1982, the Israeli public was informed by the media that
irty-two-year-old, brilliant Armored Corps colonel whose
tationed at the outskirts of Beirut, had asked the chief-of
e him of command because he felt he could not lead his
ut if this order were given and did not want to find himself
nst his better judgment. In explaining his request, he had
d that he believed that from a security standpoint it was
r the Israeli army to enter Beirut and that such a move
nvolve many losses or require massive bombing of civilian

no question about the characterization of his act or its
s an extreme and unprecedented act of protest. Eli Geva's
vents that followed it came to be known as the Eli Geva

al point of view, Eli Geva had acted within bounds. He
before any order to enter Beirut was issued, and insisted
not have refused such an order had he received one. He
prerogative to ask to be transferred from his post, so as
position to receive such an order, and it was up to his
rant or refuse his request. However, from a normative
, Eli Geva's act was a veritable breach – it cut into the
s in the normative tissue that underlies Israeli public life,
undamental differences of opinion and turning the public
"arena of conflict" (Turner 1974). The whole country
oiled in a public debate concerning basic issues of social
gnificance: for example, the relationship between one's
and group affiliation and one's universal position as a
and arguments over the definition of heroism (much the
imating Ben-Yehuda's novel). As we shall see, Eli Geva
ept a narrow, *societas*-based definition of the scene sur-
ct. That is, he refused to see it as an issue pertaining only
f military or even political life and insisted on seeing it in
ne of reference – in terms of universal human values.
refusal to carry on with his commanding position – par-
cision to quit the battlefield and leave his soldiers behind
the most cherished aspects of the Sabra ethos of heroism.
uda's novel, the Eli Geva Affair questioned the accepted
eroic New Jew in a way only acknowledged heroes like
Netiva Ben-Yehuda could have done. Thus, in the Eli
so, the particular problem of identity associated with the
as brought to the fore. The most interesting point for our

study, of course, is the observation that in his act of protest, Eli
articulated the meanings and employed the interactional means I
identified as part of the *dugri* code.

The many articles, interviews, and letters to the editor publish
the wake of the Eli Geva Affair provide a rich source of data o
public's responses to it. I will trace the major arguments put forth, t
to show that both Eli Geva's critics and his defenders, despite
differences of opinion, shared a similar orientation to some of the
cultural norms and values that have emerged in my study of *dugri* sp
Eli Geva was both acclaimed and condemned with reference to the
basic cultural code.

Eli Geva himself, it should be noted, kept silent after the even
did not give any interviews. He broke his silence only two months
after the Beirut massacre of Palestinian civilians by Christian Phal
troops following the Israeli invasion of West Beirut (which was do
circumstances and ways very different from those of Eli Geva's pro
This event, which shook the country to its depths, retrospectivel
dowed Eli Geva's desperate act of warning with a prophetic aur
was then interviewed on radio, on television, and in the press. Th
the first time the public had direct access to his own version of t
Geva Affair. In an interview with Y. Erez published in *Maariv*
26, 1982), he explained his motivation as follows:

> I thought that as a commander who is responsible for the welfare of his
> soldiers, it is my foremost duty to do everything I could in order to add
> one gram of weight to tip the scale against the decision to enter Beirut.
> second reason: The invasion of Beirut would have forced us to employ
> massive fire to safeguard our soldiers. This way we would have caused
> deal of death and destruction. In my opinion, we should not do this fro
> moral standpoint.

In this account, which generally corroborates the second-han
counts published earlier, Geva made it absolutely clear that the
was a moral one and should not be trivialized by references to que
of military law or party politics, as some tried to do. His aim
bring a moral problem into relief, to alert his superiors to its poign
Notably, he conceived of the matter in terms of personal integrit
while he was talking about the image of the Israeli public: The "
the preceding excerpt does not refer to the men who were in com
at the time – it refers to all Israelis in that collective self-referen
typical of Israeli discourse.

Eli Geva did not see his act as an attempt to undermine the stru
arrangements underlying military life but regarded the whole sit
as highly unusual, one that, in our terms, must be interpreted
rhetorical exigency (see Chapter 4). In an article by D. Gavron c

h of Symbols," he said: "I am firmly opposed to insubordination, is was one of those rare occasions when expressing your opinion gh the usual channels was not enough" (*The Jerusalem Post*, June 83). He felt he was serving a cause other commanders supported vate but refrained from endorsing openly. His act was designed to ome the communication constraints associated with military life, , with a domain of *societas*. As he said in the previously mentioned iew with Y. Erez: "I regret to say that I heard only two of my gues who stood up and spoke their minds; I felt that the intensity opposition to the invasion of Beirut was not clear enough to the on makers."

Eli Geva turned directly to the decision makers – the chief-of- the minister of defense, and the prime minister – and voiced his t in the sharpest of terms. In other words, he initiated a number *gri* rituals with those who were potential change agents (and, it l be noted, they all agreed to receive him). In those encounters, ified, "I expressed my opinion firmly, sharply, using tough expres-" He indicated his refusal to conceive of his role in narrow terms, the established, unquestioned framework of his military role. He ware of the criticism that would be later raised against him for epping the bounds of his military position and blurring the dis- n between military and executive responsibility. Another colonel, ander of a neighboring brigade, spoke to this issue:

> Eli made a fundamental mistake. He should never have taken this he commanders don't talk about it. But *I* know they feel very fortable. The problem is to struggle within the system. It is much than to stand outside and shout. It is inside that we must stand up. It t up to him to explain to the parents of the fallen, as he put it, "look n the eyes," and explain to them if the war was justified or not. It is l to Eli Geva to decide this. He is not responsible for such a decision. e has to be able to do is to look into the parents' eyes and say: I as a nder did my utmost so that your son would not be hurt. (E. Peer, , Aug. 13, 1982)

Eli Geva, however, his responsibility for his soldiers did not start d with safeguarding their lives in battle; he insisted on addressing ue in a broader perspective, as a question of basic morality rather f social or instrumental order:

> he minister of defense: We do not have the right, from a philosophical ral point of view, to intervene in the solutions of neighboring es . . . We may be called to other wars in the future, and we must see at the people are convinced that everything is being done to prevent Y. Erez, *Maariv*, Sept. 26, 1982)

Netiva Ben-Yehuda, Eli Geva appealed to the cultural code ving the *dugri* idiom in voicing his protest; he, too, utilized the 's symbolic resources in reaffirming its moral base while at the

same time renegotiating its institutionalized code of cond became clear that the conflicting public responses to El reflected completely incompatible points of view, so that was heralded by some people as a moral and courageou others as an irresponsible act of cowardice and moral deg

One side of the controversy was represented by the me liament who suggested that Eli Geva be awarded a medal courage" and by Geva's other supporters. To many othe seemed to have ignored important implications of his act; Geva's critics underscored the impact it had on his comra He was accused of leaving his soldiers behind to carry on and to struggle with the inner conflicts his act either trigge to intensify.

Although Geva clearly considered his superiors his the ence, his act had implications for a larger audience, pa soldiers he had led through difficult battles in the first pa and who felt, as one of them put it, "as if we got a slap i

A radio talk with the officers in Geva's brigade, which w twice (Aug. 13 and 14, 1982) and published in the week *Maariv* (E. Peer, Aug. 8, 1982), gave a glimpse of the i had on Geva's closest associates in the army and hinted a considerations he had had to put aside in coming to his d of them seemed to express the views of many when he sai he thought Eli Geva was quite a man (*"gever la' injan,"* lit to the point) to risk his promising career, but his overall co "I was personally very hurt by his act. I had a great deal of We've gone a long way together and we knew that the mil had chosen committed us above all else."

Another commander expressed outright bitterness at G at the approval it received from segments of the public. Hi those of the others, echo the cultural themes of strength, communal commitment over personal interest:

> What hurts the commanders around here, and we talk about it a all of a sudden we find ourselves in a situation where the one w in terms of his ability to fight from within and to withstand the the war as well as the military-political-moral battle, that guy be national hero. All the rest, if they are not Geva, then they are career-oriented, militaristic killers, prepared to do anything. Thi injustice! It hurts.

Several factors contributed to the intensity of the crisis the Eli Geva Affair: the tense public climate at the time, of the country, and the structure of the Israeli army, wh made up of reserve units so that the events in it quickly lite of the country as a whole. This crisis was acutely felt o

ersonal levels The stunned reaction of many was vividly captured
e following lines by A. Baruch (*Yedioth Ahronoth*, Aug. 6, 1982):
news about the brigade commander hits your eyesight nerve,
s the pupil of your eye contract as in response to the penetration
alien object."

ny of the redressive mechanisms that were put into play following
isis phase were designed to intensify Eli Geva's uprooted condition
solation. Keeping him out of sight was a way of helping to mend
ear his act had caused in the social fabric of the army: His request
assigned a different, simple soldier's position at the front was
d; he was not allowed to go back to his brigade and take leave of
ldiers because, it was alleged, he had lost the right to speak to
; he was treated as morally contaminated.

reover, many attempts were made to reinterpret his act in such a
s to either discredit him or shift the context of the discussion from
ublic-moral to the personal-psychological plane. In the aforemen-
d discussion with the officers of the brigade he had commanded,
of them questioned his motives as Geva had presented them. One
n mentioned that during the pullout from the Sinai, Eli Geva had
a completely different stance on the issue of the military's role in
nocratic society. In a discussion with a group of religious soldiers
opposed the pullout, Eli Geva had reportedly said:

> if you oppose it for reasons of conscience, as long as you are a soldier
> ilitary system that serves a democracy, you must fulfill the orders to
> ry last. If you don't do that, there is only one meaning to it: Come on
> ody, after me to anarchy! (*Maariv*, Aug. 13, 1982)

is mention of Geva's earlier unconditional support of the social
(in a different context) was taken by many as an indication that
's position was not as principled and morally driven as he claimed,
undermined his credibility. Similarly, some officers claimed that
had supported the use of massive fire in earlier stages of the war,
was interpreted as inconsistent with his later expressed sensitivity
ilian casualties in Beirut. Geva himself explained in an interview
his change of heart occurred when the tempo of the war slowed
and he had the chance to stop and think.

many of those who knew him, there was an incongruity in Eli
's act; in the words of one of his fellow officers: "It does not go
his character." The inability to reconcile this act with Geva's tough
cter led many to look for hidden motives behind it. One soldier
n the aforementioned interview:

> ve that something irrational was at work here . . . Thinking clearly,
> would not have reached this point. I don't know what it is . . . Perhaps

we're looking for a way to come to terms with the whole thing
difficult to accept

The situation was extremely difficult to accept undc
stances. Many people were divided in their reactions: unab
Eli Geva, yet unable to accept him. His act remained highl
for many, and yet he articulated some of the most bas
values of the culture, dramatizing the rebel's stance thro
elements of the *dugri* code. Many people resolved their a
refusing to condemn Geva while expressing reservations
Others, as noted, came to terms with it by simply argui
irrelevant to society's definition of itself. It was a private a
who could not live up to his public role for personal-
reasons.

The social drama known as the Eli Geva Affair had two
was marked by schism, as indicated by various discredit
made about him in the media. Perhaps the most damag
was the one reportedly made by former Defense Minister
in an interview with the Italian journalist Oriana Falac
Israeli invasion of West Beirut. When Falacci brought
name, he said:

> Poor Eli, I know him well. I have known him as a child, and t
> him. He did not want to enter Beirut. Well, he lost the comma
> brigade. He lost a brilliant military career, and we did not ente
> hero? I wouldn't say this. Because of him, the war was prolong
> more losses. Yes, because of him . . . All these pacifist protests
> held because of him . . . For a while, he strengthened the terror
> didn't help when I said: "Eli, Eli, it is a question of morality.
> are in the field, thousands of soldiers believe in you! Are you a
> you are doing? Eli, Eli, you are helping the enemy." (*Yedioth*
> Sept. 3, 1982)

All this time, Eli Geva refrained from responding to
charges. He was replaced by another officer, and he recede
life and became a private citizen. Here and there, there
that he was having trouble finding a job (which he later d
seemed that Eli Geva would not attract any more pub
However, as noted, events at the Sabra and Shatila Pale
in Beirut led Eli Geva to break his silence, since he felt,
that "our home has been on fire for a long time."

In an editorial article entitled "Where Was Eli Geva?"
journalist, Uri Avneri, expressed an interesting afterthou
affair in reaction to the tragic events, with its own twist
hero theme, which involves a reaffirmation of the image
the person who is prepared to step out of his social-stru

response to a situation of moral exigency. The writer doubts the rightness of Geva's act from a practical, not a moral, standpoint. He suggests that Geva's presence at the Sabra and Shatila camps might have altered the course of events, and asks:

Would he have waited for an order? Would he have passed a report upward and waited calmly for somebody to tell him what to do? . . . I have no doubt that without waiting for an order, Geva would have gone into the camps at the head of his men. (*Haolam Haze*, Sept. 29, 1982)

Three years later, when the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon was already an accomplished fact, the Eli Geva Affair still caused arguments in Israel. Following the publication in 1985 of the autobiography of Refael Eitan, chief-of-staff during the Lebanon War, in which he reiterated his criticism of Geva's act, Eli Geva found himself again the momentary center of media attention. A full-head portrait of Geva appeared on the front page of the widely circulated *Yedioth Ahronoth* weekend magazine of Sept. 20, 1985, featuring an article by A. Nevo. In it Eli Geva reiterated his position and motives, and interpreted his act more positively than he had done before:

I think I caused those three or four people who had decided about the war to think once again . . . My effect did not last very long: a week, a week and a half. But this, actually, was what I wanted to achieve. The undermining of their self-confidence by 1% or 5% was an important thing to do.

Following a public talk he gave in January 1986, the deputy chief-of-staff, Dan Shomron, responded to a student's question about the Eli Geva Affair, saying that he could see why Geva had acted the way he did, given the way he felt at the time. He also noted that officers of Geva's quality were needed in the army (the issue was whether Geva's insistent request for a reserve duty assignment should be granted). Although these comments were made against the background of the army's widely publicized concern with ways to attract high-quality officers, these comments did not pass peacefully: According to the TV evening news report of January 22, 1986, these comments aroused the displeasure of the chief-of-staff and triggered a heated argument in the Parliamentary Committee for Security and Foreign Affairs. At the time of this writing, then, the Eli Geva Affair has not yet run its full symbolic course.

Many of the arguments and claims raised by all the parties to the controversy over the Eli Geva Affair have a familiar ring: They are cast in the same terms and tropes that have emerged as central in the study of the *dugri* way of speaking. Thus, the notion of integrity so greatly stressed subsumes the idea of sincerity: Being "whole with oneself" requires that both one's words and one's deeds be congruent with and reflect one's inner convictions. Other notions that figured centrally in

the various arguments had to do with courage, str
responsibility, ideas that are central to the *dugri* cod
ritual expression. In brief, Geva's supporters tended
sincere expression of social protest by a morally driven
who was prepared to risk his career and perhaps his s
the slightest chance of affecting his world and chan
direction he deemed fit. His critics, on the other ha
that of a weak, self-centered person who was using
moral claims to hide his personal weakness and lack

Notably, although Eli Geva's purpose in protestin
was to affect their decision "even to an infinitesimal d
it, the ability to do so was for him a condition for a
of being "whole with myself," of ritually reaffirming h
conception, as in that of Shakespeare's Polonius, this
for being a socially worthy person. Geva's words un
"To thine own self be true . . . Thou canst not then be
Thus, it seems safe to say that Eli Geva's motivat
familiar meanings gleaned in the analysis of Ben-Ye
social drive to "move things my way," to affect the wo
one's audience, and the symbolic drive to construct a
so doing. This is the blend of motives that underlies
dugri ritual. It is sincerity in the fullest sense of the
person who insists that his society's principles and
actions and that his social world allow him to retain

Another noteworthy feature of the Eli Geva Affa
further to the *dugri* ritual framework, is the theme
communitas; in this case, it took the form of a contro
duty as a soldier and as a person. To him, in preferri
conscience over the demands of his structural role,
his partnership in the human community, over any o
ming from the social structure of which he was a pa
brotherhood of comrades-in-arms and its attendant spi

In sum, despite the enormous difference between th
dramas discussed in this chapter share some critical c
in content and in form. In particular, they are both
with reference to the *dugri* code and the processual un
Both were triggered by events that can be viewed as
of the *dugri* ritual – the publication of a novel expl
cast in the *dugri* mode and an act of protest articul
idiom. In both cases, due to the lack of public accepta
involved in the ritual, the initial phases could not be
the ritual framework, and they evolved into full-blow

The discussion in this chapter has sought to locate *d*

er and more dynamic analytic perspective, highlighting the com ationship between the *dugri* way of speaking as a cultural form fluctuating sociocultural reality in which it exists.

ough these two social dramas dramatized areas of normative dis- n Israeli society, they also pointed out the existence of a shared idiom. Indeed, as Turner (1974) argues, the very possibility of is predicated on the assumption of a minimal consensual base. ain that for significant parts of Israeli society, the *dugri* idiom cultural world associated with it provide such a shared cultural ork.[5]

6. *Dugri* speech in cross-cultura perspective

In the previous chapters, I explored the cultural meanin actional functions of *dugri* speech as it is generally employe stood by participants in the Sabra culture. My emphasis the explication of the *dugri* way of speaking in all its par this chapter, I attempt to place *dugri* speech in a comparativ by juxtaposing my account with four other accounts that d of speaking marked by their direct and indirect mode. M to delineate the kind of controlled comparison this type o enhance. In so doing, I draw on Gibson's (1966) accou Talk" as employed in American prose (exemplified by t Hemingway); on Keenan's (1974) discussion of the indirec and the directness of women's talk in a Malagasy speech and on Rosaldo's (1973, 1980) discussion of the plain spee by the new Ilongot administrators of the Philippines, in c elaborateness and indirection characteristic of traditional s public contexts. Finally, I draw on preliminary findings c Arabic interactional ethos of *musayra* (literally, "going is typically realized as indirectness in both men's and wom

This comparison is not only descriptively but also theo tivated: The ultimate goal of the ethnography of speaking a systematic account of the relationship between langua social and cultural matrix, an account that can acknowle mous diversity in the speechways of different groups and time, "encompass and organize, not abstract from, (Hymes 1974a:33). I therefore try to show the complexit parative task and to indicate the descriptive and concep that need to be addressed in pursuing it. The question myself is whether, or to what extent, the dimensions of m tion, and form that I have identified as relevant to the *dugri* speech are more broadly applicable. To explore this the considerations that an answer to it may entail, I have previously mentioned accounts of ways of speaking.

of the literature on verbal interaction focuses on speech acts
ns of politeness as single occurrences or on styles as persistent
ristics (registers). One significant way in which speech com
may differ, however, is in the degree of elaboration, or exten
a common act or style. Different communities may utilize the
different acts or styles as the basis of genres or events that then
symbolically potent to various degrees and in var ous ways. The
speaking we will consider in this section take either directness
ctness as the style that has become valorized and articulated in
of social events and cultural genres. By starting with a consid-
of culturally named speechways that are comparable along a
r stylistic dimension rather than with an examination of single
onal slices, one is in a better position, I believe, to attempt a
y meaningful comparison of ways of speaking.
uld be emphasized that my informants, while expounding on
ings and interactional functions of *dugri* speech, made repeated
es to *dugri* speech as a stylistic form as well, for example, in
such distinctions as the one between speech that is *dugri* in
tyle (*dugri betsura/besignon*) and speech that is *dugri* in content
tohen), or between internal *dugri* (*dugri pnimi*) and external
gri hitzoni). In the ordinary course of events, speakers are no
nsciously aware of the features of *dugri* speech than of the
neanings underlying it. As the preceding distinctions indicate,
sness of form tends to come to the fore when speakers expe
congruity between form and meaning in the employment of
eech. Clearly, in placing the *dugri* way of speaking in a com-
perspective, we must address both the attitudes and motives
g comparable speaking styles and the interactional as well as
features associated with them (Ferguson 1959).

n "Tough Talk"

egin by pointing out strands of similarity, as well as difference,
dugri speech and American "Tough Talk" as it has been de-
nd explicated by Gibson, who has distinguished three "extreme
iar styles in American prose" (p. ix). Considering *dugri* speech
e rhetorical-stylistic framework he has developed enables me
cterize the directness of form associated with it in terms of a
ge of traditional linguistic variables, both syntactic and lexical.
Gibson addresses his audience in capitalized stereotypes, he
fully draw attention to a relevant and recognized American
'Tough Talk," as distinguished from the other two "extreme

but familiar" speech styles he identifies, "Sweet Talk" an
Talk," is in many ways reminiscent of *dugri* speech: It is likewi
focused and involves a stylized dramatization of the attitud
style" as it is ritually employed in the construction of character
conception of the writer's style fits in well with the approac
in this study. He views style as "self-dramatizations in langu
describes the users of the various styles he identifies as verba

> The Tough Talker . . . is a man dramatized as centrally concerned
> himself – his style is I-talk. The Sweet Talker goes out of his way
> to us – his style is you-talk. The Stuffy Talker expresses no concer
> himself or for his reader – his style is it-talk (p. x)

Gibson stresses that these are three extreme stylistic possib
that the way we write at any given moment can be seen as an a
or compromise among them.[2]

The toughness underlying "Tough Talk" in contemporary
prose and the thorniness of the Sabra style have different c
derpinnings and are subject to context-specific interpretati
common motivational denominator, however, seems to b
attitude of "antistyle." Both involve a reaction against anothe
norm and the meanings associated with it: Hemingway's ext
of "Tough Talk" is to be read as a reaction against establish
patterns after the First World War, whereas *dugri* speech, as
part of the reaction to cultural patterns associated with Di
and European tradition.

Interactionally, on the level of social meanings, there a
similarities between the way the "Tough Talker" and the *du*
handle facework. This is clearly brought out by Gibson's
(ibid.:40–41) of the "Tough Talker" as "a hard man who
around in a violent world," a close-lipped man who is sel
about language and who watches his words:

> His rhetoric, like his personality, shows its limitations openly: sho
> sentences, crude repetitions of words, simple grammatical structur
> little subordinating (I have no use for elegant variation, for the w
> gentilities of traditional prose). His tense intimacy with his assume
> another man who has been around, is implied by colloquial patter
> oral speech and by a high frequency of the definite article.

Thus, the "Tough Talker," like the *dugri* speaker, is n
concerned about his own face than about his addressee's.
like him, much more concerned with the faithful projection
world than with the external world of facts. He is not onl
express himself, abiding by the norm of sincerity, but also i

it in his own way. Gibson hears the "Tough Talker" saying :33): "I say what I mean. If I mean the same thing twice, I say me thing twice, and I don't care if it offends the so-called rules called graceful prose."

similarities between the stance of the "Tough Talker" and that dugri speaker are echoed by formal similarities in their rhetoric. n provides a quantitative stylistic profile of the "Tough Talker," Sweet Talker," and the "Stuffy Talker," respectively. His "style ine," as he calls it, cannot be applied to Hebrew texts in a straight- rd manner (e.g., the syllable count is problematic), but some major l features of "Tough Talk" can be traced in *dugri* speech as well. at follows, I examine a selection of Israeli prose that has been fied as employing the *dugri* style using those variables within Gib- framework that can be meaningfully applied to a Hebrew text. enables me to establish in rough terms whether *dugri* speech can usibly considered akin to "Tough Talk" on formal grounds.

passage I have selected for examination consists of the opening raphs from Netiva Ben-Yehuda's autobiographical novel *1948 – en Calendars*. Like Hemingway's *A Farewell to Arms*, whose open- aragraphs provide a central example of the classical version of ican "Tough Talk" in Gibson's study, Ben-Yehuda's book is a war describing an insider's point of view. I follow Gibson's method in dering the novel's opening paragraphs, in which the author intro- her narrative voice.

already noted, Ben-Yehuda's book echoes the "tense intimacy" "Tough Talker" with his readers: It is highly conversational in employing colloquial patterns from oral speech, including localized expressions that implicate the reader in an intimate world of shared ngs. The frequent use of the definite article, as Gibson notes, has lar effect, and his profile of "Tough Talk" indicates that it is cterized by the use of the definite article 8% or more of the time. first two paragraphs of Ben-Yehuda's book, the definite article d 16% of the time (which should be corrected to about 12% given orphological differences between Hebrew and English). Thus, in of the frequency of the definite article, this passage falls well the "Tough Talk" style.

-Yehuda's sentences tend to be short and simple, as do those of n's "Tough Talker." In the said passage, sixteen out of the thirty- ntences (45%) are only two or three words long, and only seven em (20%) contain subordinate clauses. An example of such a d series of sentences (p. 7) runs as follows (I have italicized the repetitions found in the author's style, which, again, echo Gibson's gh Talker"):

> We only waited impatiently to get to Ayelet Hashahar *already*. *already* know everything. *There* they will always tell us what. No Must be patient.

Or,

> And *everything* was all right. *Everything went* according to plan. to *the course*. *And we* finished *the course*.

Indeed, the book is so repetitive that some readers discussed it criticized it, regarding the repetition as lack aware of the rhetorical function of this style.

The matter-of-factness or concreteness of *dugri* speech ance of modification and embellishment are reflected in th of adjectives, which is another characteristic of "Tough Tal of the words in the passage are adjectives, as compared to by Gibson for paradigmatic examples of "Tough Talk." M modifications of the types considered by Gibson, such modified by adverbs or noun adjuncts, are completely a passage.

The claim that the passage represents a version of I-tal with the speaker's projected face, accompanied by mini pation with the addressee's face, is assessed in Gibson' considering occurrences of first and second-person referen two paragraphs of Ben-Yehuda's novel contain eight fir erences (per 100 words) as compared to one first-person 100 words, and there are no second-person references wh

This stylistic sketch, limited as it is, indicates that *dug* articulated in Ben-Yehuda's novel, shares some major f teristics with "Tough Talk" as defined by Gibson and as re the rhetoric of Hemingway's Frederic Henry, and later by, the voice of Saul Bellow's Augie March. The latter's voice by Gibson (pp. 62–3) could be easily mistaken for that o logical Sabra:

> Like most Tough Talkers, this voice seems to speak with streng sincerity, as if we were expected to admire and agree almost wi reservation. His refusal to play the game of genteel literary trad of his strength, part of what apparently seeks to persuade me t seriously.

This disdain for genteel expression that is shared by Gib Talker" and the *dugri* speaker clearly reflects the attitude o The man who has been around in a tough world, like the in the furnace of rebellion and war, has no trust in word been thrown into a world in which big words and ideolo deep suspicion of language that they have come to share

in the two excerpts cited next. The first is the paradigmatic literary example of an American "Tough Talker," Hemingway's Frederic Henry (1957:184-5):

> There were many words that you could not stand to hear and finally only the names of places had dignity. Certain numbers were the same way and certain dates and these with the names of the places were all you could say and have them mean anything. Abstract words such as glory, honor, courage or hallow were obscene beside the concrete names of villages, the numbers of roads, the names of rivers, the numbers of regiments and the dates.

The second excerpt, by an Israeli journalist, Boaz Evron, appeared in his personal column in the weekend magazine of *Yedioth Ahronoth* (Nov. 25, 1983). In this piece (entitled "Where Do You Run Away To?") as well as in his comments on the Sabra style cited in Chapter 2, he echoes Frederic Henry's distrust of language and his dismay with the "big words":

> You are fed up with hearing and reading words . . . nationalism and national honor, morality, fate, mission, rightful defense, freedom, democracy, socialism, free enterprise, God . . . stop.

The preceding comparison of *dugri* speech and American "Tough Talk" brings out a congruity of styles between two culturally distinct ways of speaking, both of which express a negative response to a dominant style. One can ask whether this attitudinal similarity between *dugri* speech and "Tough Talk" may account for the similarities observed in their forms and interactional functions. That is, clearly, a very difficult question to answer: The specification and comparison of styles along these lines is an intricate matter, and much more needs to be done before we can have more relevant data and a more precise conceptualization of the issues involved.[4]

We must remember, also, that despite the previously noted similarities, there are important differences between *dugri* speech and American "Tough Talk." For one thing, *dugri* speech is not gender specific, whereas "Tough Talk" is associated with the macho image of the American male.[5] That is, "Tough Talk" does not imply a suspension of *societas*-related roles and an appeal to the spirit of *communitas*; rather, it involves the enactment of a particular, gender-specific social role. The directness of the "Tough Talker" involves, among other things, the dramatization of an asymmetrical power relationship, whereas *dugri* speech implies the leveling of all differences, so that social rules of gender become irrelevant, like other rules and norms pertaining to social structure. Also, it seems that *dugri* speech plays a more important role in structuring the interpersonal domain for participants in the Sabra culture than does "Tough Talk" for American users of that style. This

is indicated by the extended use of the term *dugri*
persons, of speech, and even of relationships.

Clearly, not all the features and meanings of dir
with *dugri* speech have figured in the preceding co
Additional points of interest are brought out by the
parison with other ways of speaking. We now turn to
of Malagasy women in contrast to the indirectness
which highlights further points of interest related to
mode associated with *dugri* speech.

Malagasy speech norms: men's indirectness versus w directness

In the Malagasy speech community studied by Ke
rectness rather than directness is the valorized spe
society, it is only males who have access to this indir
are trained to use the valorized community style fo
both American "Tough Talk" and Malagasy indirect
of male talk, but these ideals are in sharp contras
placed on indirect style in the Malagasy speech comm
with a powerfully felt social norm of nonconfrontat
the culture's strong emphasis on harmonious social re
to the straight-talking Sabra, the Malagasy ideal spe
not to affront another, not to put an individual in an
unpleasant situation" (p. 127). Open and direct expr
disagreement is inappropriate; criticism or censure
cated directly or explicitly, but rather through the
This stands in clear contrast to the high value placed
on the open expression of disagreements and their
tional encounters as socially valuable. Whereas for
"indirectness is desirable wherever respect is called
Sabras it is in contexts in which direct expression of c
is called for that respect for others and for the self i

The Malagasy disposition toward indirectness is a
behavioral norm that involves a "hesitation to comm
to an idea or opinion . . . One is noncommittal for f
openly advocated might have consequences that woul
alone" (p. 130). When a Malagasy speech maker is p
accusations direct, he may appeal to his audience to
sibility for the act, to share any guilt that may result

The directness of *dugri* speech is likewise associat
of commitment, but in an instructively different sen

gri speech, especially in the *dugri* ritual, the Sabra speaker displays
ommitment, too. Drawing a simple analogy with Malagasy attitudes,
e might expect the Sabra's willingness to engage in direct talk to
licate the readiness to bear alone any consequences or guilt that may
se from relaying negative information. This, however, is not the case.
hereas the indirect, noncommittal style of the Malagasy ideal speaker
guided by an orientation to the possible consequences of direct talk,
: *dugri* speaker's engagement in direct talk is guided by an attempt
avoid the expressive consequences of not using it. Malagasy speakers
r that they will be committed to the content of their speech; *dugri*
eakers' commitment, on the other hand, is interpreted in relation to
: act of speaking, as a mobilization of one's will in communicative
ion. This brings out the ritual dimension of *dugri* speech: At least in
s sense, it is as much a gesture of engagement as an informationally
cnted act.

Moreover, as was brought out in discussing the *dugri* ritual, *dugri*
eakers do not speak only for themselves. In speaking *dugri* they mo-
ize themselves to engage in a culturally approved expression of per-
ially authenticated opinions or deeply felt convictions. In using *dugri*,
: speaker warrants the directness of the talk by an appeal to com-
inity values and norms. Thus, whereas the Malagasy speaker must
ke an actual appeal to his audience to share in the guilt that may
se out of direct criticism, the *dugri* speaker makes a metaphorical
peal to communal norms and values, thereby anchoring his or her
eech in a broader cultural framework.

In *dugri* speech, some diffusion of personal responsibility for the
isequences of directness is built into the code; in enacting it, the
eaker interprets personal motivations in communal terms. As long as
: talk is framed as *dugri*, the consequences of the information con-
yed do not have to be considered in situation-specific terms every
ie. The ideal Malagasy speaker does not have a comparable cultural
irrant for engaging in direct, confrontational talk, and will avoid doing
unless pressed to do otherwise by his audience.

The difference between the Malagasy and Sabra speech communities
the way commitment in discursive contexts is interpreted – as focusing
the consequences of the act in the former case and perhaps on
ecedents to it in the latter case – must be taken into account in
nparing the meanings and roles of direct speech in these two cultural
oups. This difference is associated with a differential emphasis on the
e of preestablished as compared to situationally negotiated speech
rms.

Furthermore, Malagasy indirectness is also associated with a positive
thetic. In this speech community, "to speak indirectly is to speak

with skill" (p. 140), and the elaborate, stylized mode t
ceremonial speech situations (*kabary*) is highly valued
in contradistinction, manifests an aesthetic of simplic
aspect of the attitude of "antistyle" associated with it.

Given the characterization of indirectness as an id
Malagasy speech community studied by Keenan, the in
of a straightforward interactional style characteristic o
community is particularly intriguing. Women, like chil
ered to lack subtlety and sensitivity, and have leeway to
confrontational discourse. They are acknowledged nor
directness, though disvalued, is not only tolerated by m
utilized by them in strategic ways to express criticism an
they are prevented from doing. Women play a domin
veying negative social information, as in disputes. They
lavalela, a long tongue, since they express feelings of a
directly to the relevant party. Men therefore often us
front others with unpleasant information. Also, it is
more straightforward that women are the ones who
bargaining, buying and selling in the markets.

The role differentiation between Malagasy men and
spect to direct and indirect speech styles demonstrates
rangement between the sexes" (as Goffman might ha
respect to the fulfillment of two essentially incompatible
by social communication: the exercise of social cont
conduct through the use of verbal means and the mai
monious social relations. In this speech community, th
tion, which implies a weakening of the community's
social control, is partly offset by the interactional co
cable to women. By socially circumscribing direct, con
and associating it with a less prestigious social positio
to perform social functions without disrupting the exp
more familiar social arrangement associated with the
tension between facework requirements and the accon
cial tasks involving threats to face is related to variati
tance. Among the Malagasy and the Sabras, the use
sensitive to this dimension. Thus, the use of an indir
marked among the Malagasy in intervillage than in
tionships and *dugri* speech is associated with solidarit
stage" language of behavior and not with discour
strangers.

In addition to these intracultural differentiations in
indirect dimension of Malagasy speech seems to be
the impact of modernity, so that direct style has come

orary ways and indirect style with traditional ways uncon-
cultural contact and with a cherished sensitivity to inter
tions. As we shall see in the next section, this latter theme
the culture of the Ilongot.

ccnan's study gives us an example of a social arrangement
rect style breaks through in a society whose valorized way
is marked by indirectness. Juxtaposing this account with
speech helps to highlight various facets of *dugri* speech,
ymes's suggestion that "individual accounts that individ-
thout notice, as familiar possibilities, leap out when jux
contrasts that require explanation" (1974:33–41). In
his juxtaposition has brought out different cultural inter-
nd emphases in relation to speakers' sense and display of
t" in speaking and its interactional implications.

(1973, 1980) account of Ilongot traditional oratorical prac
stylistic changes recently introduced by Ilongot adminis-
help bring into sharper relief other aspects of directness
ith *dugri* speech.

language versus plain talk in Ilongot oratory

tional oratory employs "crooked" language, language rich
and elaborate rhythms, which allows the speaker to hide
it and beauty of the words. This speech style is in contrast
dern Ilongot oratory, represented by the speech of recently
ongots, which "substitutes an ideal of simplicity and di-
the complex, evasive style of traditional oratorical speech"
73:195).

discussion of the cultural meanings of "crooked" language
o "straight" speech provides an illuminating contrast to the

clear by now, the idea of "crooked" language is not, for
ngots, one of deviousness or deception; rather, it seems to be
feeling that men are equal, individual and difficult to
. ultimately, it is only by talking and listening, by working
uage, that one can learn anything at all. This view is in radical
e which takes it that understanding, as it derives from the
authority of God or Bible, government, science, or law, is
sible. (Ibid.: 221)

value attached to elaborate speech among the Ilongot has
its role in resolving disputes and reaching understanding,
contexts in which this is likely to be difficult. Given their

cultural emphasis on the individuality of motivations and unde
ings, and the need to consult individual sensitivities and wish
resolution of conflicts becomes a formidable task indeed. This
accomplished through the use of oratory, language "which 'hi
meaning, a style which, through metaphor and posture, the u
elaboration of category labels, talk about talking, creates a d
between the speaker as private individual and the social self wh
presents to the debate" (ibid.:218).[6]

In the image-oriented *dugri* idiom, in contrast, the negotia
socially grounded meanings and identities is subordinated to rath
conceptions of what persons should be and how they should c
themselves. This orientation involves a disregard for individual
tivities and wishes and a focus on what is (or should be) sha
participants in the speech situation. As we have seen, the *dugr*
is spoken with sincerity, and thus does not allow distance to be
tained between the speaker's private and social selves.

Interestingly, the rejection of traditional custom by newly ed
and missionized Ilongots is accompanied by a shift in language at
marked by the rejection of indirect, elaborate style as the m
through which disputes are resolved and the insistence that spe
straight. This new attitude toward language and rhetoric introdu
Ilongot administrators reflects significant cultural changes with
to interpersonal relations and members' conception of truth. Th
itarian relations of traditional Ilongot society, in which no m
assume power over others, have been replaced by the new adm
tors' claim that their authority is derived from the law, God, a
government:

Elaborate, "crooked" language belongs to a world in which none can
command or give orders, and speakers must negotiate the agreement
understanding of their opposites, through an aesthetically attractive an
politically non-directive style. "Straight" oratory, by contrast, is direct
explicit, and it is associated with new sources of, and claims to, author
(Ibid.: 221)

These new sources of authority underlie the insistence of
administrators that talk be straight. In their dealings with tradit
oriented members of the community, especially when they refuse
indirect style in the resolution of conflicts, they are perceived a
harsh, and authoritarian. Their use of plain speech is experienc
failure to consult individual sensitivities and wishes, as prevent
mutual resolution of difficulties.

Rosaldo suggests a comparison of the authority-based plain
Ilongot administrators with the Euro-American association of pl
with a scientific and democratic attitude (cf. Perelman 1963; W

nham 1974). She suggests that the same stylistic norm may have
fferent meanings in different cultural contexts. In Euro-
n society, plain speech and writing may be seen as democratic,
icive to the sharing of knowledge and the inclusion of all the
in contrast to indirect styles that are the possession of a few. In
society, as we have seen, plain talk is experienced as authori-
d exclusionary.
do rejects the generalization implied by Perelman that a high
aced on rhetoric is associated with a democratic attitude, claim-
this link is not supported by cross-cultural evidence. She offers
nt explanation:

> native generalization would be that linguistic elaboration, and a
> interest in rhetoric, belongs to societies in which no one can
> l another's interest or attention, let alone enforce his compliance. In
> eties, rhetoric may be a kind of "courtship" (cf. Burke 1950:208–
> may, as in the Ilongot case, be an acknowledgment of the real
> cs among individuals and the elusiveness of human truth. The
> ng attitude, which prefers a plain and simple style, will be associated
> social order which recognizes an ultimate and knowable authority –
> , or science, or the army. (1973:222)

all that has been said about *dugri* speech, this generalization
stand either: The *dugri* way of speaking, like traditional
d" Ilongot speech, is associated with an egalitarian, solidary
ith a spirit of *communitas*. In contexts in which an authority
holds, the *dugri* idiom is invoked in such a way as to equalize
ons involved. On the other hand, it involves a preference for a
nple style, an attitude shared by the new Ilongot administrators.
once again, *dugri* speech challenges a classification based on
m other cultures. What can we make of this? Can *dugri* speech
nciled with Rosaldo's proposed generalization? I do not think
ri speech, as I understand it, is a plain and simple style that is
ecisely as a form of "courtship" or "ingratiation" in Burke's
t is at the same time authoritarian in such a way as to preclude
veness to individual sensitivities and wishes. Its use is warranted
ppeal to a shared, highly compelling cultural code, of which
ss of style has become a major, perhaps the most dynamic,

h American "Tough Talk" and Malagasy speech, directness of
s said to be gender marked: It was associated with men in the
case and with women in the latter. In the case of *dugri* speech,
ss is not gender specific: It is shared ideally by men and women.
ceding account of Ilongot speech is not quite clear on this point.
saldo's 1980 book, too, leaves us uncertain. Public events of

"crooked" talk, *purung*, are conducted by men. It seems t
have the leeway to use straight talk in some contexts. Rosaldo
notes:

> But most public decisions in fact reflect women's opinions and fee
> people remember cases in which women "spoke right out" and so
> away hopeful suitors; and in daily life, those women who – like yo
> mere whims can decide where adults will go hunting – remain unc
> male rhetoric can speak in their own forthright manner and enforc
> desires of their own.

Even if we interpret this statement as suggesting a gender diff
in speechways of the kind found by Keenan, it seems that
entiation is less institutionalized in Ilongot society as a gend
which may be the reason why Rosaldo has not specifically
this issue.

The next and last example, the Arab interactional ethos o
completes the set of stylistic possibilities (along the dimen
rectness) associated with gender differences: In this case
women share an indirect style. The study of *musayra* also
relief additional elements of the *dugri* code, as will be briefl
in the next section.

Musayra: Indirectness among Arab men and women

"*Musayra*," one of my informants said, "is in the blood of
person." Person, he said, not specifying gender. It seems t
directness of style associated with the ethos of *musayra* is sha
and women alike, although differences are found in the con
ner, and norms of style enactment of the two genders. The
placed on *musayra*, on metaphorically "going with" the oth
moring, on accommodating oneself to the position or situa
other, reflects a concern for harmonious social relations a
social regulation of interpersonal conduct.

In "facework" terms, doing *musayra* for the other combi
liteness of deference and of identification: The speaker is
the hearer's positive and negative face-wants to the point of se
– it is an act of concession. Thus, the speaker whose in
conduct is governed by the ethos of *musayra* is not conc
maintaining and expressing demeanor, but rather is whol
avoiding affront to his or her interlocutor's face. In this, he o
[illegible] from the Sabra *dugri* speaker, whose style combines
ness of demeanor and of identification. Like the Ilongot w
direct "crooked" language, the person who does *musayra* t

e between his or her personal and public selves. Therefore, the of sincerity so central to Sabra *dugri* speech and to American n Talk" does not even come into play in this cultural context. , a major function of *musayra* is to constrain individual behavior a way as to protect the social realm from the potential disruption ay result from individual expression.

reas Ilongot indirectness is associated with an egalitarian con n, including a sense of equality between men and women, the tness of Arab speechways is governed and constrained by posi- social-structural considerations. The person lower in the hier s usually required to do *musayra* for the one higher up: the young old, the child to the adult, the woman to the man, and so on. g men of equal status, reciprocal ritual acts of politeness, which nsidered as articulating *musayra*, mark the absence of claims to differentiations by the individuals involved. In addition, the doing *ayra* may be associated with specific circumstances, with contin- s: One does *musayra* to a sick child; a man will do *musayra* to e when she is upset; one will always do *musayra* to a stranger in ommunity. In some contexts, such as trading, the doing of *mu-* as a standardized interpretation that is not speech related: The an decide (or may be asked) to do *musayra* and lower the price. ften, though, *musayra* is extended through speech, for example, use of respectful address terms or in the use of indirectness. The indirectness as an aspect of *musayra* is an interactional strategy highly responsive to the social context, reflecting the cultural tions to be interpersonally alert and cautious. A person's ability age in verbal conduct that would promote adherence to the ethos *ayra* in potentially disruptive interpersonal contexts (e.g., so as vent open, angry disputes) is highly valued. *Musayra* in these ts is equated with the art of speaking.

acute sense that speaking is essentially context dependent stands p contrast to the Sabra *dugri* speaker's stance. As we have seen, digmatic Sabra will speak his or her mind under any circumstances, the belief that expressing oneself openly will ultimately prove to most effective strategy, whatever the circumstances. Circum- l considerations are deemphasized; indeed, the speaker may use le partially to define the context rather than responding to the parameters of the given speech situation with the appropriate forms.

oing *musayra*, in communicating indirectly and elaborately when s a possibility of threat to the interlocutor's face, the Arab speaker the positions of persons in the social structure, he or she does cognize their individuality and equality, as the Ilongot speaker

does. *Musayra*, like the "crooked" language of the Ilongot, with traditional ways, but in this case this implies the re social differentiation and hierarchical relations upheld by t of religion. As in the case of the Ilongot, modernization i counteract the cultural force of *musayra*, and young people it increasingly hard to conform to the demand for other-or cessive behavior; however, even when they feel that way, also feel that there is no other way they can act in their own and find themselves utilizing the tactics of *musayra* in other well. For some, such as those whose work or studies brin continuous social contact with Westernized Jewish society between cultural worlds may involve codeswitching along th dimension. In fact, I have heard it claimed that young Pa tellectuals have become more *dugri* than Israeli Jews.

It appears, then, that the ethos of *musayra*, which is ass power relations in a hierarchical society, provides another ample to Rosaldo's aforementioned attempt at a general would replace the one implied by Perelman: Indirection i ciated with authority and not with an egalitarian, democrat

I will not attempt to formulate yet another alternative ge encompassing *dugri* speech and *musayra* as well. The issue very complicated. As I have tried to show, what is recog rectness or indirectness of style in various cultural settings different dynamic in societies with a different history and cult The differences relate to such issues as social practices, no sponsibility or commitment, conceptions of truth and perso attitudes toward interpersonal life. The four accounts I have to *dugri* speech raise the question of the possibility of ma trolled comparison of ways of speaking with regard to the dimension, in terms of both defining features and paralle circumstances. In exploring various instances of stylistic d note a convergence of styles from different historical and cu grounds. Much more needs to be known, however, in orde such a comparison in a meaningful way. In each case, the would embrace both the direct and indirect styles in each s munity, their defining features, their contexts of use, and th meanings.[7]

The great variation in the distribution of direct versus ind in relation to gender can be demonstrated with reference to speechways discussed in this chapter. The cases are chosen, n [illegible] to demonstrate the four possibilities of associating dir

	Dugri	American	Malagasy	Musayra
	+	−	+	−
	+	+	−	−

yles with gender. Using "plus" (+) for direct and "minus" (−) rect, we derive Table 3.

clude this chapter by specifying the dimensions that seem to ne *dugri* style with respect to the notion of directness. Subsequent ill, I hope, indicate to what extent these dimensions are also to the study of other ways of speaking marked by their direct d can therefore contribute to a typology of speech styles along ctness axis:

ri speech is said to be direct in the sense that it is explicit and r, expressing the speaker's intentions as transparently as sible.

directness of *dugri* speech is associated with an aesthetic of plicity: The degree of code elaboration is limited by such lin- tic properties as syntactic complexity, semantic elaboration, and torical subtlety [cf. Hymes (1974a:38–9) on the dimension of bal elaboration versus sparseness].

ri speech is direct in "facework" terms: It is speech that employs "bald-on-record" strategy and involves unmitigated face-threat- g acts.

ri speech is direct in interactional terms. Ideally, it involves nediated, face-to-face, spoken communication, so that the aker is fully and visibly engaged in and committed to his or her

ri speech is said to be "short and to the point"; the basis of this e-lipped, laconic style is a distrust of language and a preference as little talk as possible – *ma shepahot diburim*, as the native ase has it (cf. the categories of verbose–voluble versus taciturn– eent in Hymes 1974a:36).

five dimensions of directness, which appear to be central to the rization of *dugri* speech as a communicative form, can serve as le starting point for a typological analysis. But however tempting ystematizing move may be, it will be useful only insofar as the ve tonalities of the ways of speaking we investigate are kept in v. The task, as I have tried to show, is not a simple one. It s sociolinguistic and cultural anthropological concerns, involv-

ing a view of speech as both shaped by its social and cultur and as a shaping force in human affairs.

A systematic procedure for studying ways of speaking can be tentatively sketched. The steps designed to discover and cultural way of speaking are as follows:

1. A way of speaking can be identified in terms of its ch mode. The direct–indirect, formal–informal, serious–p high–low involvement pairs of terms serve as sensitizin in this task.
2. The speakers' metacommunicative vocabulary can be co native terms that are routinely used to name and describe ways of speaking.
3. The cultural significance of a natively "named" way of s a mode of expression is assessed through an examinat language game associated with its label: the terms wit tends to cooccur, the syntactic frames in which it figures, ings and metaphors associated with it, and the contexts is and is not appropriate.
4. Articulations of the characteristic mode of speaking are the interpersonal rituals, the myths and social dramas that the structural junctures in the culture's life, its moments o or of intense selfawareness.

This set of procedures, flexibly employed and appropriatel to suit particular cultural contexts, seems likely to yield th accounts that may be used in a comparative study of cultur speaking.

onclusion

study has been devoted to *dugri* speech: the cultural meanings
ied with it, the sociocultural context of its emergence and
ed performances, the role it has played in the articulation
Sabra culture's semantic of identity – both in reaffirming and
tiating it – and the interactional web of which it forms a

ri speech is labeled with reference to its directness of mode.
hout this study, I have tried to show that the dimension of di-
s relates to central and significant aspects of a group's spoken
interactional ethos. The norms related to it reflect a cultural
n to a number of fundamental tensions every social group must
s as it weaves together its communal existence: for example, the
between a cultural emphasis on the expressive as compared to
actical order; the tension between a normative preference for
nce to given truths, meanings, and values as compared to the
r's face concerns. I believe this is the reason for the high visibility
directness dimension and for the fact that it has attracted the
on of ethnographers studying speech communities in different
f the world, as was discussed in Chapter 6.

study of *dugri* speech extends accounts of the direct mode in a
r of ways.

, it provides an ethnographic example of a speech community
valorized way of speaking involves directness (rather than indi-
ss) and is associated with a normative tolerance for confrontational
unication. The directness of *dugri* speech, which in the Sabra
is associated with the expression of respect rather than disrespect,
ethnocentric attempts to deal with the direct/indirect scale such
comment that "the all-overriding aspect of politeness – 'Avoid
ntation' – is perhaps universal" (Ostman 1981:3). Clearly, it is
this study illustrates.

nd, the study of *dugri* speech brings out the cultural underpin-
of speakers' choice of interactional strategy. These choices are

presupposed by situational oriented "facework" analyses, a
interesting implications for our understanding of the notion o
as it is employed in the symbolic interactionist research trad
pecially in Goffman's work and its linguistic applications, notal
work of Brown and Levinson.

Thus, according to Goffman (1967:11), interactants' conside
each other's face-concerns implies that each is allowed to play
he or she has chosen in each particular situation. He empha
negotiated nature of social life, formulating a "rule of consider
that "is typically a working acceptance, not a real one, since it
be based not on agreement of candidly expressed heart-felt eva
but upon a willingness to give temporary lip service to judgm
which the participants do not really agree."

On the face of it, *dugri* speech is clearly not commensu
Goffman's rule of considerateness, which he regards as "a cor
interaction, not its objective." In fact, this observation colored
oretical interest in *dugri* speech from the very start. I asked
How can speech that is defined in terms of the blatant violatio
a basic structural feature of interactional life become crystall
valorized way of speaking? The answer that has emerged from
nographic study allows us to accommodate the directness of *dug*
within an elaborated version of Goffman's framework, taking
count both the dimensions of deference and demeanor and th
cultural meanings.

Dugri speakers, it was shown, are not blind to the rule of co
ness, but contextualizing it in terms of the Sabra ethos, they re
the notion of "facework." To them, a speaker's face is not – o
not be – determined by the line he wishes to adopt in a given
but rather by the culture's ideal image of the person. An acto
tional line is seen as merely an external matter. True respect
than consideration – is manifested by the use of *dugri* speec
cated on the assumption that the listener has the strength and
required to take the speaker's direct talk as sincere and natural
ing in it the promise of *communitas*. In sum, *dugri* speech in
culture does not violate but rather realizes a culture-specifi
politeness.

This should not suggest a deterministic view of social inter
is not argued that Sabra speakers always speak *dugri* or are alwa
to a restricted display of interactional style. The claim I am m
rather, that the *dugri* speech style is a major vehicle for the p
of the Sabra character. On all occasions, the decision to projec
identity is based on situational considerations. On some o
though, this is more warranted, or even expected, than on ot

ritual typically occurs in a social situation in which not projecting ra identity through the use of *dugri* speech would entail particularly costs in terms of the potential initiator's sense of self.

though speakers do indeed appeal to their verbal repertoire of eness strategies in any given case, based on their assessment of the actional context, the development and nature of such a repertoire nd on deep-seated cultural norms and values, including a differ l emphasis on the role of predetermined as compared to situation- negotiable rules of speech. A proper understanding of ways of king cannot, therefore, be confined to a consideration of the situ- al anchorage of speech signs, but must incorporate the cultural nsion as well.

third aspect of this study is that it deals with a way of speaking allized in, and modeled upon, the kind of communication that is cal of liminal contexts and the relational modality of *communitas* ciated with them. To my knowledge, communicative situations de- l in terms of the social modality of *communitas* have not been the ect of sociolinguistic inquiries, whereas those associated with the ctural world of *societas* have received a great deal of research at ion. This study suggests the possibility, and the potential value, of sidering liminal-like contexts within a sociolinguistic perspective. As indicated throughout, such a move may be used to test and, at s, to question the applicability or exhaustiveness of widely accepted olinguistic distinctions, such as the distinction between personal and tional communicative orientations (cf. Chapters 2 and 4) or the ial account of politeness strategies by Brown and Levinson, which s not address issues related to demeanor.

ourth, I would like to underline the historical and dynamic per- ctive on ways of speaking that this study seeks to promote: It is ressed both in the attempt to view the emergence of *dugri* speech inst its particular sociocultural background and in the attempt to e the role of the *dugri* way of speaking in the unfolding of significant lic events. Thus, *dugri* speech is studied both as an expression of ocultural processes and as a cultural resource for the shaping and rpretation of social events. The exploration of the meanings of *dugri* ech (Chapter 2) brought out its cultural embeddedness as a symbolic duct, and the discussion of its role in two social dramas (Chapter 5) ught out its role as a cultural resource. I hope these various descrip- and analytic moves have provided a persuasive account of the in- lependence between an understanding of speechways and the rpretation of historical events.

astly, let me stress that *dugri* speech functions as a ceremonial idiom sraeli Sabra culture, that is, it serves the ritual function of projecting

and reaffirming the speaker's, and often the listener's, The study of *dugri* speech is, therefore, not only a study use or nonuse of various forms of politeness, but also ar the cultural ethos that is encapsulated in the directness o the *dugri* way of speaking as a symbolic form.

The crystallization of a cultural way of speaking manife of a particular set of regularizing processes within a cult esses function as a "cultural statement about cultural o cultural void" (Myerhoff and Falk-Moore 1977:16). B some of the strands of form and formality in Israeli ever I have sought, through my work, to enhance the rec orderliness of the cultural world I and my informants s chaotic it is often felt to be. This is not to say, however tional and formal strata I have uncovered as motivatin emergence of the *dugri* way of speaking can be seen as minants in the communicative life of members of the Sa Rather, it is my focus on the creation of cultural order, ritualizing, that has tended to make the regularizing proc inent in the foregoing analysis. As the discussion of the has indicated most clearly, but as many informants' com more subtly, the *dugri* cultural code is constantly bei reinterpreted, and modified by members of the culture. tening" and the "roughening" of the *dugri* mode, as processes have been referred to, testify to the flux in *du* the Sabra culture at the time of this writing.

It is precisely the problematic standing of the ideolo the *dugri* idiom that gives it and its study the poignancy this was repeatedly brought home to me during the pro gation and in presenting my study to Israeli audiences. seem increasingly aware of the "indeterminacy" that ha at the edges of the cultural revolution of past generatio ficulties involved in constructing an alternative secular [cf. Shaked (1983) for a recent discussion].

In fact, as this issue was beginning to emerge as a late ethnographic investigation, one of my informants, a p teacher, startled me by using the term *halal tarburi* (cu discussing her life today. Other informants said they were what to think of as their culture, what is Israeli about it, what is East, what is West, what is local, what is universa people spoke of Israeli culture as a "culture in the making, we are all striving toward but have not achieved; at the erosion that has taken place in the Sabra ethos was repea Whether informants' emphasis was on a subjective sense

becoming," a general sense of flux and indeterminacy ran as an
urrent in their talk, making apparent the need for the kind of
l analysis Edward Sapir felt would be a starting point for the
itution of American culture in the wake of World War 1. In words
ere intended to sound a cautionary note when originally written
, and that sound perhaps overly optimistic today, he set forth the
ge and promise of cultural studies in terms that seem peculiarly
nt to my ethnographic goals in uncovering the expressive patterns
eli culture. Emphasizing that the war and its aftermath "cannot
ufficient cultural cause," he warned against the expectation that
ican culture would "somehow automatically burst into bloom,"
ncluded:

> or later we shall have to get down to the humble task of exploring the
> of our consciousness and dragging to the light what sincere bits of
> d experience we can find. These bits will not always be beautiful, they
> t always be pleasing, but they will be genuine. And then we can build.
> , in plenty of time – for we must have patience – a genuine culture –
> yet, a series of linked autonomous cultures – will grace our lives.
> 19)

udying those fleeting moments of drama and ritual that lie some-
between the formality of official ritualdom and the informality
ryday spoken exchanges, we can perhaps reveal, and thus further
l make available for reflection, the expressive idioms that shape
es. Unattended, they may leave us unschooled by the lessons they
ach, yet at the same time uncritically trapped in their compelling

Appendix

Interview format

The purpose of the semistructured interviews was to
closely the meanings and uses of the term *dugri* and its d
discursive domain of which it forms a part, and speakers
ward *dugri* speech and their perceptions of the situationa
contexts in which it is intelligible and appropriate. In fra
tions, I utilized cultural information derived from open
well as spontaneously occurring *dugri* utterances in ord
and formulate the contextual constraints governing the u
a metacommunicative term and explicit *dugri* utterances a
moves (see, in particular, Chapters 3 and 4).

The interviews varied in length and detail, but each
corpus of data that has allowed me to construct a sketch of
of *dugri* speech and to refine my understanding of the s
cultural contexts of its use.

The following issues were addressed in each interview

1. Identification of the syntactic and semantic environm the term *dugri* could be used.
2. Specification of the speech acts that could be perfo the use of explicit *dugri* utterances (i.e., utterances "I'll tell you *dugri*" indicating device).
3. Specification of the kinds of speech contexts in whic is either acceptable or actually called for.
4. Exploration of the types of interpersonal relations th or inhibit the use of *dugri* speech.
5. Exploration of the kinds of contents (feelings, opi evaluations, factual information) that could be prop through speech identified as *dugri*
6. Exploration of the language game of expressions th way similar to *dugri* for comparison and contrast.

lematic filtering of verbs of saying through the "I'll tell you *ri*" syntactic frame (e.g., "Let me ask/advise/order . . . you *du*-") in an attempt to identify the types of verbal activity speaking *ri* is felt to involve.

loration of the conditions/circumstances under which *dugri* ech would not be appropriate. The question, phrased as "When ld you not speak *dugri*?" also triggered responses that revealed en it would be useless to speak *dugri*.

essment of the degree to which the *dugri* nature of an utterance erceived as an absolute or a relative issue by asking: "Can one more or less *dugri*? Too *dugri*? Not *dugri* enough?"

citing of incidents from informants that had to do with *dugri* ech or related issues, including inappropriate uses of it.

h interview contained some discussion of the anecdotal evi- ce I had collected that exemplified the working of the *dugri* om, such as examples from the media; this enabled me to check interpretations of this portion of the data with my informants. , the following list of sentences was presented to informants. e asked to judge and comment upon their acceptability and to ossible contexts in which they would be appropriately used, if d how their use would be interpreted:

peaks *dugri*, but he is not honest.
peaks *dugri*, but he is a pleasant fellow.
k *dugri* but do not hide anything from me.
k *dugri*, but without elaborate expressions (*bli melitzot*).
speech is *dugri*, but he is blunt.
uest that in this meeting we all speak *dugri* but stick to the main ts.
peaks *dugri* but plans every word.
d it to him *dugri* because/in spite of the fact that I knew he agreed not agree with me.
oke to him *dugri* so that there would be no secrets between us.

ese "but" sentences involve an attempt to cancel out meaning of *dugri* that my previous exploration had suggested were part nantics. As expected, most of these sentences were judged to or unacceptable or triggered the construction of special contexts drawing of finer distinctions. Informants' response to these s, and particularly the discussions that ensued at many points, o be a valuable source of additional, more focused insights nterview concluded with a discussion of general characteristics abra culture as perceived by the informant, which included ons of other native terms that might be interesting to study.

Notes

Chapter 1

1 See Benedict (1946), Bateson (1958), and Geertz (1973) for e[...] the notion of cultural ethos. Brown and Levinson (1978), Tar[...] and Blum-Kulka (1982) either appeal to or imply this notion [...] discourse phenomena. Bateson (ibid.:276) was keenly aware of [...] of incorporating the notion of *ethos* into anthropological de[...] attributed it "to the merely practical difficulty of describing hu[...] in a critical and comprehensive manner," arguing that "un[...] techniques for the proper recording and analysis of human pos[...] intonation, laughter, etc. we shall have to be content wit[...] sketches of the 'tone' of behavior." There is no question th[...] behaviors play an important role in the constitution of speech [...] ever, I suggest that much can be learned about them by foc[...] verbal aspects of mode associated with given ways of speakin[...] present study will contribute to the traditional concern wit[...] qualitative aspects of verbal style.

2 Studies based on elicited, written responses to a test containin[...] of a variety of relevant situational contexts have been conduc[...] the Cross-Cultural Speech Act Realization Patterns Projec[...] Kulka, Danet, and Gerson 1983 and Blum-Kulka and Olsh[...] Hebrew data). This project provides a systematic attempt [...] cross-cultural, situational, and individual variability in the [...] speech acts in context, including an attempt to determine ge[...] preferences along the direct–indirect continuum. Results ob[...] for the speech act of requesting support general, intuitive ju[...] cerning the relative directness of Israeli style.

3 Many comments supporting these claims can be found in Avi[...] (1981) journalistic account of her experiences as an Israeli i[...] States. Professor Hymes (personal communication) reports or[...] ings for a population of American and Israeli students base[...] paper by a former Israeli student of his. On the other hand, [...] my informants were convinced that there is much admiration a[...] of other countries, especially Americans, for Israeli *dugri* sty[...] is reflected in an article about the former U.S. ambassador t[...] Nations, Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, which appeared on her arrival [...] [illegible] June 26, 1985). It offers the followi[...] the question of what makes her such a highly sought speake[...] [illegible]

oman who has a quality that Americans appreciate: she speaks *dugri*, afraid to say what's on her mind, employing strong, even blunt ge." Clearly, there are various stylistic strands in American culture rly, an article describing the great popularity in the United States of s U.N. representative, Benjamin Netanyahu, says: "His sentences mulated with clarity and lucidity, straight to the point. Their inner s compelling. In him you find the Israeli *dugriyut* which is free of d rhetoric and empty parlance, and which works – so it appears – rdinarily well with the Americans" (*Yedioth Ahronoth*, Apr. 18, That the quality of directness is also part of the American cultural is indicated by the self-description given in the section "What Amer Are Like" (pp. 103-5) of the *Pre-Departure Orientation Handbook* ed by the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs of the U.S. ation Agency, Washington, D.C. (1984). It includes the entry ricans Are Direct – Honesty and frankness are more important to eems than 'saving face'. They may seem blunt at times . . . Americans ck to get to the point and do not spend much time on formal social ies." It seems to me that to the extent that *dugri* speech is positively by Americans, this may have to do with the affinities between *dugri* and American "Tough Talk" as discussed in Chapter 6.

ymes (1962, 1972, 1974a) and Bauman and Sherzer (1974). My move sponds to Ardener's (1971:xxiii) call for a truly ethnolinguistic ap- to the study of language in its social context, one that takes "into at bobular semantic and etymological exegesis." This ethnolinguistics, n ethnometalinguistics, would be a linguistics produced by "the peo- n a par with ethnomedicine. Thus, a major source for the construction story of *dugri* speech has been members' semantic and etymological is. See also Hoenigswald's (1966) discussion of folk linguistics.

er aspect of what is here referred to as a *mode* can be found perhaps dimension of "interpersonal involvement," which has figured in im- t ways in a number of studies (e.g., Gumperz 1978; Kochman 1981; 1982; Tannen 1984).

uld be emphasized that this study touches on only one of the many tures of modern Israel. Since the Sabra subculture was dominant in until recently, it has come to be identified with mainstream Israeli y. I hope this study will contribute to its better understanding as well elativization. I believe that the anthropological perspective in general, hnographies of communication in particular, have a special con ou to make to a culturally pluralistic awareness in modern societies. an be fully achieved when the subcultures of all groups in a national are made the topic of investigation – whether they are considered groups (as are the various Israeli Sephardic Jewish groups, which ainly of Middle Eastern and North African origin), or whether they ent the relatively "colorless" mainstream culture, as the Ashkenazi of European origin tend to be considered. It should be stressed, er, that this is not a study of Israeli identity or history, but rather of y-relevant speech forms and their contextual, sociohistorical an- ge. For studies directly concerned with Israeli cultural identity, see an (1970, 1979), Kahane and Kopstein (1980), and references therein.

's conception of style, as part of his dramatistic perspective, informs current work in such modern fields as social psychology. Harre 31–2), for example, emphasizes the role of style in the "drama of

character" that attends any act by individual actors, saying: " work' is possible because when performing we act in accord certain style, qualifying our actions by the manner in which w out . . . It is in the style of performance that the dramaturgical institution is carried on. It is then that character is manifested

8 Let me briefly mention my main theoretical sources in order the forthcoming account: My study is generally located in the of speaking research tradition developed by Hymes (1962, 197 His emphasis on the notion of style and his suggestions for components of speech events are directly reflected in both th procedures of this study. Goffman's (1959, 1967) dramaturgic and his discussion of the notion of "facework" have been c interpretation of *dugri* speech. I have combined them with Tu 1969, 1974, 1977, 1980, 1982) treatment of cultural forms and t *communitas* distinction in an attempt to develop a cultural acc *dugri* way of speaking as a cultural form. Silverstein's (1976) of the notion of indexicality has been helpful in understanding of the *dugri* indicating device. Trilling's (1971) discussion of sincerity has been most helpful in contextualizing a central mea of *dugri* speech within a more comprehensive historical framew (1968) discussion of the rhetorical situation has been useful i characterize the speech situation that contextualizes the *dugri* rit Burke's approach to literary criticism (1935, 1941, 1945, 1957) me to frame my discussion of a public drama as well as a nov as employing the *dugri* mode in terms that are consistent with ethnographic goal.

Chapter 2

1 See Elon (1971), Liebman (1978), Don-Yehia and Liebman (rubavel (1980), Even-Zohar (1981), and Margalit (1983).

2 Interestingly, as Asch (1955:33) notes, equivalents of "straigh many languages and are used as a person-metaphor to designate universally honesty, righteousness and correct understanding." on to note that "closer examination of the data reveals certain among the languages under discussion and raises problems of c analysis of great interest."

3 In both colloquial Hebrew and Arabic, speaking *dugri* involves speaking to the point, getting right down to business, not beati the bush. In what follows, I focus on a particular difference betwe and Arabic usage in relation to the cultural interpretation of speaking norm in the respective speech communities. My analys include all possible comparisons of the use of *dugri* or *dugri* spe two groups. Let me note that not all my informants were aw etymology of *dugri*; some thought it was originally a Hebrew some even thought that it was derived from the English word more well-known Israeli metacommunicative term is *hut-pa* (impe speaking *dugri* and speaking with *hutzpa* share the quality of de the latter is more specifically associated with status differences toward someone higher in status) and does not carry the [illegible] that *dugri* conveys. As noted, participants [illegible]

interpretations of whether a particular act is a matter of *dugri* or *a*.

ubnov's (1955, chap. 22), Gonen's (1975), and Liebman and Don 's (1983a,b) discussions of the role of religion in this context.

yerhoff's (1978) discussion of the speech patterns of elderly Jews of European heritage in Southern California.

Gonen (1975), Rubinstein (1977), Oting (1981), and Herman (1970,

oury (in press) for a cultural semiotic account of the substitution of mers' surnames in Israel. The fact that the spirit animating this prac as not quite disappeared became apparent in 1985 upon the arrival hiopian Jews. This time, however, the name-change was openly re- l by some of the newcomers and was publicly criticized by some ed- s, politicians, and journalists. For example, an article entitled lata's New Name is Noga," which describes the first steps of a group rentless Ethiopian children in Israel says: "At the airport they were ed with clothes and new names . . . Somebody insisted on giving them, with a new homeland, a new identity as well" (M. Meron, *Yedioth roth*, Jan. 11, 1985).

Burckhardt (1928), Lukes (1973), and Sennett (1974).

borrowed the term "antistyle" from Darbyshire (1971) but am using different way: The whole point of my study is to argue that the *dugri* of speaking is a stylistic form even though Sabras imagine themselves plain, nonstylized speakers, given their cultural interpretation of the n of style as involving affected, insincere, nonspontaneous expression yshire echoes this cultural conception of style when he defines it nor- ely as a deviation from a language norm, a definition that is culturally ling but not conceptually viable: That a particular style is considered bsence of style in the folk linguistics of a speech community does not it so from an analytical standpoint.

lleague, Rachel Seginer, has drawn my attention to an expression s associated with the Sabra ethos and that similarly reflects an uneas- with words: Some speakers describe the act of indulging in literary g as "*haluo bikhiva*," to "sin at writing." A similar uneasiness seems derlie the disclaimers that open two recent autobiographies by former bers of the *Palmah* prestate units – by Netiva Ben-Yehuda (1981; cf. ter 5) and by former General Avraham Adan (1984) – which say, in atter's words, "I am not a writer, but I have things to tell."

Varnick's (1982) account of the quarrel between the Ancients and the erns in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century France indicates, the Mod inspired by Cartesianism, espoused a conception of discourse and ric "with a focus on truth establishing discourses unconcerned with " (p. 261). Their approach prevailed and affected public perceptions preferences in the area of rhetoric and eloquence, which became dom through the European Enlightenment movement.

different link between plain style and a content or reference-oriented , one that is similarly grounded in a functional framework, can be l at an even earlier period of rhetorical thought. Thus, Golden, Ber and Coleman (1978) say that Cicero had made the connection between unornamented style and the function of discourse as oriented toward rather than entertainment or persuasion.

prevalence of a proof-oriented, modernist conception of speech and

writing in the United States (Lanham 1974) may account for th of the "conduit metaphor" whereby language is conceptualiz tainer of ideas (Lakoff and Johnson 1980).

12 The ethos of simplicity and egalitarianism tends to be assoc deemphasis on elaborate ritual acts as a source of communal i and social order. Indeed, for many of my Sabra informants, th (*tekes*) itself tended to represent empty, external conduct, a them specifically associated it with lack of *dugriyut*, often pref "mere" (*stam*) as in contrasting mere ritual to sincere behavior to mind Harrison's (1979) hypothesis concerning the inverse tween a culture's emphasis on productive endeavors and its inv expressive and dramatic symbolism, which fits well with the force of the Israeli production ethos mentioned earlier. Thu American corporations discussed by Harrison, in which the tween management and the production floor was small, so, too, culture, "the rituals to be performed were often those of esc.ie 'Don't call me Sir' " (p. 73). This hypothesized link betwee with productivity and a low ritual profile may account, at least the fact that for A. D. Gordon, the revival of a Jewish ethos of was associated with a rejection of decadent European m "twisted" speech forms, which signaled both social inequality a from productive labor.

Chapter 3

1 Phrases of this general type have been studied under the label c *devices* (Fotion 1975; Katriel and Dascal 1984), *conversational devices* (Schegloff 1980; Beach and Dunning 1982) or *gambits* (with different analytical purposes in mind. These devices serve municative function, highlighting some aspect of the utteran they form a part. In the terminology of linguistic pragmatics, th sions would fall under the catch-all heading of *pragmatic partic* 1981). These include a variety of linguistic devices such as v tense, aspect, modality, sentence type, prosodic phenomena order as well as hedges, interjections, and the like, as they "implicitly anchor the utterance in which they function to th attitude toward aspects of the ongoing interaction" (Ostman ibi they will be referred to as *indicating devices* or *indicators*, interc

2 See, for example, Basso (1979:17), who refers to these two levels while reminding us that they are "no more than different abstra single strips of interpersonal activity."

3 Silverstein (1976), drawing on Peirce's trichotomy of signs, pr axes for the classification of indexical signs: the referential vers referential axis and the presuppositional versus the creative axi relevant for the understanding of the *dugri* indicating device: I nonreferentially, that is, it highlights expressive or stylistic mea shall see, it can be more or less creative. When tending more presupposing end, it reflects a social situation; when used c functions so as to redefine the situation.

The interactional consequences of using explicit *dugri* utteranc formulated in terms of Peirce's scheme for the understanding of s what he calls *interpretants* (Peirce 1985; Daniel 1984, in the la

otion is explicated in the context of anthropological interpretation). different types of interpretants that appear in Peirce's scheme, the elevant to our concern is the dynamic interpretant, the actual effect sign (in contrast, for example, to its potential effects). The actual of the sign can take the form of a feeling (the hearer's emotional nse to it), in which case it is called an *emotional interpretant*, or it can action, in which case it is referred to as an *energetic interpretant*. I e that the outstanding characteristic of the *dugri* mode in terms of its is that it emphasizes the energetic interpretant – it is evocative and impelling, which accounts for its confrontational air and punchlike . At the same time, though less saliently so, it invokes a distinctive onal response as well as a set of cultural expectations that ground and nt the employment of *dugri* speech.

el, these indicating devices can be said to function like disclaimers itt and Stokes 1975) in that they seek to suspend or qualify the meaning y conveyed by a form of conduct (verbal or otherwise), pointing to cit normative dimensions that underlie behavior in the speaker's cul- Other such visible linguistic links between culture and conduct have studied under the heading of *motive talk* (Mills 1940) and *accounts* and Lyman, 1968). All these devices are forms of *aligning actions*, ey have been labeled by Stokes and Hewitt (1976) and are associated instances of socially problematic behavior. The devices considered seem to form a distinct subclass (which I have called *cultural warrants*): both index the set of norms whose violation constitutes the proble event to which participants orient themselves (i.e., they function like imers) and point to the norms appealed to in resolving that proble ity (i.e., they function like accounts). We can say, then, that whereas pes of aligning actions considered in the aforementioned studies form -way link between culture and conduct, cultural warrants form a two- link between speakers' cultural matrix and their concrete verbal vior.

Stewart (personal communication) has noted that in American English quivalent device would be "To tell (you) the truth" rather than "I'll ou the truth." I subsequently noted that Hebrew also allows for the f "*lehagid (leha) et haemet*" (To tell (you) the truth), which conveys tly different meaning from the more common expression I am con ng here. Another expression that can function as an indicating device lloquial Hebrew is "*ani omer leha et haemet*" (I'm telling you the). This construction comes closest to the Arabic use of *dugri* in such ulations as "I am speaking the *dugri*" (cf. Chapter 2). Let me also that the *dugri* indicator can be used in a counterexpectational rather a face-threatening context (e.g., in "I'll tell you *dugri*, I don't know to do about it"). This would be appropriate as a response to a demand d on the speaker, one that remains unfulfilled and whose violation he e acknowledges in using *dugri*. The use of "I'll tell you the truth" in ase would be acceptable, but would not be heard as acknowledging a violation of expectations. The counterexpectational use of explicit utterances, which is not as common as their primary use in face- tening contexts, similarly involves a potential confrontation that in ase relates to conflicting beliefs or expectations rather than to con- g face-wants between speaker and hearer.

rly, Ostman (1981:20) notes that the pragmatic particle "you know,"

as used in American English, does not occur in couple talk, an suggests that the internal relationship within a couple is (or sho enough so as not to be in need of overt markers of politen softening devices. That is, the need to use 'you know' will d increasing rapport." The expression "you know" in Ameri like "I'll tell you *dugri*" in colloquial Hebrew, is a stylistic cating a switch from a "frontstage" to a "backstage" langua ior.

7 See Friedrich (1972) on the notion of "pronominal breakthro

8 These defensive responses indicate speakers' awareness that th is not always used in good faith and should not always be t value. In fact, several informants told anecdotes that reflecte ulative possibilities inherent in the use of *dugri*. Some of them e intercultural contacts in which the speaker took the liberty to her mind, given that "we Israelis talk straight. That's our nar informant put it. Whereas in some cases this action is a simp of ingrained attitudes, in others informants testified that th sciously manipulated what they took to be generally share about their cultural style. The very possibility of such manip forces the reality of the *dugri* interactional code.

9 Other indicating devices can be used to emphasize a factual example, "*ata tzarih lada'at*" (you should know)/"*teda leha* that) or "*ani rotze sheteda*" (I want you to know) can preface, "*lo haja kan af ehad*" (there was nobody here). These may b "epistemic" indicators, but their distribution in actual usage at least partly, governed by face considerations. For example, *rotze sheteda, lo haja kan af ehad*" (I want you to know, there here) may be heard as a reassurance, the propositionally equi *leha shelo haja kan af ehad*" (know that there was nobody he It is most likely to be heard as a disgruntled claim. The study matics of these various constructions must be left for future r

10 See Searle (1975), Ervin-Tripp (1977), Brown and Levinson (1 (1980), BlumKulka (1982), and Blum-Kulka et al. (1983). It that explicit *dugri* utterances can be appropriately used as "dire as questions, requests for information: It sounds odd to say " *dugri*" or "I'll tell you *dugri*, shut the door." Also, an indirect is made by verbalizing a precondition for requests is not read but as a literal expression of that condition, as in "I'll tell you want you to come here every day." Thus, there is a partial over the interactional phenomena studied under the shading of *dugr* those investigated in the preceding studies of the language of r Israeli society. Studies of the speech act of apology as it is us discourse (Cohen and Olshtain 1981; Blum-Kulka and Olshta shtain and Cohen 1984) provide data on the handling of the spe concerns in "remedial interchanges" (Goffman 1971), thus bro scope of that kind of analysis. The exploration of additional typ acts and their realization patterns (e.g., criticisms) seems to m ranted by this qualitative study.

11 See Rubinstein (1977), Liebman and Don-Yehia (1983a,b), (1983)

12 Cf. the expressions *open communication*, and *communication* *personal communication* as used in present-day American disc

ting that communication is both an important cultural category and a cus of problematicity; or *original Zionism*, *true Zionism*, and *sane Zionn*, which abound in Israeli public discourse, indicating that the definition Zionism has lost its clear-cut, consensual force in present-day Israeli ciety.

e Beit-Hallahmi (1984) and Shapira and Herzog (1984).

e Isaac (1976), Smooha (1978), Cohen (1983), Landau and Beit-Hallahmi 983), Lehman-Wilzig (1983), Liebman and Don-Yehia (1983a,b), and ssak (1983).

his is sometimes expressed as a distinction between *koah* (power) and *ohanijut*, a word formed from the same root with the addition of the suffix *nijut*, which has a negative connotation and denotes, roughly, "an exaggerated, ideologized orientation toward" – in this case, toward power.

r 4

this and the next chapter, I combine Turner's dramatistic, action-centered pproach to the study of social life with Burke's dramatistic, linguistically entered approach. See Conquergood (1984) for a recent discussion of the sic affinities, as well as differences in emphasis, between these two seminal riters.

his is congruent with Goffman's (1967) approach to the study of interaction uals; see Harre and Secord (1972) for a theoretical explication of this nd of move. In a later study, Harre (1976:xvi) points out the promise of ch a focus while acknowledging its limitations: "It is not our intention to ggest that the whole of social life can be exhausted by the application of e dramaturgical and liturgical models, nor that the uses of language are stricted to the acts and actions comprehended by them, but rather that ose models and the action sequences they enable us to understand are aracteristic of crucial moments in human lives."

r example, see Geertz (1973), Schneider (1980), and Schutz (1967).

e Tannen (1981b) on the combativeness popularly associated with Jewish ew York conversational style and Schiffrin (1984) on the use of argument sociability among Philadelphia Jews. This seems to suggest that there ay be a broader pattern at work here.

e Kochman's (1981) discussion of the self-assertion associated with Afromerican expressive style. Black self-assertion shares with *dugri* speech he shift in focus from doing unto others to doing for oneself" (p. 124), t this shift has a different symbolic meaning in black culture: It is interreted as the expression of feelings (rather than opinions) and is grounded "the sanctity of individual feelings and the primary and independent atus that feelings have within the culture" (pp. 123–4). The greater freeom of expression allowed in black culture (as compared to white American lture) results in greater confidence among blacks concerning their ability manage anger and hostility at the verbal level without losing self-control, fects their handling of conflict situations, and is expressed in ritual insults ch as "playing the dozens" (see Labov 1972).

he poignancy of the Israeli identity problem is revealed in other expressive ntexts as well. It has been illuminated in Oring's (1981) previously mentoned study of the *chizbat* (literally, "lie") of the *Palmah* prestate units. ccording to his analysis, the set of texts comprising the *chizbat* repertoire n be read as thematizing Israelis' profound unresolved conflict between

the image of the Sabra and the image of the Diaspora Je of a *chizbat* that involves a direct comment on the parad Sabra's preoccupation with character is the tale about the who, while sailing one night on the Lake of Galilee, dared throw his fisherman's lamp into the water as a test of cha aside his protest that it would be a waste of a good lamp. be finally conceded, the verdict came: "Hey, you've go Anybody can influence you." The message is clear: The prove his character undermines the validity of the proof it is built into the Sabra's situation.

7 Prell-Foldes stresses that this conception is incompatible view of the "psychological self," which sees the individual society and self-actualization as the escape from commu Another study that examines basic cultural assumptions relationship between the individual and the community n communication patterns of a speech community is a stu response pattern among black Americans (Daniel and Sm

8 This also calls to mind Albert Camus's (1951) more gene *l'homme révolté*. He describes the rebel as the person wh unwanted elements in his life is simultaneously an imm reaffirmation of some part of his being. In Camus's acco clearly associated with the semantic of identity. The rebel first, that there is something within him that can serve as tification, even if for a moment, and this becomes an ove reality – so much so that the person becomes his rebellion, a he may have had to compromise is exchanged for an all tionary orientation accompanied by a demand for a levelin unequals. This account is particularly useful in stressing t of the act of rebellion: It not only reflects the actor's com helps to shape and strengthen it.

Chapter 5

1 My discussion of these two social dramas is based on participation in them as a member of the Israeli public a occurrence, which was inevitably accompanied by many a sations with other self-appointed participant-observers of had the privilege of spending many hours in stimulating c Netiva Ben-Yehuda, author of *1948 – Between Calendars*, w with me all the articles, interviews, and letters (both pri that came in response to the publication of her book. Th offered in this chapter are all based on published respon as indicated in the following list:

H. Boshes, *Haaretz*, Mar. 19, 1981; D. Rabikovitz, *M* 1981; U. Seal *Yedioth Ahronoth*, Mar. 6, 1981; D. Omer Mar. 4, 1981; T. Avidar, *Maariv*, Mar. 20, 1981; D. Shcho Mar. 11, 1981; Eli S., *Kol Hair*, Mar. 13, 1981; J. Reshe 27, 1981; D. Shchori, *Al Hamishar*, Mar. 20, 1981; B. M *Post*, Mar. 20, 1981; U. Avneri, *Haolam Haze*, Mar. 25, *Haolam Haze*, Mar. 25, 1981; N. Margalit, *Maariv*, Mar. 27 *Haolam Haze*, Apr. 8, 1981; A. Porat, *Yedioth Ahronoth* A. Einat, *Haaretz*, Mar. 30, 1981; H. Katzir, *Bamahane N*

N. Gal, *Kol Yerushalaim*, June 5, 1981; Y. Golan, *Davar*, June 5,
A. Porat, *Yedioth Ahronoth*, June 12, 1981; N. Shemer, *Maariv*, June
81; H. Gur, *Maariv*, May 26, 1981; R. Sivan, *Yedioth Ahronoth*, June
981; M. Singer, *Yedioth Ahronoth*, June 19, 1981; H. Boshes, *Haaretz*,
17, 1981; M. Singer, *Yedioth Ahronoth*, July 31, 1981; M. Pa'il, *Haar*
ept. 28, 1981; R. Litwin, *Haaretz*, Sept. 28, 1981; M. Oren, *Moznaim*,
mber 1981; D. Meron, *Hadoar*, Summer 1981 (I have left out of the
rticles for which either the author or the date was not specified).
milarly, I have consulted a wide range of newspapers in order to trace
shed responses to the Eli Geva Affair. Most of them are given in the
wing list. Again, I list the name of the newspaper in which the article
otice appeared, its date, and the name of the author whenever it was
fied:
Vilan, *Al Hamishmar*, Aug. 13, 1982; B. Barzilai, *Al Hamishmar*,
13, 1982; M. Pa'il, *Al Hamishmar*, Aug. 13, 1982; *Maariv*, July 28,
(several notices); *Haaretz*, Aug. 13, 1982 (interview with former Chief-
aff Mota Gur); *Haaretz*, Aug. 1, 1982 (interview with Armored Corps
ommander); *Haaretz*, Aug. 2, 1982 (interview with the chief of staff);
Kilaf, *Haaretz*, Aug. 2, 1982; M. Har'el, *Haaretz*, Aug. 2, 1982; D.
i, *Haaretz*, Aug. 2, 1982; N. Dunevitch, *Haaretz*, Aug. 4, 1982; Y.
, *Maariv*, July 26, 1982; Y. Erez, *Maariv*, July 27, 1982; M. Rahat,
riv, July 27, 1982; Lt. A. Zakai, *Davar*, July 30, 1982; *Al Hamishmar*,
27, 1982; *Davar*, July 26, 1982 (several notices); A. Oren, *Davar*, July
982; Chazan, *Davar*, July 29, 1982; *Haaretz*, Aug. 2, 1982 (a series of
interviews with public figures on their response to Eli Geva's act);
ade, *Yedioth Ahronoth*, Aug. 19, 1982; M. Katz, *Maariv*, Aug. 29,
; Levi-Yitzhak Hayerushalmi, *Maariv*, Sept. 1, 1982; *Yedioth Ahron-*
Sept. 3, 1982 (two notices); O. Falacci, *Yedioth Ahronoth*, Sept. 3,
(interview with Ariel Sharon); A. Baruch, *Yedioth Ahronoth*, Aug.
82; Y. Erez, *Maariv*, July 30, 1982 (interview with Amir Drori, the
li chief commander of the northern front); U. Goldstein, *Maariv*, July
982 (interview with former General Y. Gavish); E. Pe'er, *Maariv*,
13, 1982 (talk with the officers of Eli Geva's brigade, also broadcast
in Galei Zahal on this and the next day); Y. Erez, *Maariv*, Sept. 26,
(interview with Eli Geva); U. Avneri, *Haolam Haze*, Sept. 29, 1982;
avron, *Jerusalem Post*, June 10, 1983; Y. London, *Koteret Rashit*, Oct.
983; A. Nevo, *Yedioth Ahronoth*, Sept. 20, 1985.
nalysis of these social dramas is informed by Burke's dramatistic ap-
ch to the study of rhetorical action, especially the dimensions included
urke's pentad. It should be noted that both Turner's conception of
l drama and Hymes's conceptualization of the speech event are in-
ed by Burke's approach.
Gregg (1971), who analyzes other cases of protest rhetoric and suggests
this rhetorical genre centrally involves an "ego function."
second volume, whose title, *Through the Binding Ropes*, is an allusion
he biblical story of Abraham's near-sacrifice of his son, Isaac, was
ished in early 1985. In her preface to this volume, the author repeats
conviction that the history of the "Zionist experiment" has not been
fully documented by disinterested persons and expresses her belief that
il it is recorded in its smallest detail "so that everybody can look at
facts, *dugri*, without evasions, honestly – only then will it be possible
raw the proper conclusions from the Zionist project." That this *dugri*

novel could be described as "350 pages of *kasah* about thre
war" (S. Evron, *Hadashot*, Apr. 5, 1985) seems to me a sad
present-day Israeli usage and sensibilities, echoing the stylisti
cated in Chapter 3.

5 After completing my analysis of the Eli Geva Affair, I had
discuss it with the playwright Daniel Hurvitz, who was about to
a play about the affair and the events surrounding it, and w
enough to share his perceptions of the event with me, as v
helpful information that he had gathered through discussions w
himself and people close to him. The creation of a drama b
materials of a social drama illustrates Turner's (1982) claim
the interrelations between real-life dramas and stage drama
feeding into the other. In acknowledging this helpful conversa
like to note that my perceptions of the event were generally
those of the playwright, even if we did not fully agree in our
was especially reassuring to note his emphasis on Geva's act
tential act," as he called it. The play had a short run. An
London that appeared during that time in the weekly *Koteret*
26, 1983), entitled "Conscience as Parable," goes beyond n
metic aspects of the play and underscores its rhetorical, c
shaping potential: "If anyone had any doubts that Eli Geva
symbol of the last war, Danny Hurvitz has come to remove t

Chapter 6

1 This account is based on two sources of data: (1) a study in p
interactional ethos of *musayra* as it is manifested in the so
some Bedouin Arabs (Yusuf Griefat, M.A. thesis, School o
University of Haifa, in preparation); (2) my own sociolinguist
with non-Bedouin Arabs, village and urban dwellers, which
this ethos is more generally relevant to the understanding of th
of Israeli Arabs. The observations mentioned here are merel
a fuller account that focuses on both continuities and shifts in
communication patterns as we have been able to discern
developed in future work, both extending and refining the pre

2 Clearly, these three types are little more than projections
singular personal pronouns and are used here only as exposi
no theoretical claims are being made.

3 The formal properties of the *dugri* mode call to mind the form
of discourse, which employs a rhetoric of objectivity, as stud
erence to news broadcasting by Roeh (1982), which, like the
science (cf. Lanham 1974), manifests the attitude of "anti-sty
whereas a rhetoric of objectivity seeks to impress the audience
speaker's absence or distance from his message, in *dugri* speech
the speaker's full presence that is dramatized. In this sense,
may be said to involve a rhetoric of subjectivity. I speculate
plicity, literalness, and transparency that have been noted t
both the rhetoric of objectivity and the rhetoric of subjectivity a
with the extreme positions they occupy on what I would call
commitment scale (vis-à-vis the content of his or her utteran
that code elaboration and opaqueness are, at least in part
expression of the speaker's [illegible] stance on this scale. Wh

to tell the truth, either as it relates to external reality or to one's world.

work, especially her hook *Natural Symbols* (1973), provides an discussion of the relationship between social structure – mainly of tightness or looseness – and symbolic and ritual richness in a he relates antiritualism, which I take to be a more encompassing on than an aesthetic of simplicily in the discursive domain, to ess of social ties. Part of the concern of this study is indeed with sm in spoken life as a prevailing attirude in the culture studied. st, however, has been with the ideational rather than the social lthough it might be said to have some of its roots in a particular inction – that between the modality of *communitas* and *societas*. s difference, my account as it stands can neither confirm nor Douglas's hypothesis. I try, however, to show that in an anti society, the forms of antiritual, which are governed by an aesthetic ity, can themselves acquire symbolic meaning and serve as a resource once the revolutionary spirit that triggered the antirit-entation becomes routinized.

s (1978:423) sketchy characterization of the American ideal of ch, which includes the following: "A male speaker should be on the taciturn side and slightly inarticulate. Being a little tongue e taken as a sign of humility or worthy reluctance to put into at everyone knows but cannot or should not say. The speaker if speak in such a situation may rightfully erupt with vulgarity. In te situations he may be given to bombast, exaggeration, over-, and folksy commonness, if not earthiness. Anyone who talks suspect, characterized as 'glib' or as a 'fast talker,' and anyone too much is a 'chatterbox' or 'jabbers like a monkey' and cannot eriously or trusted."

of elaborate, "crooked" Ilongot talk in ritualized conflict reso-nts, one of which is beautifully described in Rosaldo's paper, hat this style is associated with the redressive phase of social hereas *dugri* speech, as we have seen, is associated with the breach phases). Other rituals and dramatic events may be relevant to standing of the speech styles glossed in this chapter, but they are ne enough to be taken up comparatively, except as aspects of the parison.

, of course, other ethnographic studies I do not review here that e direct–indirect scale one way or another – for example, studies 1975), notably Strathen's study of veiled speech in Mt. Hagen; 1972) study of the Burundi; Tannen's (1981a) work on conver-yle; Morris's (1981) study of Puerto Rican discourse; and Scollon on's (1979) discussion of Athabaskan forms of deference

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